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The study explores how Public policy (and/or public order) is utilised as a ground for challenging and 
vacating domestic arbitral awards in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Among the points of particular 
interest being its impact on the finality, conclusiveness and binding nature of arbitration due to the 
existence of different parallel courts in the country.  
Three research questions are presented focused on first, the purpose of the Public policy (and/or 
public order) exception in the UAE; the second, on the scope of this exception and the third (and final) 
on the impact of the exception on the judicial rulings of the different parallel courts that constitute the 
‘UAE Courts. Three findings are made. The first suggests that Public policy (and/or public order) is 
used to provide legitimacy to institutions enacting coercive power. The second finding is that Public 
policy (and/or public order) is generally construed in a very broad manner in the UAE. The third is that 
is that there are differences in terms of interpretation of public policy across the various parallel courts 
in the UAE.  
This study has three possible limitations. First, the case laws analysed were based on cases 
decided within the context of the ‘old’ UAE Arbitration law. However, the UAE promulgated a new 
standalone arbitration law, Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration, which took effect on July 2018. 
For this reason, none of the case laws analysed is based on statutory interpretations of ‘new’ UAE 
Arbitration law. Second, because the UAE does not maintain any formal case reports, nor do the arbitral 
institutions that operate in the country retain comprehensive information on arbitral awards that have 
been challenged, for this reason, the cases analysed in the study were limited to those reported in English 
in a number of legal databases.  Third, noting that the UAE does not adhere to the principles of stare 
decicis, it is very doubtful whether a comprehensive overview of the Public policy (and/or public order) 
imperative in UAE domestic arbitration can actually be drawn. Arguably, these three limitations may 
impede the applicability of the findings to a future understanding of the use of Public policy (and/or 
public order) as a justification for challenging and also vacating domestic arbitral awards in the country. 
18 
 
However, despite these limitations, the analysis of the cases still affords scholars the opportunity to 
engage in detailed and intimate exploration of the broad manifestation of the Public Policy and ‘Order 
Public’ (public order) exception. Thus, in terms of generalisability, the findings from the study are likely 
to apply to a developing arbitration practice across the Gulf region. 
The thesis makes specific contributions to the theory and practice of arbitration law in general 
and its application to Public policy (and/or public order) in particular. In terms of desired improvements 
which will entail restricting arbitration vacatur on the basis of Public policy (and/or public order), the 
study highlights the impact of such exceptions on the operations of parallel legal systems in the UAE by 
directing our attention to the relationship and tensions between two of such parallel courts; UAE federal 
courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) and the ‘free zone’ courts such as the Dubai International Financial Courts 
(DIFC) and the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) who together with the UAE federal courts 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background - Bechtel 
On the 15th May 2005, the Dubai Court of Cassation in Judgement 503 of 20031 nullified an arbitration 
award made to International Bechtel Company Limited (hencewith, ‘Bechtel’) in its dispute with the 
Department of Civil Aviation of the Government of Dubai (hencewith, the ‘DCA’). The dispute had 
arisen in connection to a written contract (with an extensive arbitration clause) for project management 
services entered into between Bechtel and the DCA, an organ of state. The project entailed the planning, 
design and delivery of a major infrastructure development consisting of a theme park and adjourning 
residential and commercial units in Dubai. In 1999, a dispute arose between the two parties following 
which Bechtel submitted claims to the DCA for non-payment (the DCA made subsequent counterclaims 
for non-performance and payment restitution).  
Arbitration proceedings commenced on July 26, 2000 before a single arbitrator.  On February 
20, 2002, following written findings to the two parties, the arbitrator made an award of approximately 
US$25.4 million to Bechtel. The award encompassed not only damages, but also costs and legal fees. In 
the process, he dismissed in its entirety, the counterclaim (valued at approximately US$42 million) made 
by the DCA. As the UAE is a 'double exequatur2 jurisdiction3, on April 7, 2002, Bechtel made 
submissions to the Dubai Court of First Instance seeking an enforcement order against the DCA who 
responded with a counter suit (on April 22, 2002) seeking to nullify the arbitrators award.  On November 
16, 2002, the Dubai Court of First Instance4 rejected Bechtel’s prayers for an enforcement order against 
the DCA and instead, nullified the arbitrators’ award on the ground of public policy stating that the 
arbitrator had failed to properly swear in witnesses during the arbitral proceedings in a manner prescribed 
                                                 
1 International Bechtel Co. Ltd v Department of Civil Aviation of the Government of Dubai, case No. 503/2003 [Court of 
Cassation] 
2 The notion of double exequatur is simply being used to emphasise that enforcement of arbitration awards in the UAE still 
need an affirming court judgement. This in effect implies that arbitration still remains a two-way process within the UAE. 
3 Luttrell, S. 2009a. The Changing Lex Arbitri of the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 23 (2), 139-166 




under Article 41(2) of the Civil Procedure Code as applicable to UAE court procedures. Doing so the 
court opined, voided the arbitration proceedings and therefore, nullified the award. The court opined that 
stipulated court procedures were clear as relates to the proper manner and form of swearing in witnesses 
during civil proceedings. In its ruling, the court further rejected arguments put forward by Bechtel that 
the DCA had not objected to witnesses giving evidence during the arbitration proceedings without being 
under oath and had in fact waived any objections to this during the arbitration proceedings. On December 
14, 2002, Bechtel filed an appeal with the Dubai Court of Appeal seeking to (i) overturn the decision of 
the Dubai Court of First Instance nullifying the award and (ii) affirm/ratify the original arbitration award. 
The Dubai Court of Appeal rejected Bechtel’s appeal on June 8, 2003, following which Bechtel made a 
final appeal to the Dubai Court of Cassation. On 15 May 2005, in a decision that attracted considerable 
scholarly attention5, the Dubai Court of Cassation ratified the earlier decision of both the Dubai Court 
of First Instance and the Dubai Court of Appeal, nullifying the arbitrators award in its entirety. The court 
found that under the laws of Dubai, rendering of oaths were as a matter of public policy, not waivable. 
Furthermore, the courts stated that the arbitrator had only issued warnings to the witnesses on their need 
to be truthful when rendering testimony and that this did not amount to oaths6. 
Following the decision of the Dubai Court of Cassation, Bechtel then took the unusual step of 
seeking to enforce the arbitrators’ award before the Courts of France and the United States Courts7. 
While the specific jurisdictional rationale is beyond the interest of this paper, Bechtel’s enforcement 
proceedings were based on the argument that the public policy exception relied upon by the Dubai Court 
of Cassation was “hypertechnical”8. 
                                                 
5 Polkinghorne, M. 2008. Enforcement of annulled awards in France: the sting in the tail. International Construction Law 
Review, 25(1), 48-56; Blanke, G and Corm-Bakhos, S. 2017. The Enforcement of International Commercial and Investment 
Arbitration Awards in the MENA Region, Arbitration, 1 (2017), 71-81.. 
6 Robertson, J (District Judge). 2005. Arbitration Between International Bechtel Co. and Department of Civil Aviation of 
Government of Dubai, 360 F.Supp.2d 136 (2005), United States District Court, District of Columbia. 
7 The rational being to be able to seek financial restitution in countries where the DCA were known to have financial assets. 
8 Robertson, J (District Judge). 2004. Arbitration Between International Bechtel Co. and Department of Civil Aviation of 
Government of Dubai, 300 F. Supp. 2d 112 (2004), United States District Court, District of Columbia. 
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What made the 2005 Bechtel judgement controversial from a public policy perspective? The 
controversy is that it will appear that two parallel courts in the same country were able to draw upon 
public policy to frame two contradictory legal perspectives on what appears to be similar disputes. Thus, 
while the Dubai Court of Cassation had relied on public policy to nullify an arbitration award on the 
basis that that there were procedural flaws in the manner within which witnesses were sworn in during 
the arbitral proceedings, an earlier decision by the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation found differently. More 
specifically, in Judgment 433/17 of 1997, the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation ruled that it was not against 
public policy in the UAE for an arbitrator to depart from strict procedural rules regarding witnesses, 
production of evidence, and documentation. The court ruled that arbitrators were empowered to establish 
their own processes and procedures pertaining to, for example, the production of evidence. Process and 
procedures could also extend to an arbitration proceeding deciding on a point of law which is either not 
relevant to the dispute or which has not been cited by parties to the dispute. 
Concerns about the scope of Public policy (and/or public order) considerations and its impact on 
the finality, conclusiveness and binding nature of arbitration expressed by a number of commentators9 
arguably provides us with an appropriate springboard justifying the need to seriously examine the role 
of Public policy (and/or public order) as a ground for challenging and vacating domestic arbitration 
awards in the UAE10. Organisations and individuals who seek to challenge arbitral awards do so due to 
a number of reasons. The Public policy (and/or public order) exception represents one of the special 
                                                 
9 See for example Nambiar, S. (2009), Common law needed as UAE sees spurt in arbitration, Emirates Business 24/7, 
https://www.emirates247.com/eb247/companies-markets/construction/common-law-needed-as-uae-sees-spurt-in-
arbitration-2009-09-09-1.24400, accessed 09/11/18; See for example Blanke, G. (2012), United Arab Emirates: Public 
Policy In The UAE And The Future Of Arbitration: Has The Unruly Horse Turned Into A Camel?, 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/201392/Arbitration+Dispute+Resolution/Public+Policy+In+The+UAE+And+The+Future+Of+
Arbitration+Has+The+Unruly+Horse+Turned+Into+A+Camel, accessed 09/11/18; See for example Blanke, G. and Corm-
Bakhos, S. (2012), United Arab Emirates: Enforcement Of New York Convention Awards: Are The UAE Courts Coming Of 
Age? 
10 For example, in a reported interview, Philip Punwar (of Baker Botts LLP) had suggested that there was a fear following 
the Dubai Court of Cassation in Judgement 503 of 2003 (International Bechtel Co. Ltd v Department of Civil Aviation of 
the Government of Dubai) that “…when an arbitration award is issued, it will be struck down by the courts – for one 
reason or the other.” 
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conditions upon which an arbitral award may be challenged and vacated (nullified and set aside) by the 
courts.  
More specifically, three research questions will be presented and addressed using a combination 
of different analytical approaches (mixed methods); in effect, triangulation. Doing so ensures that 
limitations associated with specific analytical approaches are limited. It is intended that the first two 
questions will be addressed through the literature (and case analysis). In terms of the third research 
question, a content analysis of written judicial opinions of both the UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the 
UAE’) and the ‘free zone’ courts (which together with the UAE federal courts constitute the ‘UAE 
Courts’) will be undertaken. As will be later shown, content analysis is deemed particularly useful in 
research focused not only on topics of essential interest and value11, but also research focused on gaining 
an appreciation of the important legal reasoning of judges in matters with significant social interest12. 
Public policy (and/or public order) it will be argued, is a matter of significant social/public interest13.  
At this point, it is worth alerting the reader to what may appear as two interchangeable concepts; 
‘Public policy’ and ‘Public order’. As will be shown later in the literature review, UAE law14 does not 
make reference to ‘Public policy’. Instead, it cites ‘Public order’, a concept which from the literature 
will be shown to be similar to the notion of ‘Public policy’, but is more widely applied in civil law 
jurisdictions15. Noting that although fundamentally different concepts, for expediency, a number of 
                                                 
11 Green J, and Thorogood, N. (2004), Analysing qualitative data. In: Silverman D (ed.). Qualitative Methods for Health 
Research (1st edn). London: Sage Publications, 173–200; Hall, M. and Wright, R. 2008. Systematic content analysis of 
judicial opinions. California Law Review, 96 (1), 63-122. 
12 Heise, M. 2002. Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New 
Empiricism. University of Illinois Law Review,2002 (4), 819-850. 
13 Howlett, M., Ramesh, M. and Perl, A. 2009. Studying public policy: Policy cycles and policy subsystems, Vol. 3, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
14 Article 3 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992 
15 Bewes, W. 1921. Public Order (Ordre Public). Law Quarterly Review, 37 (3), 315-322; Bernier, J. 1929. Droit Public and 
Ordre Public. Transactions of the Grotius Society, 15, 83-92; Husserl, G. 1938. Public policy and public order. Virginia 
Law Review, 25 (1), 37-67; Forde, M. 1980. The Ordre Public Exception and Adjudicative Jurisdiction Conventions. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 29 (2 & 3), 259-273; Murphy, K. 1981. The Traditional View of Public 




scholars equate ‘Public policy’ to ‘Public order’16.  For brevity, we adopt the same; thus reference to 
‘Public policy (and/or public order)’ in the study.  
The study is driven by a number of reasons including the ubiquitous nature of Public policy 
(and/or public order). Yelpaala17 suggests that academic and judicial interest in public policy exceptions 
in recent times has meant that the topic has generated more interest than other legal concepts have. The 
ubiquity of the concept has also meant that numerous scholars have examined policy grounds for 
challenging and vacating arbitration awards18.  
                                                 
16 Angell, N. and Feulner, G. 1988. Arbitration of Disputes in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 3 (1), 19-32; 
Dimitrakopoulos, A. 2001. Arbitration Practice in the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 16(4), 398-403; Kantaria, S. 2012. The 
Enforcement of Domestic and Foreign Arbitral Awards in the UAE under the Civil Procedure Code and Proposed 
Arbitration Law. International Arbitration Law Review, 15 (2), 61 – 66; Almutawa, A. and Maniruzzaman, A. 2014. The 
UAE’s Pilgrimage to International Arbitration Stardom. Journal of World Investment & Trade, 15(1-2), 193-244; Kanakri, 
C., and Massey, A. 2016. Comparison of UAE and DIFC-seated arbitrations. Global Arbitration News. Available from: 
https://globalarbitrationnews.com/comparison-uae-difc-seated-arbitrations-20161012/, accessed 07/02/18.. 
17 Yelpaala, K. 1989. Restraining the Unruly Horse: The Use of Public Policy in Arbitration, Interstate and International 
Conflict of Laws in California. Journal of Transnational Law, 2 (2), 379-494. 
18 Antoine, T. 1977. Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny. 
Michigan Law Review, 75 (5 & 6), 1137-1161; Sterk, S. 1980. Enforceability of agreements to arbitrate: an examination of 
the public policy defense. Cardozo Law Review, 2 (3), 481-544; Edwards, H. 1988. Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration 
Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 64 (1), 3-
36.; Meltzer, B. 1988. After the Labor Arbitration Award: The Public Policy Defense. Industrial Relations Law 
Journal,10,241-257; Parker, J. 1988. Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Misco and Its Impact on the Public 
Policy Exception. The Labor Lawyer, 4(4), 683-714; Stempel, J. 1990. Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration 
Agreements. St. Mary's Law Journal, 22 (2), 259-356; Randall, B. 1992. The History, Application, and Policy of the 
Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards. Brigham Young University Law Review,1992 (3), 759-784; 
Galbraith, B. 1993. Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the 
Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard. Indiana Law Review, 27 (1), 241-266; Hayford, S. 1995. Law in Disarray: Judicial 
Standards for Vacatur of Commerical Arbitration Awards, Georgia Law Review, 30 (3), 731-842; Hayford, S. 1997. New 
Paradigm for Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards 
for Vacatur, George Washington Law Review, 66 (3), 443-507; Glanstein, D. 2000. A Hail Mary Pass: Public Policy 
Review of Arbitration Awards, Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 16 (2), 297-334; Hodges, A. 2000. Judicial 
Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution, 16 (1), 91-164; Arfazadeh, H. 2002. In the shadow of the unruly horse: international arbitration and the public 
policy exception. American Review of International Arbitration, 13, 43-197; Ogden, J. 2002. Do Public Policy Grounds 
Still Exist for Vacating Arbitration Awards, Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, 20 (1), 87-116.; Sullivan, K. 2002. 
The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, Saint 
Louis University Law Journal, 46 (2), 509-560; Helm, K. 2006.  The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop?. Dispute Resolution Journal, 61(4), 16 – 26; Gibson, C. 2008. Arbitration, civilization 
and public policy: Seeking counterpoise between arbitral autonomy and the public policy defense in view of foreign 
mandatory public law. Penn State Law Review, 113 (4), 1227-1268.; Rendeiro, A. 2010. Indian Arbitration and Public 
Policy. Texas Law Review,89 (3), 699-728.; Brand, F. 2014. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Stellenbosch Law 
Review, 25 (2), 247-264. 
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According to Postema19, Beck20 and Feteris21, the majority if not all legal judgements are drawn 
from interpretations of legislative provisions, legal principles and/or supporting case law (precedent). 
Thus, judicial decisions are arrived at after due consideration (and balancing) of a number of factors. 
These include the ability of the courts to deliver justice (between specific disputants), but also after 
consideration of how the specific judicial decision may impact on the public at large22. In such 
circumstances, Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) considerations arise following 
recognition that a number of public concerns and priorities may need to be protected by law23. This 
means that the need to take into consideration the interests of the public becomes, according to the 
American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes24, 
 
“…the secret root from which the law draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course, 
considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned. Every important principle 
which is developed by litigation is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less definitely 
understood views of public policy…” (pp. 35-36). 
 
The study focuses on domestic arbitration awards in the UAE. Although the recently25 promulgated UAE 
Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration is directed towards both international and local arbitral 
proceedings, the focus herein is on the challenge and vacation of domestic arbitration awards under the 
                                                 
19 Postema, G. 2011. A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. Volume 11: Legal Philosophy in the 
Twentieth Century: The Common Law World (Vol. 11). Springer Science & Business Media. 
20 Beck, G. 2013. The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU. Bloomsbury Publishing. 
21 Feteris, E. 2017. Fundamentals of legal argumentation: A survey of theories on the justification of judicial decisions, 
Vol. 1, Springer. 
22 Richards, M. and Kritzer, H. 2002. Jurisprudential regimes in Supreme Court decision making. American Political 
Science Review, 96(2), 305-320; Slepcevic, R. 2009. The judicial enforcement of EU law through national courts: 
possibilities and limits. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(3), 378-394; Wasserfallen, F. 2010. The judiciary as 
legislator? How the European Court of Justice shapes policy-making in the European Union. Journal of European Public 
Policy, 17(8),1128-1146; Reeves, A. 2016. Reasons of Law: Dworkin on the Legal Decision. Jurisprudence, 7(2), 210-230. 
23 Box, R. 2007. Redescribing the public interest. Social Science Journal, 44(4), 585-598; Bozeman, B. 2007. Public values 
and public interest: Counterbalancing economic individualism. Georgetown University Press. 
24 Holmes, O. 1881. The Common Law. Pub. Little Brown. 
25 This law was promulgated in May 2018. 
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‘old’ UAE Arbitration law as  articulated under Federal Law, Articles 203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 
and Articles 239 to 243 of Federal Law (11) of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). This governs the 
procedure for civil cases that come before UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’). The UAE 
promulgated a new standalone arbitration law – Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration – as recently 
as 3 May 2018, which then appeared in the official gazette in June 2018 before taking effect in July 
2018. At the time of writing, there was no concluded case law on arbitration vacation in the UAE based 
on the new UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration. The interest in domestic arbitral awards is 
driven by the fact that arbitration awards which are made outside the UAE can be enforced or challenged 
in the UAE under any one of three avenues: 
 
(i) the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award of 1958  
(ii) the GCC26 (The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf), or  
(iii) other bilateral recognition and enforcement of judgements (basically, treaties) in civil matters 
that the UAE holds with other countries. These treaties includes the Riyadh Arab Convention 
on Judicial Cooperation27 and the Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters for 
the Service of Summons, Judicial Documents, Judicial Commissions, and the execution of 
Judgments and Arbitral Awards28, which the country holds with India. 
 
The study is further driven by not only calls for empirical research on arbitration awards and arbitral 
decision-making29, but also a recognition that although considerable interest (supporting literature and 
                                                 
26 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, also know as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an economic 
and political of Arab states in Persian Gulf consisting of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates. 
27 ratified under UAE Federal Decree No. 53 of 1999. 
28 ratified under UAE Federal Decree No. 33 of 2000. 
29 See Coyle, J. and Drahozal, C. 2018. An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Clauses in International Supply 
Contracts, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206695, In Press; Drahozal, C. 2003. Of 
Rabbits and Rhinoceri: A Survey of Empirical Research on International Commercial Arbitration. Journal of International 
Arbitration, 20 (1), 23-34; Drahozal, C. 2006a. Arbitration by the Numbers: The State of Empirical Research on 
International Commercial Arbitration. Arbitration International, 22(2), 291-308; Drahozal, C. 2016a. The Issue Preclusive 
Effect of Arbitration Awards. Proceedings of the NYU 69th Annual Conference on Labor: Mediation and Arbitration of 
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case law) exists in understanding why arbitration awards may be challenged and vacated on the basis of 
Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order), empirical and/or case-based-content analytical studies 
explicitly contextualised within the UAE remain sparse (see, for example, Almutawa and 
Maniruzzaman30). This calls for exploration of: 
 
(i) the purpose of this Public policy (and/or public order) exception,  
(ii) the scope of the exception as applied by the UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) and the 
‘free zone’ courts (which together with the UAE federal courts constitute the ‘UAE Courts’), 
and  
(iii) possible differences in terms of judicial ruling on the finality, conclusive and binding nature of 
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism emanating from the ‘UAE Courts’, due to the 
broad manner to which Public policy (and/or public order) is construed within the country’s 
jurisprudence. 
 
So what is this context?  
 
1.2 Articulation 
As a recognised form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), arbitration is regarded as an attractive 
dispute resolution mechanism. One major attraction of arbitration is that its proceedings are construed 
as likely to ensure that private civil controversies and disputes are resolved to the point that they become 
                                                 
Employment and Consumer Disputes, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888570, accessed 29/09/18; Drahozal, C. 2016b. The State 
of Empirical Research on International Commercial Arbitration: 10 Years Later. The Evolution and Future of International 
Arbitration: The Next 30 Years, Kluwer Law International, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2716377, accessed 29/09/18; 
Drahozal, C. 2016c. Empirical Findings on International Arbitration: An Overview. Oxford Handbook on International 
Arbitration. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888552, accessed 29/09/18. 
30 Almutawa, A. and Maniruzzaman, A. 2014. The UAE’s Pilgrimage to International Arbitration Stardom. Journal of 
World Investment & Trade, 15(1-2), 193-244. 
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final, conclusive and binding. This is a position reiterated in both the literature31 and international case 
law. Two legal principles underpin/ underlie this idea – Res Judicata and estoppel.  
Numerous international cases clearly demonstrate the international judicial fraternity’s 
willingness to reiterate the finality, conclusive and binding nature of arbitration as a dispute resolution 
mechanism. Such cases have included seminal cases heard at the highest courts of countries such as the 
United Kingdom (in Holmes v Pumpherston32, Mardorf Peach v Attica Sea, The Laconia33 and Italmare 
Shipping v Ocean Tanker34), the United States (American Almond Products Co. v Consolidated Pecan 
Sales Co35, United Steelworkers v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp36 and National Union Fire v Nationwide 
Insurance37), Clark v African Guarantee38, Hyperchemicals v Maybaker Agrichem39, Bester v Easigas40  
and Naidoo v EP Property Projects41 in South Africa, and Guru Nanak Foundation v Rattan Singh42 
decided by the Supreme Court of India. Other similar cases have been decided in countries such as 
Canada (National Ballet of Canada v Glasco 186 DLR (4th) 34743, Bramalea v T. Eaton 44 and Superior 
                                                 
31 Ashe, B. 1983. Arbitration finality-myth or reality. Arbitration Journal, 38(4), 42-51; Thieffry, J. 1985. Finality of 
Awards in International Arbitration, Journal of International Arbitration, 2 (3), 27-48; Delaume, G. 1989. The finality of 
arbitration involving states: recent developments. Arbitration International, 5(1), 21-34; Jaffe, P. 1989. The Judicial Trend 
toward Finality of Commercial Arbitral Awards in England. Texas International Law Journal, 24 (1), 67-86; Cowling, M. 
1994. Finality in Arbitration, South African Law Journal, 111 (2), 306-315; Schmitz, A. 2002. Ending a Mud Bowl: 
Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional Analysis. Georgia Law Review, 37 (1), 123-204; Zaiwalla, S. 2003. 
Challenging Arbitral Awards: Finality is Good but Justice is Better. Journal of International Arbitration, 20(2), 199-204; 
Mourre, A., di Brozolo, L. and Radicati, G. 2006. Towards Finality of Arbitration Awards: Two Steps Forward and One 
Step Back. Journal of International Arbitration, 23 (2), 171-188; Milone, N. 2011. Arbitration: the Italian perspective and 
the finality of the award. Oñati Socio-Legal Series, 1 (6), 1-12; Kirby, J. 2012. Finality and Arbitral Rules: Saying an 
Award is Final Does Not Necessarily Make it so. Journal of International Arbitration, 29 (1), 119-128; Roodt, C. 2012. 
Reflections on Finality in Arbitration. De Jure, 45 (3), 485-510; Platt, R. 2013. Appeal of Appeal Mechanisms in 
International Arbitration: Fairness over Finality, Journal of International Arbitration, 30 (5), 531-560; Conley, A. 2015. 
Promoting Finality: Using Offensive, Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel in Employment Arbitration. UC Irvine Law Review, 5 
(3), 651-682 
32 Holmes Oil Co Ltd v Pumpherston Oil Co Ltd (1891) 18 R 52 (HL), 28 SLR 940. 
33 Mardorf Peach & Co Ltd v Attica Sea Carriers Corp of Liberia, The Laconia [1977] A.C. 850 at 878. 
34 Italmare Shipping v Ocean Tanker [1982] 1 WLR 158 at 162(f). 
35 American Almond Products Co. v Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 [2d Cir. 1944]. 
36 United Steelworkers v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960). 
37 National Union Fire Insurance Company v Nationwide Insurance Company., 82 Cal. Rptr. [1999]. 
38 Clark v African Guarantee and Indemnity Co Ltd 1915 CPD 68. 
39 Hyperchemicals International (Pty) Ltd & another v Maybaker Agrichem (Pty) Ltd & another 1992 (1) SA 89 (W). 
40 Bester v Easigas (Pty) Ltd & another 1993 (1) SA 30 (C). 
41 Naidoo v EP Property Projects (Pty) Ltd (444/2012) [2014] ZASCA 97 (31 July 2014). 
42 Guru Nanak Foundation v Rattan Singh, [1981] 4 SCC 634. 
43 National Ballet of Canada v Glasco 186 DLR (4th) 347 at 362. 
44 Bramalea v T. Eaton Co [1994]. 
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Propane v Valley Propane45), New Zealand (Gold & Resource v Doug Hood 46), and Australia (White 
Constructions v Mutton47).  
Reviewing the aforementioned cases, it becomes apparent that the various appellate courts have 
focused on both economic and policy perspectives of finality, conclusive and binding nature of 
arbitration as a critical rule-of-law principle. For example, from an economic perspective, by ensuring 
certainty in commercial and business transactions, it is assumed that businesses will be more secure in 
their legal rights and obligations. This is a point discussed extensively by Oxley and Yeung48 and Veasey 
and Brown 49. If disputes are not settled and companies engage in never-ending litigation, it is also 
possible that contractual obligations will not be adhered to. This has the potential of reducing trust and 
increasing transaction costs as, in an effort to protect their investments, companies will be obliged to 
expend considerable resources monitoring business partners. The policy perspective of finality, 
conclusive and binding nature of arbitration is, however, more contentious, for while policy 
considerations play a major role in how private law disputes are adjudicated, scholars are equally divided 
on whether policy considerations should play any role in private law dispute adjudication. According to 
Plunkett50 this divide is between those who emphasise a rights-based perspective of justice and therefore 
posit that policy considerations should play no role in private law dispute adjudication51 and those who 
do not share such a rights-based perspective of justice who posit that policy considerations should play 
a role in private law dispute adjudication, particularly when existing legal rules and standards are unable 
                                                 
45 Superior Propane Inc v Valley Propane (Ottawa) Ltd [1993]. 
46 Gold & Resource Developments Limited v Doug Hood Limited [2000] NZCA 131. 
47 White Constructions (NT) Pty Ltd v Mutton (1988) 91 FLR 419 (Australia). 
48 Oxley, J. and Yeung, B. 2001. E-commerce readiness: Institutional environment and international competitiveness. 
Journal of International Business Studies, 32(4), 705-723. 
49 Veasey, E. and Brown, G. 2014. Overview of the General Counsel's Decision Making on Dispute-Resolution Strategies 
in Complex Business Transactions. Business Law Journal, 70 (2), 407-436. 
50 Plunkett, J. 2016. Principle and Policy in Private Law Reasoning. Cambridge Law Journal, 75(2), 366-397. 
51 Weinrib, E. 2005. The Disintegration of Duty. In M.S. Madden (ed.), Exploring Tort Law, Cambridge; Weinrib, E. 2012. 




to provide clear guidance on how to resolve novel disputes52. A rights-based perspective of justice in 
this context refers to obligations and liabilities individuals owe to each other which the state can enforce 
through its coercive power53. 
 
1.3 Study interest 
While the courts have sought to reiterate the finality, conclusive and binding nature of arbitration as a 
dispute resolution mechanism, it is noted, as restated in the seminal case of Ras Behari Lal v King 
Emperor54 heard by the Privy Council, that 
 
“…finality is a good thing, but justice is better”. 
 
This author postulates that this idea of justice from the literature55 implies the establishment of benefits 
and burdens within social interactions, which are equitable, evenly balanced and fair. Thus, as was 
reiterated in Czarnikow v Roth Schmidt56, it will be inappropriate for the judiciary not to – at the very 
least – enquire into the procedure of arbitral proceedings and the nature of the approach that such 
proceedings take in their determination of awards. 
 Essentially, therefore, this study is particularly interested in conditions that may lead to the ‘UAE 
Courts’ not only enquiring into arbitration proceedings and awards, but also actually vacating an award 
conferred through arbitration proceedings on the ground of Public policy (and/or public order). In doing 
so, the author’s objectives are to understand:  
                                                 
52 Stapleton, J. 1998. Duty of Care Factors: A Selection from the Judicial Menus. In P. Cane and J. Stapleton (eds.), The 
Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming, Oxford; Stapleton, J. 2003. The Golden Thread at the Heart of 
Tort Law: Protection of the Vulnerable, Australian Bar Review,24 (2), 135-148.. 
53 Nolan, D and Robertson, A. 2011. Rights and Private Law. Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds), Rights and Private 
Law (Hart 2011) 1-33. 
54 Ras Behari Lal v King Emperor (1933) 50 TLR 1, (1933) 60 IA 354. 
55 Rawls, J. 1957. Justice as Fairness. Journal of Philosophy, 54 (22), 653-662; Bentley, D. 1973. John Rawls: A Theory of 
Justice. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 121(5), 1070-1078;  Gans, E. 2005. John Rawls's Originary Theory of 
Justice. Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture, 12(1),149-157; Follesdal, A. 2015. John Rawls’ Theory of 
Justice as Fairness. Contemporary Philosophy, 12, 311-328. 




(i) the purpose of this Public policy (and/or public order) exception, 
(ii) the scope of the exception as applied by the ‘UAE Courts’, and  
(iii) the possible differences in terms of judicial rulings on the finality, conclusive and binding nature 
of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism emanating from the different ‘UAE Courts’ 
taking into account the broad manner to which Public policy (and/or public order) is construed 
in the country’s jurisprudence. 
 
In terms of these possible differences identified in the third objective of this study, two factors are 
considered.  The first is to what extent differences exists between the various ‘UAE Courts’. As will be 
demonstrated later in the thesis, although arbitration is not in itself a young quasi-legal dispute resolution 
mechanism – at least not according to recorded arbitration cases such as Vynior's Case57, Wellington v 
Macintosh58 and Kill v Hollister59, there is ambiguity in terms of not only what is meant by ‘policy’60, 
but also what is meant by ‘public policy’61.  This ambiguity also extends – as noted by Husserl62, Scott63 
and Gualtieri64 – to the notion of ‘public order’. Of particular interest in terms of the UAE is that as 
                                                 
57 Vynior's Case 8 Co. 8oa, 8ib (1609). 
58 Wellington v Macintosh 2 Atk. 569 (Ch. 1743). 
59 Kill v Hollister.3 I Wilson 129 (K. B. 1746). 
60 Ball, S. 1993. What is policy? Texts, trajectories and toolboxes. Australian Journal of Education Studies, 13(2), 10-17; 
Ball, S. 2015. What is policy? 21 years later: Reflections on the possibilities of policy research. Discourse: Studies in the 
Cultural Politics of Education, 36(3), 306-313; Wedel, J., Shore, C., Feldman, G. and Lathrop, S. 2005. Toward an 
anthropology of public policy, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 600(1), 30-51; Fimyar, O. 
2014. What is policy? In search of frameworks and definitions for non-Western contexts. Educate, 14(3), 6-21; Plunkett, J. 
2016. Principle and Policy in Private Law Reasoning. Cambridge Law Journal, 75(2), 366-397. 
61 Winfield, P. 1928. Public Policy in the English Common Law. Harvard Law Review, 42(1), 76-102; Husserl, G. 1938. 
Public policy and public order. Virginia Law Review, 25 (1), 37-67; Paulsen, M. and Sovern, M. 1956. Public Policy” in the 
Conflict of Laws. Columbia Law Review, 56(7), 969-1016; Yelpaala, K. 1989. Restraining the Unruly Horse: The Use of 
Public Policy in Arbitration, Interstate and International Conflict of Laws in California. Journal of Transnational Law, 2 
(2), 379-494; Gibson, C. 2008. Arbitration, civilization and public policy: Seeking counterpoise between arbitral autonomy 
and the public policy defense in view of foreign mandatory public law. Penn State Law Review, 113 (4), 1227-1268; 
Hollander, P. 2016. Report on the Public Policy Exception in the New York Convention. Dispute Resolution International, 
10, 35-50 
62 Husserl, G. 1938. Public policy and public order. Virginia Law Review, 25 (1), 37-67. 
63 Scott, W. 1940. Private Agreements and Public Order. Canadian Bar Review, 18 (3), 159-171. 
64 Gualtieri, R. 1952. The Legal Concept of Public Order. Revue Juridique Themis, 2 (3), 155-162. 
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Almutawa and Maniruzzaman65 opine, the UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) have construed 
Public policy (and/or public order) to encompass almost any matter. What this arguably means is that 
there is a strong need for some form of consensus to be reached about the essence of Public policy 
(and/or public order) in arbitration. In fact, we can go further to claim that there is certainly an interest 
in reflecting upon the very nature of Public policy (and/or public order). Arguably, such an 
understanding will facilitate more insight into its scope and meaning. Second, the impact of such 
differences in terms of judicial rulings is considered, particularly within the scope of: 
 
(i) the provisions of UAE Federal Law No. 18 of 1993 on Commercial Transactions Law which 
states that: “Traders and commercial activities shall be governed by the agreement entered into 
by the two contracting parties unless such agreement contradicts an imperative commercial 
text” (Article 2 (1))…and furthermore states that: “Specific agreements or commercial customs 
rules may not be applied if they contradict the Public Order or Morals” [Article 2 (3)] and  
(ii) the provisions of the recently promulgated UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration which 
states that: “Any Arbitration conducted in the State, unless the Parties have agreed that another 
law should govern the Arbitration, provided there is no conflict with the public order and 
morality of the State”66(Article 2 (1)). 
 
According to Turrini et al.67, the recently promulgated law on arbitration is not applicable in certain 
parallel jurisdictions within the UAE, such as the DIFC (Dubai International Financial Courts)68 and the 
                                                 
65 Almutawa, A. and Maniruzzaman, A. 2014. The UAE’s Pilgrimage to International Arbitration Stardom. Journal of 
World Investment & Trade, 15(1-2), 193-244. 
66 As the law is written in Arabic, an English version of the law is based on an unofficial translation obained under license 
by the author from two UAE law firms; Baker & McKenzie Habib Al Mulla  and Al Tamimi & Co. 
67 Turrini, M., Robottom, L., Bailey, J., Cuffe, C., Roshan, A. and Raza, H. 2018. The New UAE Arbitration Law: an 
incremental shift towards international norms. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/new-uae-arbitration-law-
incremental-shift-towards-international-norms, accessed 26/05/18 
68 Carballo, A., 2007. The Law of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Common Law Oasis or Mirage within the 
UAE?. Arab Law Quarterly, 21(1), 91-104; Luttrell, S. 2008a. Choosing Dubai: A comparative Study of Arbitration Under 
the UAE Federal Code of Civil Procedure and the Arbitration Law of the DIFC’, Business International, 9 (3), 254-292; 
Luttrell, S. 2008b. The Arbitration Law of the Dubai International Finance Centre. Journal of International Commercial 
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DIAC (Dubai International Arbitration Centre)69 pursuant of UAE Federal Law No. 8 of 2004 regarding 
the Financial Free Zones. This law allows these ‘free zones’70 which in addition to the DIFC and the 
DIAC, includes the Abu Dhabi Commercial, Conciliation and Arbitration Centre (ADCCAC) and the 
Islamic Centre for Reconciliation and Arbitration (IICRA) to operate civil laws independent of UAE 
Federal laws. Companies based in Free Zones are deemed (under UAE law – specifically UAE Federal 
Law No. 8 of 2004 Regarding The Financial Free Zones), as if they are operating offshore and are 
therefore not permitted to undertake any form of business within the ‘mainland’ of the UAE. If they wish 
to do so, then they must comply with all regulations governing the establishment of foreign businesses 
in the country. That being the case, the author directs his attention to the relationship between the UAE 
federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) on one side and the ‘Free Zone’ courts such as the DIFC and the 
DIAC. More specifically, in Isai v Isabelle71, the Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial 
Centre: Court of First Instance opined [at 20] that: 
  
“Not only are the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts and the jurisdiction of the Dubai Courts in 
relation to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award mutually exclusive, they are 
also complementary. In enacting Article 7 of the Dubai Judicial Authority Law, the legislators 
contemplated that both the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts would have power (in appropriate 
cases) to ratify (or recognise) arbitral awards. There is no conflict between the jurisdiction of 
                                                 
Law and Technology, 3 (3), 170-177; Luttrell, S. 2008c. Commentary on the 2008 Arbitration Law of the Dubai 
International Finance Centre. International Journal of Private Law, 2(1), 31-45;  Kanakri, C., and Massey, A. 2016. 
Comparison of UAE and DIFC-seated arbitrations, Global Arbitration News. Available from: 
https://globalarbitrationnews.com/comparison-uae-difc-seated-arbitrations-20161012/, accessed 07/02/18. 
69 Bunni, N. 2008. The Dubai International Arbitration Centre, Journal of World Investment & Trade, 9, 83-86. 
70 These free zones are in effect ‘free trade zones’ and they exist in the different emirates within the UAE. These includes the 
Khalifa Industrial Zone Abu Dhabi and Masdar City Free Zone and Science and Technology Park  (situated within the emirate 
of Abu Dhabi), Ajman Free Zone (situated within the emirate of Ajman), Dubai International Academic City, Dubai Internet 
City and Dubai Media City (all situated within the emirate of Dubai), Fujairah Free Trade Zone (situated within the emirate 
of Fujairah), Ras al Khaimah Free Zone (situated within the emirate of Ras al Khaimah), Sharjah Airport Free Zone and 
Sharjah Hamriya Free Zone (all situated within the emirate of Sharjah), and the Umm al Quwain Free Zone (situated within 
the emirate of Umm al Quwain). 
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the two courts, as is reflected in the complementary relationship highlighted by Article 7 of the 
Judicial Authority Law”. 
 
Thus, arguably, within limits of reason, both represent parallel courts on matters relating to arbitration 
in the UAE. However, as noted by the Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: 
Court of First Instance in (1) Fiske (2) Firmin v Firuzeh 72, notions of complementarity does not extend 
to the functions of the Union Supreme Court as the DIFC courts are extremely mindful of its exclusive 
jurisdiction on constitutional73 matters as stipulated in Article 99 of the UAE Federal Constitution.  
 
1.4 Tensions in the literature 
As demonstrated in the literature74 the grounds (reason or justification) for challenging and vacating 
arbitration awards continues to be a matter of interest to scholars. In the context of the UAE, this interest 
                                                 
72 (1) Fiske (2) Firmin v Firuzeh [2014] [Dubai International Financial Centre, Court of First Instance, 006/2017] ARB 001 
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Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards. Brigham Young University Law Review,1992 (3), 759-784; 
Galbraith, B. 1993. Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the 
Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard. Indiana Law Review, 27 (1), 241-266; Hayford, S. 1995. Law in Disarray: Judicial 
Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, Georgia Law Review, 30 (3), 731-842; Bingham, L. 1997. On 
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Law Review, 29 (2), 223-260; Poser, N. 1998. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of the Law. 
Brooklyn Law Review, 64 (2), 471-518; Younger, S. 1999. Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards. Albany Law Review, 63 (1), 241-262; Ogden, J. 2002. Do Public Policy Grounds Still Exist for 
Vacating Arbitration Awards. Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, 20 (1), 87-116; Mills, L., Bader, J., Brewer., and 
Williams, P. 2005. Vacating Arbitration Awards. Dispute Resolution Magazine (Archives) - American Bar Association, 11 
(4), 23-27; Mills, L., Bader, J., Brewer., and Williams, P. 2006. Vacating Arbitration Awards. General Practice, Solo and 
Small Firm Division of the American Bar Association Magazine, 23, 28-29; Dammann, A. 2007. Vacating Arbitration 
Awards for Mistakes of Fact. The Review of Litigation, 27 (3), 441-512; Huber, S. 2008. State Regulation of Arbitration 
Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards by State Courts. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10 (2), 509-
578; Gronlund, A. 2010. The Future of Manifest Disregard as a Valid Ground for Vacating Arbitration Awards in Light of 
the Supreme Court's Ruling in Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc. Iowa Law Review, 96 (4), 1351-1376; Ghodoosi, 
F. 2015. The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting the Role of the Public Policy Doctrine in the Enforcement of 
Private Legal Arrangements. Nebraska Law Review, 94 (3), 685-736; Cole, S. 2016. Curbing the Runaway Arbitrator in 
Commercial Arbitration: Making Exceeding the Powers Count. Alabama Law Review, 68 (1), 179-224; Marrow, P. 2016. A 
Practical Approach for Expanding the Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards: Using an Appellate Arbitrator. AAA 
Handbook on Commercial Arbitration, 3rd Ed. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2754455, accessed 21/09/17; Stalker, T., 
Rosenberg, D. and Nolan, R. 2016. Vacating Arbitration Awards due to Evident Partiality under the Federal Arbitration 
Act. Defense Counsel Journal, 83(2), 207-211. 
37 
 
is being driven by the unsettled nature of the academic literature75 practitioner commentary76 and recent 
developments and changes in terms of UAE arbitration legislation following the promulgation in May 
2018 of UAE Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration and the repealing of prior statutory provisions previously 
articulated under Articles 203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 and Articles 239 to 243 of Federal Law (11) 
of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).  
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A reading of various works of scholarship – for example those of Randall77, Hayford 78, 
Gelander79, Younger80, Mills et al.81, Huber82, Arfazadeh 83, Feldman84 and Marrow85 – appears to 
suggest that there are four factors that, when taken into consideration, raise tensions within the literature 
that has sought to explore the grounds upon which arbitration awards may be challenged and vacated. 
These grounds are (i) contravention of core elements or the essence of a contract, (ii) serious manifest 
disregard of the law, (iii) illegality or serious irregularity in the arbitral proceedings, and (iv) when the 
arbitral proceedings or  award are in conflict with Public policy (and/or public order).  
To elaborate further, as relates to purpose, here, in the context of this study, the interest is in the 
purpose of the Public policy (and/or public order) exception as against the fundamental goals of 
arbitration, which emphasises finality, conclusive and its binding nature. Conversely, as relates to scope, 
this thesis is interested in understanding the scope of the Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) 
exception as applied by the parallel courts which operate in the UAE as against the rule-of-law 
implications for the different perspectives maintained by parallel courts and arbitrators – specifically as 
relates to the need to preclude endless litigation which threatens certainty in the law. As relates to 
improvements, this thesis is particularly interested in exploring how the number of arbitration cases that 
are challenged and vacated on the ground of Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) can be 
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reduced. One notes a particular challenge of the UAE's perspective on the rule of law which emphasises 
that litigants have the right to resort to federally constituted public courts regarding their disputes. 
Despite that being the case, the new UAE Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration now makes a number of 
distinct provisions than were the case under the now repealed Articles 203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 
and Articles 239 to 243 of Federal Law (11) of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). 
Taken together, these three factors lead to major tensions, which has been recognised by scholars. 
For example, in terms of the fundamental goals of arbitration which emphasises finality, conclusiveness 
and its binding nature, Hoellering (199586, p. 25) points out that  
 
“…the effectiveness of [international commercial] arbitration depends on the predictable 
enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards”. 
 
However, as observed by Ojiako87, this position appears slightly more contentious in the UAE. First, in 
the UAE, prior to 3 May 2018, there were no explicit stand-alone statutory provisions for arbitration 
except as stated in Articles 203 to 218 of Federal Law (11) of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). 
Under its provisions, the enforcement of any domestic arbitral award in the UAE had to be confirmed 
and ratified by a UAE court as part of a new set of legal proceedings. The recently promulgated 
arbitration law – the Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration which was signed into law on 3 May 
201888 – appears to retain similar provisions. Thus, in Article 19 (2), parties to an arbitration hearing are 
allowed to challenge an arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction before the UAE federal courts; in effect, the 
‘Courts of the UAE’89. Similarly, Article 52 does stipulate that arbitration awards must be confirmed 
                                                 
86 Hoellering, M. 1995. International Arbitration Under US Law and AAA Rules. Dispute Resolution Journal, 50, 25-25. 
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recently as 3 May 2018 which appeared in the official gazette in June 2018 taking effect in July 2018. 
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and ratified by the courts.  This in effect means that every domestic arbitral award in the country is still 
subject to validation by the courts according to the provisions of UAE law. This position had been 
emphasised (under the old provisions contained in the now repealed Articles 203 to 218 of Federal Law 
(11) of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code) by the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation Judgment 118 of 2014 
where it had stated unequivocally that 
 
“…litigants have the right to resort to the regular courts regarding the disputes relating to the 
performance of the temporal and precautionary procedures or the summary matters”. 
 
1.5 The problem statement 
This study focus is on the notion of Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) exception in the 
UAE. The reason for this focus is particularly driven by the potential for tensions emanating from a view 
within the UAE jurisprudence that suggests (i) an inalienable right of the judiciary to interfere with the 
mechanism of arbitration and (ii) the operation of parallel courts which concurrently operate under 
different legal traditions in the country90. The author further posits that the standards of review which 
empower disputants to challenge arbitration proceedings and courts to vacate arbitration awards are a 
source of tension in arbitration jurisprudence in three ways. The first is that the principle of vacatur 
represents a major threat to the notion of arbitration finality. The second source of tension is that while 
arbitration emphasises finality, the requirement to preclude endless litigation which threatens the rule of 
law needs to be counterbalanced by uniformity in judicial decisions touching upon Public Policy and 
‘Order Public’ (public order) across the various parallel courts operating in the UAE. The third source 
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of tension relates to a need to clarify the scope of vacatur as an exception; in effect for instance, as relates 
to the exception of Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order), to what extent do UAE Courts differ 
in their judgements on matters that touch upon public policy and will the possible existence of differences 
impede the on the finality, conclusive and binding nature of arbitration. 
 
1.6 The research questions 
Research questions are important in that they support the effort of researchers to not only develop an 
understanding of the gap that exists in literature, but also facilitate an understanding of what knowledge 
gap actually needs to be filled91. More specifically, Locke and Golden-Biddle92 claim that, to understand 
the gap in literature, scholars are required to 
 
“…cite and draw connections between works and investigative streams not typically cited 
together…[this will]… suggests the existence of underdeveloped research areas” (p. 1030). 
 
Research questions are particularly important in that, according to Bryman93, they serve as guides in 
terms of how research should be designed and developed. Research questions also serve to provide 
guidance on what research methods should be adopted to support specific types of studies. In effect, the 
research question is the primary determinant in research and will guide the research methods adopted. 
In the process, research questions serve as a basis of developing a link between the reviewed literature 
and the data that will be eventually collected94. More specifically, White95 claims that 
                                                 
91 Alvesson, M. and Sandberg, J. 2011. Generating research questions through problematization. Academy of Management 
Review, 36(2), 247-271. 
92 Locke, K., and Golden-Biddle, K. 1997. Constructing opportunities for contribution: Structuring intertextual coherence 
and “problematizing” in organizational studies. Academy of Management Journal, 40, 1023–1062. 
93 Bryman, A. 2007. The Research Question in Social Research: What is its Role?. International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology, 10 (1), 5-20. 
94 Bryman, A. 2007. The Research Question in Social Research: What is its Role?. International Journal of Social Research 
Methodology, 10 (1), 5-20. 
95 White, P. 2013. Who's afraid of research questions? The neglect of research questions in the methods literature and a call 




“…researchers make connections with existing theories and previous empirical findings and 
helps avoid unnecessary repetition of, or overlap with, previous work” (p. 213).  
 
Noting the current articulation of the research problem in circumstances where according to Stuart et 
al.96 the “…the subject matter is complex” (p. 423), the researcher sought to ‘explore’ in the words of 
Handfield and Melnyk97, in the context of the UAE, “What are the key issues?” (p. 324), by presenting 
the study’s three research questions as:  
 
(i) RQ1: What is the purpose of the Public policy (and/or public order) exception? 
(ii) RQ2: What is the scope of this exception as applied by the ‘UAE Courts’? and  
(iii) RQ3: How does the existence of different parallel courts within the ‘UAE Courts system impact 
on how the Public policy (and/or public order) exception is construed and how is its impact on 
the finality, conclusive and binding nature of arbitration? 
 
1.7 The need for the study 
The position of the author is that a study of this nature is undertaken for a number of reasons, and is 
particularly timely noting the recent changes in UAE arbitration law. Firstly, though, the following are 
attested: 
 
(i) the concurrent operation of different judicial jurisdictions and traditions within the UAE,  
(ii) the existence of historical literature on the Public policy (and/or public order) exception98,  
                                                 
96 Stuart, I., McCutcheon, D., Handfield, R., McLachlin, R. and Samson, D. 2002. Effective case research in operations 
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(iii) the existence of considerable literature on the Public policy (and/or public order) exception 
in domestic arbitration in a number of different countries such as India99, the United 
Kingdom100, Saudi Arabia101 and in fact a number of African countries102,  
(iv) literature focused on the Public policy (and/or public order) exception in the UAE appears 
quite sparse and nascent, yet the Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) exception 
has been a matter of considerable judicial interest in a number of arbitration cases heard in 
the UAE.  
 
As reported by scholars such as Ballantyne103, Angell and Feulner104 and Mohtashami105, for a number 
of different historical reasons, much earlier cases involving appeals to the UAE courts on matters relating 
to arbitration had taken a very restrictive view of arbitration, finding that the courts had exclusive 
jurisdiction over the implementation of any contract within the UAE. In such circumstances, 
contractually, disputes were not subject to arbitration. However, more recent judicial rulings in the UAE 
suggest that a clearer view of the Public policy (and/or public order) exception is materialising. 
Examples of such cases includes (1) Fiske (2) Firmin v Firuzeh106 heard by the Judicial Authority of the 
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Dubai International Financial Centre: Court of First Instance which found that matters of conflict 
between Emirate of Dubai laws and DIFC laws on one hand and UAE Federal law on the other hand 
were matters of Public policy (and/or public order). Other cases include Dubai Court of Cassation 
Judgment 43 of 2009 which found that matters concerning registering of property, because they could 
subside proprietary rights, were matters of Public policy (and/or public order) and, thus, not subject to 
arbitration. Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 43 of 2009 was affirmed in Dubai Court of Cassation 
Judgment 180 of 2011, where the courts re-stated that sale and purchasing of off-plan property units that 
did not comply with mandatory registration rules could not be subjected to arbitration, again on the 
grounds of Public policy (and/or public order). In the UAE, land registration lies outside the competency 
of arbitration as it is regarded as a matter of Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order). Other cases 
that have involved Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) considerations relating to arbitration 
in the UAE include the following cases: Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 14 of 2012107, Abu Dhabi 
Court of Cassation Judgment 663 of 2012, Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 282 of 2012 and Abu 
Dhabi Court of First Instance Judgment 2847 of 2013. 
This study is also timely because there has been a proliferation of arbitral institutions in the UAE, 
and the UAE is no doubt becoming a popular arbitral centre 108 . In light of the reality that the UAE does 
not recognise the doctrine of judicial immunity109 as reiterated in Article 257 of the UAE Penal Code110, 
it is important that arbitral institutions, arbitrators and those interested in arbitration jurisprudence are 
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able to develop a comprehensive understanding of how the UAE balances individual autonomy to 
contract against Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) in order not to be caught by the 
provisions of Article 257 of the UAE Penal Code111. This study is also timely because not understanding 
the Public policy (and/or public order) exception in UAE law may lead to arbitration in reality being 
utilised as a pre-litigation forum. This has the possibility of degrading the legal doctrines of Res 
Judicata112 and estoppel113. This is likely even when judicial opinion in the UAE, as in the case of Dubai 
Court of Cassation Commercial Appeal 199 of 2014114, has stated that arbitral awards were subject to 
Res Judicata.  
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
To undertake the study, our approach is structured to be consistent with the scientific method of 
research115. This method of research is not necessarily new to the legal studies and over the years, its 
application has been much discussed in the academic literature116. There are numerous advantages 
associated with the adoption of the scientific method of research in legal studies. Harper117 for example 
claims that the use of the scientific method in legal studies will at the very least, help reduce the gulf that 
                                                 
111 Judicial Department United Arab Emirates (2011), (Legislation Series in English), Penal Code, ISBN, 978-9948-492-
70-2 25/01/18; UAE's Federal Law No. 3 of 1987 (Penal Code). 
112 Vestal, A. 1965. Preclusion / Res Judicata Variables: Nature of the Controversy. Washington University Law Review, 
1965 (2), 158-192. 
113 Andrews, N. 1991. Issue Estoppel and Changes of Precedent. Cambridge Law Journal, 50 (3), 419-421; Chitimira, H. 
2017. Aspects of the application of issue Estoppel on directors’ fiduciary duties in South Africa: possible lessons from the 
United Kingdom and related jurisdictions Royal Sechaba case 1. Juridical Tribune Journal, 7, 136-152. 
114 This ruling was made on 21 August 2016. 
115 Beveridge, W. 1950. The Art of Scientific Investigation, Heinemann, Melbourne, Australia; Bauer, H. 1992. Scientific 
Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method, University of Illinois Press, Champaign, Illinois. 
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Scientific Method in the Application of Law. Dakota Law Review, 1 (4), 110-125; Cohen, M. 1928. Law and Scientific 
Method. American Law School Review, 6 (5), 231-239; Radin, M. 1931. Scientific Method and the Law, California Law 
Review, 19 (2), 164-172; Diamond, B. 1967. The Scientific Method and the Law. Hastings Law Journal, 19 (1), 179-200; 
Levit, N. 1989. Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method. Fordham Law Review, 58 (3), 
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Southern Illinois University Law Journal, 18 (2), 329-346; Ulen, T. 2002. A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, 
Empirical Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law. University of Illinois Law Review, 2002 (4), 875-920; 
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[iv]. 
117 Harper, F. 1927. Scientific Method in the Application of Law. Dakota Law Review, 1 (4), 110-125. 
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exists between the law and social sciences. Doing so is important because of the interdependency that 
exists between the law and other various disciplines.  
Essentially, the scientific method of research focuses on developing key critical knowledge of 
phenomena via ‘structured’ investigations. It does so with the ultimate aim of reliably predicting future 
events118. To achieve this aim, it involves approximately four steps which includes (i) making an 
observation of a phenomenon (ii) undertaking a basic description of the phenomenon under observation 
(iii) articulating basic inferences of possible general principles associated with the phenomenon under 
observation (iv) presentation of questions about the occurrence of the phenomena (v) the advancement 
of hypotheses, assertions or propositions of likely outcome of the phenomena and (iv) conduct of specific 
test (via empirical data) to explore, prove or in fact disprove the hypotheses or propositions. The thesis 
is structured in a manner that supports the chosen scientific method of research. Thus, the thesis proceeds 
as follows. In the next chapter (Chapter 2), the literature on ‘policy’, ‘public policy’ and the ‘policy 
exception’ is reviewed. The main objective of a literature review according to Fink 119 is to produce a 
“…systematic, explicit and reproducible method for identifying, evaluating and synthesizing the existing 
body of completed and recorded work produced by researchers, scholars and practitioners” (p. 3). The 
researcher utilised mainly peer-reviewed journal academic papers published by well respected legal 
publishers such as Heinonline and OUP. Book commentaries and conference papers were largely 
excluded from the literature research.  
Chapter 3 focuses on providing background information on the specific context of domestic 
commercial arbitration. In Chapter 4, the legal and court systems of the UAE are described in detail. At 
the same time, the existence of parallel court systems in the UAE and their implications for the finality, 
conclusive and binding nature of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism and the notion of vacatur 
based on Public policy (and/or public order) are examined. For the theory which is presented in Chapter 
                                                 
118 Lawlor, R. 1963. What Computers Can Do: Analysis and Prediction of Judicial Decisions. American Bar Association 
Journal, 49 (4), 337-344. 
119 Fink, A. 2010. Conducting research literature reviews: From the internet to paper. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. 
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5, the author draws on both Freedom of contract and social contract theory120. These theories have also 
been applied to arbitration121. Chapter 6  presents the research methodology and analysis, and the thesis 
concludes in Chapter 7. The research map is shown in Table 1. 
                                                 
120 Hobbes, T. 1651. Thomas Hobbes. 2016 Leviathan (2016 reprint), Longman Library of Primary Sources in Philosophy. 
Routledge; Locke, J. 1690. Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980; Locke, J. 1992. Second Treatise 
of Government. Classics of Moral and Political Theory, 768-69, Michael L. Morgan ed; Roussseau, J. 1762. The Social 
Contract. London: Penguin Books; Rousseau, J. 1920. The Social Contract: & Discourses. Pub. JM Dent & Sons; Kahn, C. 
1981. The Origins of social contract theory. Hermes, 44, 92-108; Riley, P., Goldie, M. and Wokler, R. 2006. Social 
contract theory and its critics. The Cambridge history of eighteenth-century political thought. Pub. Cambridge University 
Press, 347-376. 
121 Carlston, K. 1952. Theory of the arbitration process. Law and Contemporary Problems, 17(4), 631-651; Kochan, T. and 
Jick, T. 1978. The public sector mediation process: A theory and empirical examination. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
22(2), 209-240; Thomson, D. 1994. Arbitration theory and practice: A survey of AAA construction arbitrators. Hofstra Law 
Review, 23, 137-172; Speidel, R. 1996. Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent. Brooklyn Law 
Review, 62 (4), 1335-1364; Macneil, I. 1999. Relational contract theory: challenges and queries. Northwestern University 
Law Review, 94 (3), 877-908; Lipsky, D. and Seeber, R. 2003. The social contract and dispute resolution: The 
transformation of the social contract in the United States workplace and the emergence of new strategies of dispute 
resolution. International Employment Relations Review, 9(2), 87-109; Lipsky, D. 2007. Conflict resolution and the 
transformation of the social contract, Proceedings of the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the Labor and Employment 
Relations Association. Presidential Address, 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=conference, accessed 22/09/17. 
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Table 1: The research summary 
Problem Statement Research aim Research objectives Research questions Underlying theories 
The four grounds of 
arbitration vacatur which 
empower disputants to 
challenge arbitration 
proceedings and courts to 
vacate arbitration awards 
represent source of tension 
in arbitration 
jurisprudence. As relates to 
‘public policy’ and ‘public 
order’), its broad 
construction by the UAE 
Courts has the potential to 
impede the on the finality, 
conclusive and binding 
nature of arbitration. This 
is especially more so in 
circumstances where 
parallel courts operate. 
The study explores how 
Public policy (and/or 
public order) is utilised 
as a ground for 
challenging and vacating 
domestic arbitral awards 
in the UAE. 
 
To establish the purpose of the public policy 
exception. To review the extant literature on the 
notion of Public policy (and/or public order) as a 
ground for challenging and vacating arbitration 
awards - What do we mean by Public policy (is 
there, for example, a difference in the literature 
between ‘public policy’ and ‘public order’)? 
RQ1: What is the purpose of 
the Public policy (and/or 
public order) exception in 
the UAE? 
 
Freedom of contract theory 
and Social contract theory 
To articulate the scope of the exception as applied 
by the UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) 
and the ‘free zone’ courts (who together with the 
UAE federal courts constitute the ‘UAE Courts’).  
Here, the researcher is particularly interested in the 
extent of such exceptions (in effect, how broad such 
exceptions are construed) taking into consideration 
the existence of parallel courts in the UAE.  
RQ2: What is the scope of 
this exception as applied by 
the ‘UAE Courts’?   
To draw from a content analysis of UAE case law 
of the different parallel courts that constitute the 
‘UAE Courts’, an understanding of impact of the 
broad construction of Public policy (and/or public 
order)  on the finality, conclusive and binding 
nature of arbitration as a dispute resolution 
mechanism. By doing so, the regular citation of the 
public policy exception as an avenue of challenging 
and vacating arbitration awards – ultimately 
transforming arbitration into a pre-litigation 
procedure may be minimised, thereby enhancing the 
finality, conclusive and binding nature of 
arbitration. 
RQ3: How does the 
existence of different 
parallel courts within the 
‘UAE Courts system impact 
on how the Public policy 
(and/or public order) 
exception is construed and 
how is its impact on the 
finality, conclusive and 




CHAPTER 2: POLICY, PUBLIC POLICY AND ‘ORDER PUBLIC’  
2.1 What is policy? 
In the introduction chapter, the author advanced literature suggesting that there were four grounds 
available to justify judicial intervention in arbitration awards via vacatur. These grounds are (i) 
contravention of core elements or the essence of a contract, (ii) serious manifest disregard of the law, 
(iii) illegality or serious irregularity in the arbitral proceedings, and (iv) when the arbitral proceedings or  
award are in conflict with Public policy (and/or public order). In the chapter that follows, the Public 
policy (and/or public order) concept is explored in more detail and, in the process, the first research 
question What is the purpose of the Public policy (and/or public order) exception in the UAE? will be 
addressed. 
 Over the years, ‘Policy’ as a topic has attracted the attention of numerous scholars in the field of 
administrative sciences. The various studies have focused on, for example, the meaning of ‘policy’122, 
its applicable frameworks123, its various classifications124, its development and enactment125 how it 
influences and shapes governance126, and its analysis127. Policy has also attracted the attention of legal 
                                                 
122 Thompson, D. 1985. Philosophy and policy. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (2), 205-218; Edelman, M. 1988. 
Constructing the Political Spectacle. Pub. University of Chicago Press; Ball, S. 1993. What is policy? Texts, trajectories 
and toolboxes. Australian Journal of Education Studies, 13(2), 10-17; .Ball, S. 2015. What is policy? 21 years later: 
Reflections on the possibilities of policy research. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 36(3), 306-313; 
Bacchi, C. 2000. Policy as discourse: What does it mean? Where does it get us?. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics 
of Education, 21(1), 45-57; Wedel, J., Shore, C., Feldman, G. and Lathrop, S. 2005. Toward an anthropology of public 
policy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 600(1), 30-51; Fimyar, O. 2014. What is policy? 
In search of frameworks and definitions for non-Western contexts. Educate, 14(3), 6-21; Ball, S. 2015. What is policy? 21 
years later: Reflections on the possibilities of policy research. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 
36(3), 306-313.. 
123 Lowi, T.  1985. The State in Politics: The Relation between Policy and Administration. In Regulatory Politics and the 
Social Sciences, ed. Roger Noll. Berkeley: University of California Press; Smith, K. 2002. Typologies, Taxonomies, and 
the Benefits of Policy Classification. Policy Studies Journal, 30 (3), 379–395; Jones, T. 2013. Understanding education 
policy: The ‘four education orientations’ framework. Springer Science & Business Media. 
124 Smith, K. 2002. Typologies, Taxonomies, and the Benefits of Policy Classification. Policy Studies Journal, 30 (3), 379–
395. 
125 Page, B. and Shapiro, R. 1983. Effects of public opinion on policy. American Political Science Review, 77(1), 175-190; 
Moynihan, D. and Soss, J. 2014. Policy feedback and the politics of administration. Public Administration Review, 74(3), 
320-332; Siddiki, S., Carboni, J., Koski, C. and Sadiq, A. 2015. How policy rules shape the structure and performance of 
collaborative governance arrangements. Public Administration Review, 75(4), 536-547. 
126 Mosse, D. 2004. Is good policy unimplementable? Reflections on the ethnography of aid policy and practice. 
Development and Change, 35(4), 639-671. 
127 Gale, T. 1999. Policy trajectories: Treading the discursive path of policy analysis. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural 
Politics of Education, 20(3), 393-407. 
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scholars in areas of jurisprudence such as judicial consistency128, agenda setting129 and jurisdiction 
disputes130. 
The literature131 suggests that a cohesive and generally acceptable definition of policy is 
extremely difficult and has been used to describe a wide variety of shifting administrative sciences and 
legal concepts and ideas. Thus, in some instances, policy has been construed as a field, a government 
idea, or a specific proposal for government action. It has also been used to describe a series of desirable 
outcomes of interest to governments and, on other occasions, it has been used to describe how the nature 
of the relationship between the government on behalf of the state and its local communities is articulated.  
From an administrative sciences perspective, policy can be construed to represent a set of 
attitudes, propositions, moral standards and values in the form of statements of intent that serve to guide 
decisions made by government and organisations132. Wedel et al.133 claims that the objective of policy 
is to articulate ideals on normative citizenship and societal behaviour. At its core is its ability to convey 
information on the standing and outlook of society concerning matters of interest. However, noting that 
                                                 
128 Dias, R. 1962. Remoteness of Liability and Legal Policy. Cambridge Law Journal, 20(2), 178-199; Williams, D. 1971. 
Policy and Discretion in Administrative Law. Cambridge Law Journal, 29(1), 6-8; Bailey, S. and Bowman, M. 1986. The 
Policy/Operational Dichotomy—A Cuckoo In The Nest. Cambridge Law Journal, 45(3), 430-456; Clayton, R. 2003. 
Legitimate Expectations, Policy, and the Principle of Consistency. Cambridge Law Journal, 62(1), 93-105; Plunkett, J. 
2016. Principle and Policy in Private Law Reasoning. Cambridge Law Journal, 75(2), 366-397. 
129 Mondak, J. 1994. Policy legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The sources and contexts of legitimation. Political Research 
Quarterly, 47(3), 675-692; Bailey, M. and Maltzman, F. 2008. Does legal doctrine matter? Unpacking law and policy 
preferences on the US Supreme Court. American Political Science Review, 102(3), 369-384; Black, R. and Owens, R. 2009. 
Agenda setting in the Supreme Court: The collision of policy and jurisprudence. Journal of Politics, 71(3), 1062-1075. 
130 Fawcett, J. 1989. Trial in England or abroad: The underlying policy considerations. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 9 
(2), 205–229. 
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anthropology of public policy. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 600(1), 30-51; Fimyar, O. 
2014. What is policy? In search of frameworks and definitions for non-Western contexts. Educate, 14(3), 6-21; Plunkett, J. 
2016. Principle and Policy in Private Law Reasoning. Cambridge Law Journal, 75(2), 366-397. 
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the study of policy is usually undertaken from a perspective that it represents a political outcome (see 
Moynihan and Soss134), in reality policy is more than a simple object of administration. Moynihan and 
Soss135 sees policy in its own right as an arm of political action capable of altering critical elements of 
administration. These critical elements includes routines136 and organisational structures137. For policy 
to be effective, it must be capable of legitimising and mobilising political138 and societal support. 
Arguably, Edelman 139 offers a more dynamic administrative sciences definition of policy as 
 
“…a set of shifting, diverse, and contradictory responses to a spectrum of political interests” (p. 
16).  
 
Again, from an administrative sciences perspective, policy can also represent 
 
 “…visions for society” (Edmondson140, p. 11).  
 
Alternate to administrative sciences perspectives of policy are legal perspectives. Here, similar to the 
notion of ‘legal principles’ which Waddams141 claims that there is considerable “…uncertainty” (p. 7) 
as relates to its true meaning, MacCormick142 notes that the conceptualisation of policy is a particularly 
 
                                                 
134 Moynihan, D. and Soss, J. 2014. Policy feedback and the politics of administration. Public Administration Review, 
74(3), 320-332. 
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“…hideously inexact word in legal discourse” (p. 263).  
 
Thus, on one hand, policy can be construed to represent 
 
“…a reason that does not rely on the law and is either goal-based or ethical/deontological in 
nature” (Plunkett143, p. 370).  
 
On the other hand, it can also be considered according to Bell144(p. 230):  
 
“…as substantive justifications to which judges appeal when standards and rules of the legal 
system do not provide a clear resolution of a dispute”.  
 
Plunkett145 primarily posits that ‘policy-based’ legal perspectives basically represents 
 
 “…an alternative to an argument based on the strict law” (p. 369).  
 
In sum, policy goes beyond the law146. Rather than simply addressing matters of specific interest to 
disputants, it seeks to address not only the wider economic but also political and social welfare concerns 
of communities. For this reason, according to Jones147 it is important that in policy discourse, a 
determination is made on precisely (i) whom and what the policy is for, and (ii) who decides what such 
policy. Policy can also imply the balancing of 
                                                 
143 Plunkett, J. 2016. Principle and Policy in Private Law Reasoning. Cambridge Law Journal, 75(2), 366-397. 
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“competing public interests by criteria which a court is not equipped to evaluate in terms of 
reasonableness” (Aronson and Whitmore148, p. 69).  
 
Policy therefore has the ability to cause major disruption to administration leading to the need for 
routines to be altered and resources to be redistributed149. This can lead to a need for “negotiation, 
contestation or struggle between different groups who may lie outside the formal machinery of official 
policy-making” (Ozga150, p. 113). Managing the negotiation required within the myriad of multi-layered 
and complex relationships that characterises Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) in 
particular requires the constant shaping of the capabilities of government in a manner that allows for 
assumptions and interests to be re-evaluated and repositioned as need be According to Siddiki et al.151, 
it also requires stakeholder engagement between government and non-state actors. 
 
2.2 Policy and public opinion 
Policy is context-based and, according to Shore and Wright152( p. 7), is set to 
 
 “…encapsulate the entire history and culture of the society that generated them”.  
 
Its primary function is social, although its standard use refers to specific courses of social or political 
action that are adopted and pursued by governments and organisations (Wedel et al.153, p. 35). Policy 
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has a wide role in modern society in that it shapes and regulates practically every aspect of contemporary 
life including private rights and obligations. It is safe to suggest that, irrespective of whether policy is 
explored from an administrative sciences perspective or a legal perspective, the purpose of policy is to 
serve as a means of ensuring that people or individuals likely to be impacted by the subject matter of the 
policy in question are no worse off because of uncertainties associated with the relative merits of the 
factors under considerations154.  
Although this study’s interest is on the large and developing body of literature which suggests 
that policy is impacted by public opinion155, the researcher  also acknowledges the existence of a number 
of studies which suggest that public opinion does not impact upon policy making. Such studies by 
Converse156 suggest that societal policy-related interests do not generally contribute to policy formation 
because of their incoherent nature.  
Public opinion refers to 
 
“…the aggregated responses of individuals as reflected in opinion polls” (Manza and Cook157, 
p. 631).  
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According to Entman and Herbst158, public opinion can occur in three forms: (i) views shared by those 
who participate actively within the political sphere, (ii) views perceived to represent fundamental values 
of the society, and (iii) views perceived and assumed to be shared by the majority of the population. 
Fundamental to this idea from a governance perspective which emphasises that societal preferences are 
embodied in policy (see  Manza and Cook159), is that on one side, the three branches of government (that 
is the executive, the legislature and the judiciary) in their respective public policy-making capacity will 
be responsive to the preferences of the society. Manza and Cook160, however, points out that the 
responsiveness of the three branches of government to public opinion is enacted through legislation (for 
the legislature), administrative action (for the executive) and judicial decisions and rulings (for the 
judiciary). What has been observed is that among the three branches of government, responsiveness 
varies significantly with the judiciary being the least responsive among the three arms of government. 
Perhaps this is unexpected. Both the legislature and the executive draw their legitimacy from public 
approval. However, while responsiveness to public approval is desirable, the judiciary is not expected to 
decide on matters based solely on public opinion161. For example, in the recently decided case of Owens 
v Owens 162, while acknowledging “…the relevant social norm which has changed most obviously during 
the last 40 years” [at 34], the UK Supreme Court refused to grant a divorce petition based on Section 
1(2)(b) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973163 on the basis that [at 46]: 
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(Eds.), Mediated politics (pp. 203-225). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
159 Manza, J. and Cook, F. 2002. A democratic polity? Three views of policy responsiveness to public opinion in the United 
States. American Politics Research, 30(6), 630-667. 
160 Manza, J. and Cook, F. 2002. A democratic polity? Three views of policy responsiveness to public opinion in the United 
States. American Politics Research, 30(6), 630-667. 
161 As will be discussed later on, there is an expectation that the judiciary decides cases in line with existing perceived 
societal values. 
162 Owens v Owens [2018] UKSC 41 
163 The Supreme Court found that the only avenue available to grant a ‘no defence’ divorce petition was under the 
provisions of Section 1(2)(e) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 that required divorcing couples to have lived apart for a 
continuous period of five years. 
56 
 
“It is not for us to change the law laid down by Parliament - our role is only to interpret and 
apply the law that Parliament has given us”. 
 
Such ruling should not come as a surprise. As reiterated by Breyer164, this is because judges are by stature 
and constitutional provisions (if in existence) required to decide legal questions solely on their merits. 
This has been reiterated in the case law such as McGonnell v United Kingdom165, Dimes v Proprietors 
of Grand Junction Canal166 and Davidson v Scottish Ministers167, where it has been stated that judges 
are personally and institutionally independent168. Personal and institutional independence means that 
judges should be free  
 
“…to develop whatever theories of statutory construction and constitutional interpretation, wise 
or foolish, deferential or mischievous, that captures their fancy” (Epstein169, p. 851). 
 
The public will not only notice but will also respond to the actions of those who make policy170. 
The literature suggests that when the scale of policy is dissimilar from the desired scale preferred by the 
public (or society); policy is adjusted to ensure that both are aligned171. Without the existence of such 
responses, policy is unlikely to be incentivised to respond in a manner which public opinion desires (and 
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vice-versa). Thus, how policy is impacted by public opinion (and vice-versa) is likely to differ across 
different policy areas172. 
According to Page and Shapiro173, there are a number of factors which may curtail the ability of 
public opinion to influence policy. For example, well-organised pressure and interest groups may curtail 
any potential influence of public opinion on policy. The reason for this, according to Manza and Cook174, 
is that the political sphere is generally prejudiced towards the interests of professional groups and 
businesses. Both Page and Shapiro175 and Manza and Cook176 also suggest that, in some cases, the 
relationship between public opinion and policy is actually reversed, with the public sector being able to 
manipulate public opinion. What further emerges from reviewing policy-related literature is that the 
relationship between public opinion and policy is dependent on historical, institutional and political 
factors177. These institutional factors may include context178 and information asymmetry179. In terms of 
context, for example, the expectation is that policy decisions in areas of little or no major public interest 
(for example, foreign policy) are unlikely to be substantially influenced and/or impacted by public 
opinion. Conversely, policy decisions in areas of considerable public interest such as the criminal justice 
system and healthcare are more likely to be substantially influenced and/or impacted by public 
opinion180. In effect, the relationship between public opinion and policy is more likely to be influenced 
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by the level of public interest with the government and the judiciary more likely to accentuate policy 
responses in matters of considerable and sustained public opinion than when such public opinion is 
temporal or of a lesser degree. On the other hand, in terms of information, for example, the expectation 
is that how the public responds to policy will be dependent on the degree of information relating to 
policy, which the public is able to access. Poor or limited availability of information is likely to distort 
societal policy-related preferences in a significant manner181. When information is readily available and 
clear, the public is empowered not only to clearly respond to policy, but also to resist the influence of 
private interest groups182. Similarly, Manza and Cook183 claim that policy makers are only likely to be 
responsive to public opinion when they are in possession of information with which they can confidently 
ascertain the precise nature of public opinion. Being in possession of such information clearly facilitates 
reasoned decisions to be made by policy makers. 
 
2.3 Types and forms of policy 
A traditional perspective of policy sees it as primarily 
 
 “…what governments do” (Bacchi184, p. 48).   
 
This apparent focus on policy by governments suggests that the central tenet of policy is the coercive 
power of the state; that is, the ability of the government acting on behalf of the state to force individuals 
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to conduct themselves in a specific manner. Both Lowi185 and Smith186 point out that this power 
represents the core characteristics of governments. Thus, policy is determinative of power relationships. 
Policy can be developed and enacted both privately and publicly: in other words, policy can be private 
or public. Drawing from Benn and Gaus187, it will appear that the differences between public and private 
types of policy may be determined from three different dimensions. First, both differ in terms of their 
interest. For example, the interest of Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) lies in accruing 
communal or society benefits. Second, because of the focus of Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public 
order) on the wider community or society, information is generally open and readily available. The third 
difference between the two types of policy relates to agency. In Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public 
order), its various agents (in this case, the government) are construed as acting on behalf of the 
community’s or society’s interest (the idea of the public interest). On the other hand, in private forms of 
policy, its agents will be acting primary in the sole interest of the private entity in question. The author 
also contends that these two types of policy are distinguished in terms of the way and manner in which 
they are not only developed and enacted, but by the target of their influence, their constraints and also 
their incentives. 
Thus, for example, Osborne and Gaebler188 state that public forms of policy focus among others 
on 
 
“…ensuring equity, preventing discrimination or exploitation, ensuring continuity and stability 
of services, and ensuring social cohesion” (pp. 24-25).  
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According to Rosenau189, Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) focuses on matters of public 
interest and stewardship (p. 11). That being the case, Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) is 
developed and enacted in the public space meaning that it is open to public scrutiny. Private policy, 
however, focuses primarily on factors such as “access to finance, technological knowledge, managerial 
efficiency and entrepreneurship” (Rosenau190, p. 218). Taking all the above into consideration, Fimyar191  
points out that the traditional perspective of policy as being about governments is conceptually limiting. 
It also has been one of the drivers for advancing an extended view of policy that encompasses both a 
textual and a discursive perspective of policy (as discussed by Ball192 and Bacchi 193). 
It is worth highlighting that while it has been possible to distinguish between public and private 
forms of policy, some scholars suggest that such distinctions are in reality not easily construed.  In fact, 
scholars such as Greenberg et al. 194, Steinberger195 and Smith196 have explored the benefits and 
challenges of policy classifications noting that the challenge with such classifications stems from the 
reality that not only will different scholars classify similar policies in different ways, but also that policies 
may overlap and, over time, their categories may change as they respond to broader social, political and 
economic changes. Smith197 notes that the ambiguity associated with the true meaning of policy also 
served as a major challenge to any effective classification or categorisation of policy. Thus, it is of no 
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surprise that Seeleib-Kaiser198 suggested that the distinction between the ‘public’ policy and the ‘private’ 
policy remains highly contested, fluid, and susceptible to negotiation. One such area is in the articulation 
of the notion of the ‘public interest’ which has proved quite challenging to precisely define and assess 
due to its multiple and often contradictory meanings199. Hamilton200, however, defined the public interest 
as matters which are legally of common and general concern to the society. 
In addition to policy being distinguished in type between public and private, policy can also be 
distinguished in applicability201 and form202. In terms of applicability, Lowi203 elaborated on four main 
categories of policy applicability: 
 
(i) distributive policy  
(ii) constituent policy – which deals with information and reapportionment  
(iii) regulative policy – which deals with unfair competition, and  
(iv) redistributive policy – which deals with matters relating to social welfare and wealth 
redistribution.  
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On the other hand, the four forms of policy discussed by Ball204, Bacchi205 and Jones206 are: 
 
(i) ‘policy as text’  
(ii) ‘policy as discourse’  
(iii) policy as values, and  
(iv) policy as process. 
 
These are discussed further. It is worth mentioning that Greenberg et al.207 are of the view that an 
interesting aspect of Lowi’s policy categories is that the relationship between individual policy variables 
may be quite pronounced in one policy type, but less pronounced or even absent in another policy type. 
 
2.3.1 Policy as text 
The first form of policy is referred to as ‘policy as text’208. In its basic form, policy as text refers to the 
means and process of its encoding, interpretation and translation. However, Gale209 suggests that policy 
as text could be defined from an expansive perspective which moves policy beyond being conceptualised 
as mere documentation. This expansive perspective of policy as text is made up of four different, but 
interrelated perspectives: 
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(i) a form of policy that is understood or perhaps, distinguishable through meanings that can be 
ascribed to it  
(ii) a form of policy that has a specific meaning ascribed to it  
(iii) a form of policy that is separate and distinguishable from other policy forms, and  
(iv) a form of policy that can only be understood when set within a specific context.  
 
According to Jones210 a text-based form of policy may also carry with it the assumption that policy 
represents a type of communication that exists in the form of text contained in documents, He contends 
that such policy exists irrespective of whether any meaning can be gleaned from the text or whether the 
texts conjure multiple meanings and/or are prone to multiple and differing interpretations that may end 
up supporting the development and enactment of policy that is contradictory to the society’s benefit. Its 
focus is therefore on language used in documentation and how such language impacts on the effective 
communication and understanding of policy. More specifically, Ball211 claims that 
 
“…the translation of the crude, abstract simplicities of policy texts into interactive and 
sustainable practices of some sort involves productive thought, invention and adaptation” (p. 
19).  
 
Drawing from Ball212, Gale213 suggests that policy texts are at the core of the interrelationship between 
the production and interpretation of policy.  
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2.3.2 Policy as discourse 
The second refers to policy as ‘policy as discourse’214. Noting that discourse implies the social use of 
language, here, the emphasis is on the meaning and use of specific words contained in policy text. Ball215 
postulates that ‘policy as discourse’ involves 
 
 “…ways of talking about and conceptualizing policy” (p. 109).  
 
The literature216 suggests that the true meaning of discourse depends on the statements that both precede 
and succeed such discourse. In effect, policy as discourse focuses on the language of policy and how 
such language can be employed to facilitate dialogue and refract, produce or distort the desires and 
intentions of policy makers as captured in policy text. From Jones217, we come to understand that a 
discursive view of policy perceives the language utilised to construct meanings of text as determined by 
the nature of the society. In fact, according to Gilbert218, language within this context articulates how 
individuals 
 
“…enter into relations with each other as they engage in the process of producing and 
interpreting meaning” (p. 58).  
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According to Jones219, the main contribution of Gilbert’s220work is that he (Gilbert) was able to elaborate 
on the need to emphasise not only the interpretation but also the interaction between individuals in the 
society in the course of policy development, enactment and interpretation. 
Discourse also focuses on the way in which policy is formed, refined and shaped for 
consideration. In this context, among its different meanings221, discourse represents an embodiment of 
the interpretation and use of policy222. Bacchi223 defines discourse as  
  
“…the ways in which bodies of knowledge, interpretive schema, conceptual schema and signs 
define the terrain in ways that complicate attempts at change” (p. 48).  
 
By this definition, Bacchi 224 points out that it is the discourse perspective of policy that provides reasons 
on the difficulties associated with policy change and implementation although she does warn that 
unresolved ambivalence in terms of how best to combine the textual and discourse perspective of policy 
will continue to lead to unresolved tensions. This is a point also reiterated by Ball225. Of particular 
relevance is that it is through discourse that policy can be represented in a form which ends up subverting 
its true intentions. Thus, this perspective of policy suggests that, in terms of the public sector, problems 
are actually created by the nature of discourse contained in policy which is offered as representative of, 
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among other factors, the propositions that will guide decisions made by the various tiers of government. 
In other words, the premise of policy as discourse is that governments do not necessarily respond to 
societal problems via policy; instead, it is more likely that societal problems are actually created in the 
very policy that governments enact as responses to societal problems. The position adopted by Bacchi 
226 is supported by an earlier assertion by Goodwin227 who stated that the discourse perspective of policy 
 
“…frames policy not as a response to existing conditions and problems, but more as a discourse 
in which both problems and solutions are created” (p. 67).  
 
To summate, based on the works of Fairclough 228(p. 25), three attributes of ‘policy as discourse’ can be 
conceptualised. First, discourse can exist within the societal imperatives that drive the need for policy to 
be formulated. Second, discourse can encompass the actual production process. Finally, discourse is the 
text and language of the policy itself and how, specifically, such language is interpreted.  
 
2.3.3 Policy as value 
In addition to the conceptualisation of policy in the form of text229 and discourse230, policy can also be 
defined from a value perspective that conveys societal ideals231. Easton232 defined policy as 
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  “…a web of decisions and actions that allocates values” (pp.129-130). 
 
On the other hand, Kogan233 defined policy as the 
 
  “…authoritative allocation of values” (p. 55).   
 
The author contends that both definitions represent the value perspective of policy. This perspective of 
policy argues that policy is primarily a political objective234. Because values are most likely to be 
construed to mean a set of socially constructed attitudes and beliefs235, the primary interest of such values 
is the need to resolve conflicts over morality. Studies by Studlar and Cagossi236 found that in European 
countries and the United States, the main five areas of interest of this form of policy are (i) same-sex 
marriage, (ii) abortion, (iii) stem cell research, (iv) capital punishment, and (v) euthanasia and assisted 
suicide. For this reason, this form of policy is generally perceived as the most divisive and controversial; 
thus, the greater is the likelihood that it generally involves judicial intervention in its enactment237. It is 
not surprising therefore that Studlar and Cagossi238 suggest that the perceived role of the judiciary in 
policy as values (or the morality policy) requires further study.  Here they highlight that, over the years, 
the judiciary has taken on increasing roles in policy239. In fact, as this thesis demonstrates (a point also 
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noted by Studlar and Cagossi240), while the doctrine finality, conclusive and binding nature of judicial 
decisions as relates to policy may vary across different national jurisdictions, its importance cannot be 
underestimated.  
 Values can also mean qualities that contribute or constitute what may be determined to be ‘right’ 
or ‘good’241. The challenge with the values perspective of policy is that it is characterised by the reality 
that the enactment of policy is not a linear, rational or consensual process. Rather, it is a process that 
involves various interest groups and stakeholders, all in competition with each other242. For this reason, 
although governments are not the only institutions with public value obligations, they play a crucial role 
in shaping and influencing public values243. More specifically, what are considered public values tend 
to be aligned to the views of those with political authority which is why what are considered public 
values will generally correspond to the law. Thus, in its various rulings and findings, the judiciary will 
set legal obligations for public (for government and other public institutions) and private entities (for 
private individuals) in line with perceived societal values. The values perspective of policy suggests that 
policy enactment is a disjointed and reactionary process that is dependent on the circumstances, 
dominated by the stakeholder groups in a position at that particular point in time to control how values 
are allocated. According to Ozga244 these stakeholder groups are drawn from a variety of sources which 
include agencies, organisations and institutions that strive to generate and implement various policies 
through a number of different avenues including through agreements, policy networks and advocacy. 
Such advocacy may occur through a number of actions taken with a view to change legislation. However, 
while there has been a tendency for such legislative-changing advocacy, the reality is that values do not 
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always have to be captured within legal forms in order for society to acknowledge their relevance, 
importance or correctness. Thus, sometimes advocacy focuses on legal action through the courts.  
Values from a policy expectation will generally refer to the expectation of society245, manifested 
in the form of actions and behaviour. While socially constructed and, by implication, juristically derived, 
values may be on occasion be specific to a particular legal jurisdiction although it is safe to suggest that 
some values transcend juristic boundaries. Values are manifested in all forms of law, including private246 
law of which arbitration is a part. In terms of private law, there are possibly three key values that 
transcends most juristic boundaries adhere to. Broadly speaking, they focus on what we construe as 
 
(i) a legal dimensions of values – here it is expected that the society will not encourage the 
individual to be unfairly denied indelible rights to a fair and just hearing  
(ii) social dimensions of values, and  
(iii) economic dimensions of values.  
 
Social and economic values are related in that they both emphasise opportunities. Overall, both imply 
an expectation that societal value systems support, for example, 
 
(i) the right of individuals to develop themselves, and  
(ii) the right to trade and make a living.  
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This implies that societal value systems will support commercial activities that are conducted fairly, 
honestly and peacefully. Societal values are likely to disapprove of commercial activity which is 
unconscionable, dishonest, oppressive and conducted under duress. 
 
2.3.4 Policy as process 
The final form of policy highlighted in this thesis is ‘policy as process’. Because policies have also been 
seen to represent not only processes, but also outcomes247, the focus of this form of policy is on  the 
multi-level routines within which the intended outcomes of policy are achieved. As stated in the policy 
as values discussion, the policy process is neither a linear, rational nor consensual process; rather, it is a 
process that involves various interest groups and stakeholders, all in competition with each other. Policy 
generally involves a repetition of decisions where policy is constantly made and then revised. The 
process of policy encompasses how policy is developed (see, for example, Keeney et al.248), funded, 
resourced, tested, enacted, implemented and enforced and then monitored. However, as Jones249 notes, 
there is in reality no single and generally applicable policy process. In fact, policies do not need to be 
announced or distributed. Similarly, a policy can be completely abandoned without the need for any 
announcement. 
In sum, the four forms of policy which have been discussed suggests that policy can be 
represented in text, contextualised, and bound within a narrative or discourse250. Most importantly, all 
this will occur in a process which reflects societal value systems.  
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2.4 Policy and the courts 
2.4.1 Judges and policy making 
The erstwhile American jurist Benjamin N. Cardozo251 (p. 168) had suggested that: 
 
“…[Judges] do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we shall not help the 
cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do. The great tides and currents which engulf the 
rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by”. 
 
This dictum brought to the fore that the notion of the impartial judge whose exclusive premise is to 
debate obscure legal points is far from the reality. As the literature posits252, for judges to be able to 
properly settle disputes, it is imperative that they interact with various actors outside the institutional 
context of the courts thus familiarising themselves with events that occur outside the confines of not 
only the courtroom, but the legal profession as well.  
The contention that judges are makers of law is generally accepted in the academic literature253. 
For example, judges make law in that when occasions arise in disputes relating to the applicability of 
legislative provisions to a dispute within which such legislative provisions has not been previously 
applied, judges make law through their restatement of the law in a manner not previously done254.  
In the development of the law, it is also acknowledged that judges are required to call upon 
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“…common sense, legal principle and public policy in that order” (Lord Reid255: 25-9). 
 
Thus, in addition to their law-making function, judges are also political actors engaged in policy making. 
Defined by Grossman and Tanenhaus256 as “…the factor that punctuates the role of courts in the political 
system” (p. 406), the policy-making role of the judiciary has attracted considerable academic interest 
and been espoused in the works of numerous scholars over the years257. This policy-making role 
according to Roesler258 is indicative of the fact that the notion of the impartial judge whose exclusive 
premise is to debate obscure legal points is far from the reality. Instead, judicial policy making occurs 
because, as Volcansek259 notes, more often than not, judges are called upon to make rulings where either 
competing rules exist or where new ones have to be interpreted or where in fact, there are no clear rules. 
This of course does not mean that the legitimacy of such roles is widely shared. Indeed some scholars 
argue that the judiciary lacks any form of technical-related competency and political legitimacy to make 
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policy-related decisions260. In Anns v Merton261 heard in the House of Lords, this position was espoused 
by Lord Wilberforce who stated [at 754]: 
 
“Most, indeed probably all, statutes relating to public authorities or public bodies, contain in 
them a large area of policy. The courts call this ‘discretion’ meaning that the decision is one for 
the authority or body to make, and not for the courts”. 
 
In terms of technical-related competency, Plunkett262 for example points out that the judiciary are not 
conversant with policy via their training or educational background. On the other hand, as relates to 
political legitimacy, because the judiciary are generally not elected, they do not hold account to the 
public as, for example, government officials would.  
According to John Doyle263 the former Chief Justice of Australia, judges are engaged in policy 
making because when formulating a revised or new legal principle, in their quest to ensure that a practical 
judgement is rendered, judges are expected to take into consideration existing societal interests. It 
therefore follows that judges arrive at their rulings by drawing upon policy considerations in the sense 
that their decisions are influenced by their view of what the society considers as appropriate. This should 
be expected as the law does not serve its own interest. The law must serve and be seen to serve the 
interest of the society. It is important however to note that the policy-making role of the judiciary does 
not imply that it is their role to decide on what societal values are or what is in effect an appropriate 
value for the society. Judges make policy in that they must only take into consideration what those 
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societal values are and ensure that the law is appropriately aligned to such values. They also make policy 
when they make decisions not to affirm existing rules.  
According to Glick264, the most visible way in which this occurs is through the courts where 
judges seek to draw upon policy when creating legal solutions to disputes presented to them to adjudicate 
on. It therefore emerges that the judiciary will develop and draw upon policy when hearing and 
determining one case. Sometimes, however, such policy is developed and drawn upon in a number of 
cases which are all focused on the same or similar subject matter. Thus, according to Dahl 265, the 
judiciary play a policy role in that they adjudicate on controversies which involve policy questions.  
 
2.4.2 Principled or Policy judicial making 
Judicial decision making can either be driven by principles or policy266. It can also be driven from a 
confluence of both whereby, for example, legal principles are construed in the form of policy, or vice-
versa267). When judicial decisions are based solely on principle, it implies a set of broad (Hart268) and 
abstract legal rules (Beever269), which tend to serve to 
 
“…justif[y]ies an outcome on the basis that it conforms to a generalisation of a particular set 
of legal rules” (Plunkett270, p. 370).  
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Waddams271 further posits that principles are legal decisions that will be made based solely on 
generalised legal rules or reasoning. This also implies that such judicial decisions will be based on the 
application of such generalised legal rules to the dispute without any consideration for the potential 
impact of such judicial decisions on the society. Judicial decision making which is principle-driven 
emphasises interpersonal justice, which focuses on the standard or state of interactions, relationship and 
exchanges that exists between disputants272. The focus of legal principles is therefore on the individual 
disputants before the court. One key characteristic of the principle-based approach to justice according 
to Plunkett273 is that its advocates tend to opine the exclusiveness of its relevance. They do so on the 
premise that it is only by determining cases purely on legal principles that a key rule-of-law principle 
can be attained, as advocated by Lord Bingham274:  
 
 “…the law must be…clear and predictable” (p. 69).  
 
When a dispute comes before the courts, and judicial decision making is to be based on principles, judges 
traditionally draw upon legal history, analogy and custom (Winfield275) to make judicial decisions in six 
forms which have been identified by Daynard276 to comprise the following. He refers to the first type as 
the particularistic judicial decision type. Here, judicial decisions are reached with limited or no 
exploration of any legal principles nor impact of precedent. The objective of decision making here will 
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be simply to apply clearly articulated law to the facts of the case. The statutory judicial decision type is 
the second type of judicial decision making. Here, the primary objective of the court is to ensure that the 
a proper and correct interpretation of particular legislation and statute or rules is applied to the question 
of law before the court. The courts here will apply plain meaning of such laws to the case before them; 
but will also, in applying such law, be willing to draw upon accepted notions in the case of ambiguity 
with any of such statutory provisions. The precedential judicial decision t is the third type. Here, the 
courts will seek to defer to the doctrine of stare decisis. Precedent from similar prior cases is strictly 
drawn upon. Noted by Daynard277 as slightly similar to the statutory and precedential judicial decision 
types, the fourth type, the grand style judicial decision, occurs when the courts are only willing to go as 
far as recognising statute and precedent as persuasive and indicative of the law. Daynard278 claims that 
public policy considerations are only manifest in the fifth and sixth types of judicial decision making. In 
the fifth type, which he refers to as social policy asserted, social (public) policy is drawn upon as 
persuasive and indicative of the law. The final (sixth) judicial decision type which Daynard279 identifies 
is referred to as social policy derived. Here, judicial decision making is based on social (public policy). 
In this type of judicial decision making, the courts will go beyond the use of social (public) policy as 
persuasive and indicative of the law. Instead, the courts rigorously examine such policy, its intentions 
(directions) and likely (expansive) meanings within the context of justice.  
Policy as earlier discussed mainly refers to non-legal-based justifications. One key difference 
between the policy-based approach to justice and the principle-based approach is that, unlike the 
principle-based approach which opines exclusiveness in terms of relevance, the policy-based approach 
only claims that policy can be relevant to judicial decisions. This approach therefore recognises the 
relevance of legal principles, but only claims that such principles cannot be the sole considerations in 
judicial decision making. Plunkett280 posits that policy represents 
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 “…an alternative to an argument based on the strict law” (p. 369).  
 
Bell281 claims that policy-based reasoning in law serves as  
 
“…substantive justifications to which judges appeal when standards and rules of the legal 
system do not provide a clear resolution of a dispute” (p. 23).  
 
As observed in the literature, the role of policy (or the potential of such a role) has attracted the attention 
of a number of scholars with some (Stapleton282) noting particular advantages of its considerations in 
judicial decision making and others suggesting otherwise283. Policy-based reasoning is however of 
particular interest to private law of which arbitration (our main interest) is a constituent element, exerting 
considerable influence on rights-based theories of private law284. 
Dworkin285, Robertson286 and Plunkett287 suggest that from a private law context, policy tends to 
be construed predominantly from the perspective of goals. More specifically, Dworkin288 stated that 
“Arguments of policy justify a political decision by showing that the decision advances or protects some 
collective goal of the community as a whole” (p. 82) while Robertson289 stated that 
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“considerations of community welfare, as distinct from considerations of interpersonal justice” 
(p. 1).  
 
What this means is that, for those who advocate a policy-based approach to judicial decision making, 
the central ethos of policy-based reasoning is that, in determining legal disputes, the courts should not 
necessarily rely on the law itself (Beever290); instead, they should take into consideration factors likely 
to accentuate societal values and expectations. Plunkett291 points out that incorporating policy 
considerations in judicial decision making is important because of two factors – the reality that (i) the 
sole use of legal principles is seldom adequate to cater for the complexity and novelty of legal disputes, 
and (ii) the law should represent an instrument of attaining societal goals. By implication, it therefore 
appears that a policy-based approach to judicial decision making will emphasise the more general 
interest and concerns of the society (community) as against that of disputants standing before a court. 
This has led to some scholars such as Mason292 positing that a policy-based approach to judicial decision 
making equates to public policy. 
Thus, not surprisingly, Morgan293 suggests that policy-based reasoning in [tort] law is “a central, 
perhaps the central, characteristic of the judicial development of [tort] law” (p. 215). Similarly, 
Waddams294 claims that the policy-based approach to judicial decision making in contract law is of 
“enormous practical as well as theoretical importance” (p. 148). On the other hand, those who argue a 
principle-based approach to judicial decision making advocate that policy has no role in judicial 
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rulings295  and that, instead, the courts should focus exclusively on the individual rights and obligations 
of disputants296. 
The literature supports the contention that although forms and methods vary considerably, 
judicial policy making occurs both in civil law and common law traditions297. However, it is safe to posit 
that in civil law jurisdictions, there are more legal and institutional factors that will restrict judges from 
expressing their personal policy preferences. While it is noted that the civil law tradition expects judges 
to be rigorous in their application of the law to the facts of individual cases, judges are able to engage in 
policy making through ascribing different interpretations to legal provisions. 
A review of literature on judicial policy making in civil traditions suggests that there are 
approaches to judicial policy making in civil law traditions298. These two approaches are judicial review 
and  judicial interpretation. Under judicial review within a civil law tradition, the courts through vested 
constitutional powers will generally exercise their discretion to rule on the constitutional validity of 
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2.4.3 Factors favouring policy based judicial making 
According to Plunkett300, there are three principal factors which will favour a policy-based approach to 
judicial decision making. These three factors relate to (i) transparency, (ii) a clear differentiation between 
legal principles and policy, and (iii) conceptualisation of policy itself.  
The first factor which Plunkett301 highlights is transparency. One key attribute of the 
transparency factor in policy-based judicial decision making is a more open form of judicial reasoning. 
This differs significantly from principle-based judicial decision making which generally has the potential 
to obscure the reasoning behind judicial decisions302. According to Plunkett303, the advantages of the 
policy-based judicial decision making come from the fact that it does not place restrictions on the 
rationale for judicial decision making. This creates supporting conditions for the courts to articulate the 
rationale and reason for individual judgements, thus creating further opportunities for interested parties 
to understand how the courts reason. This scenario contributes to the development of the law in that such 
judicial reasoning can serve as precedent when applied to different scenarios.  
The second factor which Plunkett304 identified is differentiation. Here, the contention is that, in 
reality, there is no major distinction between principle and policy. Thus, irrespective of the view that 
legal principles focus predominantly on interpersonal forms of justice305 and policy principles focus 
predominantly on social imperatives, there is, in an actual sense, very limited differentiation between 
principle and policy because rights and obligations are in reality always traceable to social imperatives.  
The final factor which Plunkett306 identified is policy conceptualisation. More specifically, 
Plunkett307 claimed that one of the principal reasons why the policy-based approach to judicial decision 
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making was favoured is because accounts of the law which are free of policy are actually not cogent. 
Luntz308 supports this proposition by stating that the courts “…must make use of policy, since principle 
alone is seldom sufficient, to enable it to decide the cases before it” (p. 1). This position taken by Luntz309 
appears to be supported by Stapleton310 and Witting311 who both argue that, irrespective of attempts by 
the courts to give an impression that rulings are driven by principle; the reality is that judicial rulings 
flow from policy reasons. 
 
2.4.4 How the courts influence policy 
So how do the courts play a major and significant role in policy? The literature312 suggests that, 
irrespective of the courts serving as one of the three main arms of government, the role of the courts in 
policy making is not necessarily that straightforward. In fact, Dahl313 and Glick 314 claim that, in reality, 
the courts cannot make policy on their own. Dahl315 actually claims that, as relates to national policy 
making, the judiciary rarely play any decisive role.  
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Science, 41 (2), 468-498; McGuire, K. and Stimson, J. 2004. The least dangerous branch revisited: New evidence on 
Supreme Court responsiveness to public preferences. Journal of Politics, 66(4), 1018-1035; Bailey, M. and Maltzman, F. 
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The judiciary are only able to make policy indirectly through either their cooperation with other 
stakeholders such as the legislative and executive branches of government and other political agencies 
(Glick316), and by drawing upon their role in setting policy boundaries for the public sector (Casper317) 
or through their ability to determine the timing and effectiveness of subordinate policy. Overall, to make 
policy, the judiciary generally adopt any or a combination of the following approaches which may 
include: 
 
(i) through judicial review where the choices and considerations of the judiciary become part of 
the wider policy-making process318;  
(ii) through expressed views on policy as part of obiter dicta when making rulings;  
(iii) through their interpretation of laws – which will inevitably lead to the legislature intervening 
to revise or change the laws in question;  
(iv) through the judicial conferences where policy preferences and alternatives are discussed and 
recommendations made openly by the judiciary on matters both related and not related to the 
courts, and;  
(v) sometimes (although this raises considerable separation of powers questions) through 
recommendations made directly to the legislative and/or the executive branches of 
government.  
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Thus, in sum, the courts not only make or influence policy outside regular judicial decision-making 
channels319, but also do so by their ability to confer legitimacy on the actions of public servants and the 
policies that emerge from their activities. To summate, judicial policy making flows from the complex 
nature of relationships between the different (and numerous) actors involved in the politics of policy. 
Through judicial policy making, judges have been able to frame societal values in a manner enforceable 
by the state through its coercive power.  
 
2.5 Public policy 
2.5.1 What is public policy? 
The literature suggests that what is meant by public policy has not only historically been unclear320 but 
continues to remain so321; Conversely, Sterk322 states that public policy 
 
“…is a catchphrase elusive of meaning without reference to the context in which it is used” (p. 
483). 
 
Gibson323 describes public policy as a 
 
                                                 
319 Glick, H. 1970. Policy-Making and State Supreme Courts-The Judiciary as an Interest Group. Law & Society Review, 5 
(2), 271-292. 
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“…dynamic concept that evolves continually to meet the changing needs of society, including 
political, social, cultural, moral, and economic dimensions” (p. 1230).  
 
Similarly, Yelpaala324 had posited that  
 
“…public policy appears to have constantly defied all attempts at precise definition…and 
remains…vague, nebulous, intractable, and lacks meaningful and consistent contours that can 
guide its definition and application” (p.380).  
 
A review of international case law also suggests an acknowledgement of the vagueness of the concept 
of public policy. In the Duke of Norfolk's Case325, in considering the merits of public policy 
considerations in the common law rule against perpetuities, the court reflected:  
 
“Where will you stop, if you stop, if you do not stop here?... I will tell you where I will stop: I will 
stop wherever any visible inconvenience doth appear”.  
 
In the seminal case of Richardson v Mellish326 which dealt with a dispute over a contract that involved 
a presumed breach of contract to purchase command of a voyage ship in the Courts of Common Pleas, 
the courts stated that public policy was 
 
“... a very unruly horse, and once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It 
may lead you from sound law”.   
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Similarly, in Safeway Stores v Retail Clerks International Association327, the California Supreme Court 
in the US suggested that 
 
 “…what is public policy in a given case, is as broad as the question of what is fraud”.  
 
The vagueness of the concept is also recognised by the Supreme Court of India which stated in Murlidhar 
Aggarwal v State of Uttar Pradesh 328 that:  
 
“…public policy does not remain static in any given community. It may vary from generation to 
generation and even in the same generation”329.  
 
Although the author acknowledges the conceptual vagueness associated with the concept of ‘public 
policy’, there are attempts both in literature and in the case law to bring clarity to the concept. Scholars 
have not deferred to the judiciary on what is ‘public policy’ because, according to Traynor330, scholars 
should not 
 
“…be misled by the half-truth that policy is a matter for only the legislators to decide…” (p. 749). 
 
Public policy has been defined by Lowi331 as the 
 
“…deliberate coercion-statements attempting to set forth the purpose, the means, the subjects, 
and the objects of coercion” (p. 86).  
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At common law, public policy is defined more expansively by Walker332 as: 
 
“A very indefinite moral value, sometimes appealed to by Anglo-American courts as justifying a 
decision. It has been said to be a principle of judicial legislation or interpretation founded on 
the current needs of the community. It normally prohibits and rarely creates: the standard phrase 
is 'contrary to public policy'. It depends not on evidence but on judicial impression of what is or 
is not in the general public interest. For that reason judges have criticised it as providing an 
uncertain, even dangerous, standard, an 'unruly horse', and have been reluctant to invoke it in 
unprecedented circumstances” (p. 1015). 
 
Public policy is not an instant, determinate single phenomenon, but reflects a process with numerous 
decision points and participants333. Public policy is 
  
“…formulated by some governmental authority, expressing an intention to influence the 
behaviour of citizens, individually or collectively, by use of positive or negative sanctions” 
(Lowi334, p. 70). 
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Social Sciences, ed. Roger Noll. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
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2.5.2 Attributes of public policy 
Public policy exceptions flow from legal provisions which are rooted within national constitutions, 
treaties and legal precedent335. At the core of the ‘public policy’ exception is the focus on matters that 
may generate a wider national impact on society’s effects. However, Yelpaala336 emphasises that public 
policy is not necessarily about social-driven value systems. Instead, the focus of public policy is on how 
individual rights and obligations can be articulated within such a system. Thus, public policy should be 
about “…fundamental values of society are not subverted by sharp dealings, manipulative litigants, and 
by transactions contrary to the esprit de corps of the law” (p. 383) or, more importantly, as the Buea 
Court of Appeal in the Cameroons stated in Anya v Anya337,  it should be about “…natural justice, equity 
and good conscience” 
Kanakri and Massey338 suggest that the overriding determination of public policy may be 
consideration of those matters which have the potential to damage the 
 
 “…foundations on which society is based” (n.p). 
 
In effect, public policy serve as a means of ensuring that legal reasoning and decisions do not ignore the 
perception of the public on what represents an acceptable level of moral values and equitable justice339. 
So, what do we mean by public policy?  
Winfield340 defines public policy as “a principle of judicial legislation or interpretation founded 
on the current needs of the community” (p. 92). According to Easton341, public policy represents the 
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means by which values are allocated through politics. This is further espoused by Mason342, who 
highlights that a policy-based approach to judicial decision making can be equated to public policy.  
Yelpaala343 claims that conceptualising public policy against it’s “…ordinary meaning” (p. 388) 
allows for resolution of the challenge on whether its articulation requires that all available legislative 
provisions within a specific jurisdiction are taken into account. Historical case law appears to support 
this conceptualisation of public policy. Thus, in Egerton v Earl of Brownlow344 where the House of Lords 
considered a legal challenge related to the terms and conditions of a trust on the argument that such terms 
were against public policy, the courts suggested [at 196] that: 
 
“Public policy…is that principle of the law which holds that no subject can lawfully do that 
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public, or against the public good, which may be 
termed, as it sometimes has been, the policy of the law, or public policy in relation to the 
adminstration of the law.…”.  
 
Similarly, in Deutsche Schachtbau-und v. Ras al Khaimah National Oil345, the House of Lords in the 
context of arbitration stated that public policy [at 254] referred to matters deemed 
 
“… clearly injurious to the public good or, possibly, that enforcement would be offensive to the 
ordinary reasonable and fully informed members of the public on whose behalf the powers of the 
State are exercised”. 
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The issue here is that such wide conceptualisation of ‘public policy’ suggests that every legal ruling 
could be construed as representing an element of public policy. However, in Loucks v Standard Oil 346, 
the Court of Appeals of New York suggested that  
 
“…a statute or a decision would announce a state public policy only if it addresses some 
fundamental principle of justice, deeply rooted traditions, or good morals”. 
 
Arguably, the precise nature of ‘public policy’ as defined by the Supreme Court of India reflects the 
view of both academic scholarship347 and other judicial opinions, such as the United States Supreme 
Court in United Paperworkers Int'l Union348 [at 2] where it was stated that public policy must be 
 
“…well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal 
precedents, and not from general considerations of supposed public interests”. 
2.5.3 Fluidity in public policy 
The inconclusiveness of these different decision points means that what is extolled as public policy can 
change as the process of its formation and enactment evolves over a period of time.  
The literature349 suggests that the aim of Public policy (and/or public order)is to attain desired 
goals deemed to be in the societies’ best interests. It is therefore impacted by a wide range of economic, 
social and political factors350. Public policy is inherently a social process which aims to shape societal 
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values and aspirations. Public policy can also be described as an organised but not necessarily integrated 
range of actions, proposals, precepts and positions that affects the public. It encompasses a system of, 
for example, regulatory and other measures and priorities concerning topics promulgated by 
governments on behalf of the society they govern. Public policy is therefore not static: It can change in 
response to a myriad of reasons, which may include changes in demographics. Public policy therefore is 
expected to address societal concerns and aspirations. It must, however, be noted that not all public 
policies are necessarily promulgated for the benefit of the entire society. As Torjman351 claims, on some 
occasions, ‘public policy’ is promulgated to promote targeted interest of specific groups. However, on 
such occasions, such policies – while targeting specific interest groups – are expected to be of benefit to 
the wider society.  
 
2.5.4 Types of public policy 
Drawing from Torjman352, the author posits that public policy can be classified into four major types. 
The first type, referred to as ‘administrative public policy’, focuses on legislative provisions that exist to 
provide the necessary governance to societal work. From an administrative perspective, public policy 
represents the programmes by which officers of the state attempt to govern and exercise control over the 
public353. Heckathorn and Maser354 claims that this is only possible if public policy draws upon the 
contractual-based perspective which is focused on “… unanticipated physical and social conditions” (p. 
1104). It also involves administrative processes related to, for example, the collation of statistical 
information that can be utilised to support policy-related decision making. Ghodoosi355 identifies various 
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352 Torjman, S. 2005. What is policy. Caledon Institute of Social Policy, Ontario, Canada. 
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types of ‘administrative public policy’. These include (i) policies that limit the incorporation of foreign 
laws into national jurisprudence – this flows from society being unwilling to assent to foreign values, 
(ii) policies that forbid the enforcement of judgements from foreign jurisdictions and (iii) public policy 
as rules that ensure that personal rights to contract do not supersede societal values. 
The second type can be referred to as ‘structural public policy’; it focuses more on the internal 
process of policy introduction, formation and implementation, and seeks to explore where policy 
originates from and the framework of organisational structures that underpins the development of policy. 
At the heart of this form of public policy is stakeholder collaboration.  
Public policy can also be classified based on response (as the third type). Here, the interest is on 
whether policy is introduced, formed and enacted in response to, for example, a crisis or whether such 
policy is introduced, formed and enacted consciously and intentionally. Heckathorn and Maser356 
advance a contractual perspective of the ‘response-based form of public policy’ that is based on 
transaction cost economics. This contractual perspective argues that, for example, the predominant role 
of the government (in this case, the judiciary) is to economise costs associated with business transactions. 
Thus, intervention in disputes will only tend to arise on the occasion that individuals become unable to 
resolve private disputes.  
The fourth type of public policy classification deals with ‘time frame’, the major interest being 
to understand whether a particular policy is currently or not currently within the scope of public interest.  
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In addition to the four types of public policy gleaned from Torjman357, public policy can also be 
explored from a number of other perspectives including an economic and political perspective358, the 
sociological perspective359 and a legal perspective360. 
 
2.5.5 The administrative sciences and legal perspectives of public policy 
The administrative sciences perspective emerges from the idea that policy is in its own right as an arm 
of socio-political action capable of altering critical elements of administration361. The administrative 
sciences perspective serves a number of functions, providing insights into the role of politics, and 
articulating how processes, routines362 and organisational structures363 serve to guide policy decisions 
made by government364. Drawing from Metcalfe365, the focus of the administrative sciences perspective 
is on the managerial capacity required to ensure appropriate performance. Policy from an administrative 
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sciences perspective has the ability to be disruptive leading to the need for routines to be altered and 
resources to be redistributed366. This can lead to a need for  
 
“…negotiation, contestation or struggle between different groups who may lie outside the formal 
machinery of official policy-making” (Ozga367; p. 113).  
 
Managing the negotiation required within the myriad of multi-layered and complex relationships 
that characterises public policy requires constant shaping of management capabilities in a manner that 
allows for assumptions and interests to be re-evaluated and repositioned as need be. In particular, it also 
requires stakeholder engagement between government and non-state actors. 
 Of also interest to public policy is its legal perspective368. This perspective is particularly 
interested in understanding how socially framed policy, which are in reality discretionary, can be 
validated utilising instruments of the law369. The legal perspective of policy serves the primary function 
of providing the necessary foundations (legitimization) of public policy implementation370. In effect, it 
is the legal perspective that provides the authoritative context for policy implementation. The legal 
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Management: Starting to Talk Workshop held at the European University Institute (Part I), pp. 5-10; Strauss, P. 2001. 
Public Management From a lawyers Perspective: A view from the United States, In George, A., Machado, P., and Ziller, J. 
(eds) European University Institute Working Paper LAW No. 2001/12 Law and Public Management: Starting to Talk 
Workshop held at the European University Institute (Part I), pp. 11-14; Lynn, L. 2009. Restoring the rule of law to public 
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management, and political science. Public Administration Review, 71(1), 96-101. 
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perspective of policy also provides the necessary governance framework and analytical tools required to 
effectively articulate individual the relationship, but also how these relationships can be regulated and 
enforced 371. A further governance role of the legal perspective as relates to governance is that they serve 
to provide the necessary checks against unfettered public sector discretion and self-serving interests (or 
non-critical deference to the government by public sector managers372. They also not only provide the 
necessary framework for accountability (clarity in terms of responsibilities and roles) of the public 
service bureaucracy373, but also ensure that such frameworks are legitimately established and can be 
enforced to ensure effective functioning of the society. In effect, drawing from Ibanez374, the legal 
perspective ensures that the key regulatory and procedural principles of the rule of law guides policy 
development and implementation. In sum, Metcalfe375 claims that the focus of the legal perspective is 
on the legitimization of power and the articulation of legal authority (in effect, the mandate to manage).  
 
2.5.6 The law and public policy 
A core aspect of public policy is the law. The law is important to public policy because for public policy 
to be enforceable, it must have legal force376. Thus, it is of no surprise that scholars such as Kain and 
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The Oxford handbook of political science (pp. 885-918). Oxford, Inglaterra: Oxford University Press. 
95 
 
Yoshida377 claim that public policy remains one of the most arcane concepts in the laws. The literature378 
suggests that the concept of public policy is to be found in virtually all areas of law including public law, 
private law (more specifically, contract law) and real estate. Along the same lines, Ghodoosi379 suggests 
that the term ‘public policy’ exists in practically all legal systems making it a well-recognised legal 
concept in numerous legal jurisdictions. For example, a search by Ghodoosi380 in 2015 in Westlaw, an 
online legal research service for lawyers and legal professionals in the United States, found more than 
7000 case references to public policy. We conducted a similar search on BAILII, the British and Irish 
Legal Information Institute website and found 8902 case references to ‘Public policy’. The pervasive 
nature of the public policy concept has led to scholars suggesting that the concept is not only an 
indication of judicial deference “…towards a rational system of justice” (Waddams381, p. 404), but that 
it fundamentally is “…the one principle rule at the foundation of the whole system of [English] law” 
(Knight382, p. 219). However, although public policy is pervasive in judicial decision making, the 
literature383 does suggest it has its limit in terms of applicability; that limit is that it is the law that 
eventually leads to public policy. Any considerations of public policy in judicial decision making cannot 
be done in a manner that contradicts national legislative provisions. In this context, policy only serves 
to support the courts in their efforts to interpret such legislative provisions.   
                                                 
377 Kain, B. and Yoshida, D. 2007. The Doctrine of Public Policy in Canadian Contract Law. Annual Review of Civil 
Litigation. In Todd L. Archibald and Randall Scott Echlin (eds), Annual Review of Civil Litigation, Pub. Toronto: 
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Virginia Law Review, 25 (1), 37-67; Tirona, S. 1941. What is Public Policy. Philippine Law Journal, 21, 158 – 170; 
Paulsen, M. and Sovern, M. 1956. Public Policy” in the Conflict of Laws. Columbia Law Review, 56(7), 969-1016; Stigler, 
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Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements. Nebraska Law Review, 94 (3), 685-736.  
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383 Daynard, R. 1970. Use of Social Policy in Judicial Decision-Making. Cornell Law Review, 56 (6), 919-950; Chayes, A., 
1976. The role of the judge in public law litigation. Harvard Law Review, 89 (7), 1281-1316; Abella, R. 1988. Public 
Policy and the Judicial Role. McGill Law Journal, 34 (4), 1021-1035; Handler, A. 1999. Judging Public Policy. Rutgers 
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According to Winfield384, public policy has influenced the law in three ways. Firstly, it is 
observed that legal rules which emerged from public policy considerations now require legislation before 
they can be altered. Secondly, it is observed that legal rules exist which are dependent on relatively 
debateable public policy, and cases in these area still require adjudication. Third, it is observed that there 
are legal rules flowing from public policy which are still subject to changes. 
Public policy also plays a major role in arbitration. More specifically, according to Nuss385 and 
Hollander386 there are two aspects of public policy in law as relates to arbitration. The first relates to 
process and procedures while the second relates to the substantive essence of the law itself. In terms of 
process and procedures, the emphasis is on whether the arbitration proceedings is/was undertaken in a 
manner consistent with fundamental and well recognised rule of natural justice and fairness (such as the 
right to be heard).  
 
2.5.7 Public policy based approach to judicial decision making 
We had for example earlier stated (drawing from Mason387), that a policy-based approach to judicial 
decision making can be equated to public policy. However, Baron Pollock notes in Egerton v Earl of 
Brownlow388 [at 149/150] 
 
“…that all matter relating to the public welfare - all acts of the legislature or the executive - must 
be decided and determined upon their own merits only”.  
 
                                                 
384 Winfield, P. 1928. Public Policy in the English Common Law. Harvard Law Review, 42(1), 76-102. 
385 Nuss, J. 2013. Public Policy Invoked as a Ground For Contesting the Enforcement of an Arbitral Award, or for Seeking 
its Annulment. Dispute Resolution International, 7, 119-133. 
386 Hollander, P. 2016. Report on the Public Policy Exception in the New York Convention. Dispute Resolution 
International, 10, 35-50 
387 Mason, A. 2001. Policy Considerations. In A. Blackshield, A., Coper, M., and Williams, G. (eds.), The Oxford 
Companion to the High Court of Australia (Melbourne, Oxford), 536. 
388 Egerton v Earl of Brownlow [1853] 4 HLC 484. 
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In effect, public policy considerations in judicial decision making had to be determined on their 
merits alone. While public policy is pervasive in judicial decision making (Wedel et al.389, p. 31), it can 
often play a direct or an indirect role in shaping judicial decision making in that its incorporation in 
judicial decision making can be unconscious or conscious390. However, as demonstrated in the seminal 
case of Egerton v Earl of Brownlow391, the incorporation of public policy considerations in judicial 
decision making has historically been regarded as controversial and associated with considerable debate 
due to the lack of clarity on the true meaning of public policy; thus, Furmston’s392 claim that public 
policy has been “clouded by much confusion of thought” (p. 405).  
Winfield’s393 case analysis of Egerton v Earl of Brownlow394 suggests, for example, that the 16 
judges involved in this case developed various and remarkably differing connotations of public policy. 
These ranged from its representation as a basic guide for establishing the objective of particular laws to 
an abstraction of judicial legislation that was independent of both individual circumstances and also of 
time. More specifically, the courts [at 123] stated the following:  
 
“Public policy is a vague and unsatisfactory term, and calculated to lead to uncertainty and 
error, when applied to the decision of legal rights; it is capable of being understood in different 
senses; it may, and does, in its ordinary sense, mean ‘political expedience,’ or that which is best 
for the common good of the community; and in that sense there may be every variety of opinion, 
according to education, habits, talents, and dispositions of each person, who is to decide whether 
an act is against public policy or not. It is the province of the statesman, and not the lawyer, to 
discuss, and of the Legislature to determine, what is best for the public good, and to provide for 
                                                 
389 Wedel, J., Shore, C., Feldman, G. and Lathrop, S. 2005. Toward an anthropology of public policy. Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 600(1), 30-51. 
390 Winfield, P. 1928. Public Policy in the English Common Law. Harvard Law Review, 42(1), 76-102. 
391 Egerton v Earl of Brownlow [1853] 4 HLC 484. 
392 Furmston, M. 2001. Cheshire, Fifoot & Funnston's Law of Contract, 14th ed. London: Butterworths. 
393 Winfield, P. 1928. Public Policy in the English Common Law. Harvard Law Review, 42(1), 76-102. 
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it by proper enactments. It is the province of the judge to expound the law only; the written from 
the statutes: the unwritten or common law from the decisions of our predecessors and of our 
existing courts, from the text writers of acknowledged authority, and upon principles to be clearly 
deduced from them by sound reason and just inference; not to speculate upon what is best, in his 
opinion, for the advantage of the community. Some of these decisions may have no doubt been 
founded upon the prevailing and just opinions of the public good; for instance, the illegality of 
covenants in restraint of marriage or trade. They have become part of the established law, and 
we are therefore bound by them, but we are not thereby authorised to establish as law everything 
which we may think for the public good, and prohibit everything which we think otherwise”. 
 
This observation is based on the variability around the concept of public policy. The literature395 posits 
that this variability stems from the reality that a particular set of actions in one country, society or 
location may be construed to be against public policy, while in another country, society or location; such 
an action will be construed as in line with public policy. Thus, the case law is repellent with the courts 
arriving at what appears to be different conclusions when public policy is drawn upon as a basis of 
judicial ruling. 
 
Bockstiegel396(p. 123) suggests that  
 
“Public policy is a relative concept dependent on the judgment of the legal community and that 
public policy can change through time”.  
                                                 
395 Knight, W. 1922. Public Policy in English Law. Law Quarterly Review, 38 (2), 207-219; Winfield, P. 1928. Public 
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At the same time, Wakim397 states that 
 
“…the construction of public policy by national courts turns on legal interpretation as much as 
it does on political, sociological, and even religious matters”. 
 
Yelpaala398 also suggests that the difficulty with public policy considerations is that, while on the facts 
a specific case may not appear to have implications for a specific public policy; it may actually indirectly 
impact upon a number of contradictory policies.  In fact, according to Hodges399, the basic principle of 
the public policy exception is an observation that  
 
“...the public's interest in confining the scope of private agreements to which it is not a party will 
go unrepresented unless the judiciary takes account of those interests when it considers whether 
to enforce such agreements” (p. 101). 
 
The choice of public policy to be considered in a particular dispute can in itself be a decision based on 
individual preferences400. It is for these reasons that some legal practitioners have expressed reservations 
over taking public policy into consideration in judicial decisions, except under well-defined and limited 
conditions. This view is also shared in judicial decisions; thus, in Richardson v Mellish401, the English 
courts found that 
 
                                                 
397 Wakim, M. 2008. Public Policy Concerns Regarding Enforcement of Foreign International Arbitral Awards in the 
Middle East. New York International Law Review, 21(1), 1-51. 
398 Yelpaala, K. 1989. Restraining the Unruly Horse: The Use of Public Policy in Arbitration, Interstate and International 
Conflict of Laws in California. Journal of Transnational Law, 2 (2), 379-494. 
399 Hodges, A. 2000. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law. Ohio 
State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 16 (1), 91-164. 
400 Coffin, F. 1988 Judicial balancing: the protean scales of justice. New York University Law Review, 63 (1), 16-42. 
401 Richardson v Mellish, [18241 130 Eng. Rep. 294. 
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“…the courts of Westminster-hall…have gone much further than they were warranted in going 
in questions of policy”. 
 
Judicial attempts to instil clarity on the concept of public policy can be best understood from a historical 
perspective of the case law in the first instance because the determination of what is public policy is as 
stipulated in Building Serv. Employees International Union Local 262 v Gazzam402 where the United 
States Supreme Court stated that 
 
“…the public policy of any state is to be found in its constitution, acts of the legislature and 
decisions of its courts…primarily, it is for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the 
state”. 
 
This position was also reiterated in W.R. Grace & Co. v Local Union 759, International Union of United 
Rubber Workers403 where it was stated that determination of what was public policy was 
 
“…ultimately one for resolution by the courts”.  
 
Relying on judicial determination of the public policy concept is reasonable. According to Sharma404, 
this is because 
 
“…principle of judicial legislation or interpretation [are] founded on the current needs of the 
community” (p. 147).  
                                                 
402 Building Serv Employees Int'l Union Local 262 v Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537-38 (1950). 
403 W.R. Grace & Co. v Local Union 759, International Union of United Rubber Workers (1983) at 461 U.S. 757, 766 
(1983). 
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This position appears to be reiterated in by the United States Supreme Court in Hurd v Hodge405 where 
it was opined that 
 
“...the public policy of the United States [is] . . . manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal 
statutes, and applicable legal precedents”. 
 
Similarly, in United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association406, a case dealing with a dispute over 
an illegal agreement, commenting on policy reasons for determining that there is no remedy at law where 
contractual agreements are illegal, the United States Supreme Court suggested that 
  
“…when the law-making power speaks upon a particular subject, over which it has constitutional 
power to legislate, public policy in such a case is what the statute enacts”. 
 
As a concept recognised in the laws, historical commentaries by Veeder407; Knight,408 and Winfield409 
make earlier references by the English courts to concepts such as ‘equity of public necessity’ and ‘public 
policy’ in cases such as Mitchel v Reynolds410 which was decided in 1711 and had focused on deciding 
on the true meaning of reasonable restraints of trade. Other historical cases that appear to have addressed 
public policy issues include the Duke of Norfolk's Case, Jones v Randall411, Gilbert v Sykes412, Cole v 
                                                 
405 Hurd v Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948). 
406 United States v Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) [1]. 
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Gower413, Kircudbright v Kircudbright414, Kingston v Pierepont415, and Lawton v Lawton416. However, 
Tirona417, Gualtieri418 and Brachtenbach419 suggested that the impact of public policy considerations on 
judicial decision making was perhaps first explored in considerable detail in the seminal case of Egerton 
v Earl of Brownlow420 with the courts finding that public policy focused on the ‘spirit of the law’ and 
not necessarily on the actual law itself. 
 
2.5.8 When is public policy engaged? 
In effect, public policy considerations do take effect when the dispute between two or more parties draws 
upon legislative provisions, legal principles and/or supporting case law (precedent) which has the 
potential to go beyond dispensing justice between the disputing parties by invariably impacting, 
interfering with or compromising the interests of the wider public. 
Thus, according to the literature421, the question of public policy flows from society’s increasing 
reliance on the courts and judiciary to resolve an increasing number of social challenges and questions. 
These may relate to questions of free speech, religious rights, civil liberties, and freedom of association. 
The danger of course is that, irrespective of the author’s earlier justifications on why the judiciary was 
best placed to articulate precisely what public policy meant, one might still contend that the court’s 
perception of public policy is restrictive since it was based on their own perception of what actually 
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417 Tirona, S. 1941. What is Public Policy. Philippine Law Journal, 21, 158 - 170. 
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constitutes ‘Public policy’. This assertion is made taking into consideration the literature which has 
questioned the role of the judiciary in public policy making. Ghodoosi422(p. 7), for example, claims that 
similar questions were raised in Egerton v Earl of Brownlow423. In addition, there are some scholars – 
notably Sterk424 and Stempel425 and more recently Wasserfallen426 – who suggest that deferring to the 
judiciary on the articulation of public policy allows a much wider scope of judicial policy making and 
discretion, and by implication, wider powers to make law. Also, because ‘Public policy’ considerations 
go beyond a “…rule by the law alone” (Harvey427, p. 493), the notion of ‘public policy’ is problematic 
in that it can be used to defeat substantive obligations and rights owned by particular disputants428. This 
can lead to injustice; hence, the dicta by the courts in Janson v Driefontein Mines429 [at 491] where (the 
then) Lord Halsbury stated:  
 
“I deny that any court can invent a new head of public policy”. 
 
In effect, the courts denied the possibility that judicial decisions could be influenced by a change in legal 
principles flowing from public policy. One could then argue that the danger of incorporating public 
policy considerations to challenge and vacate arbitration awards is that it raises connotations of 
obligations and rights being superseded by considerations that fall outside the remit of legal merits430. 
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In fact, a much wider implication is that incorporating Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) 
considerations into legal reasoning can – according to Ghodoosi431 – actually constrain the development 
of the law. As Winfield432 suggests, these differing views of public policy ultimately created 
considerable uncertainties as relates to the assertion of legal rights. 
As relates to purpose, some jurors have – as in the case of Fletcher v Sondes433 – expressed a 
view that public policy considerations should guide judicial decision making where the law was less than 
clear while others have opined that the legislature should be left to fill the gap where the law was less 
than clear. The main argument here as stated in Denny v Denny434 is that the judiciary should focus on 
interpreting the law as against proffering and articulating public policy. However, the thread that appears 
to be running right through academic commentary is that while the willingness of the courts to make 
judicial rulings based on public policy considerations remains controversial, the courts are still obliged 
and (perhaps more so than ever) bound to take public policy into consideration in their judicial rulings.  
Thus, irrespective of the claims of Lord Haldane the eminent jurist in Rodriguez v Speyer Bros435 that 
public policy considerations involved “the opinions of men of the world, as distinguished from opinions 
based on legal learning”, it is the judiciary that is best placed to objectively articulate public values, 
which have been determined by the society. 
According to Winfield436 the root of academic commentary on public policy considerations in 
judicial decision making can be traced to the works of Littleton437 where, in numerous paragraphs, it was 
postulated that laws cannot be said to exist if such laws were: 
 
(i) inconsistent with other well-recognised laws, and  
                                                 
431 Ghodoosi, F. 2015. The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting the Role of the Public Policy Doctrine in the 
Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements. Nebraska Law Review, 94 (3), 685-736. 
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436 Winfield, P. 1928. Public Policy in the English Common Law. Harvard Law Review, 42(1), 76-102. 
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(ii) such laws appeared illogical, even to someone not trained in or conversant with the laws.  
 
Underpinning public policy considerations are considerations of the public good438, in other words, 
matters which are either repugnant to the society or against any reasonable maxim related to the rule of 
law. It then transpires that public policy considerations should focus on ensuring that legally protected 
rights and expectations of and obligations to the public are not interfered with or compromised. The 
premise for this, as emphasised by the United States Supreme Court in Trist v Child 439,is that 
 
“No people can have any higher public interest, except the preservation of their liberties, than 
integrity in the administration of their government in all its departments”. 
 
Thus, public policy considerations represent a means by which the government enacts its social contract 
with the society within its jurisdiction440. Noting all the above, Winfield441 suggests that, while it may 
be challenging to articulate a general understanding of judicial attitude to public policy, it is safe to 
suggest that judicial attitude gleaned from seminal cases suggests some sort of overall cautious 
acceptance of the concept of public policy although, as the courts stated [at 507] in Janson v Driefontein 
Mines, public policy remains 
 
“…a very unstable and dangerous foundation on which to build until made safe by judicial 
decision”. 
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2.6 Public Policy and ‘Order Public’ (public order) 
Public order is a concept “embodied by statute in the rules of civil law countries” (Murphy442, p. 599) 
meaning that the concept of public order is primarily applicable to civil law jurisdictions. In these 
jurisdictions, Wedel et al443 claims that it refers to “…police or, more precisely, to organize and regulate 
the internal order of”. Public order implies “rules from which parties have no freedom to derogate” 
(Kessedjian444, p. 26). Conversely, ‘Public policy’ is a concept primarily applicable to common law 
jurisdictions445. In common law jurisdictions, public policy tends to be construed explicitly as 
fundamental societal values (Hollander446) while in civil law jurisdictions, public order tended to be 
construed from a more legalistic perspective based on economic, political and moral regulation. The 
essence of the public order concept is to provide various stakeholders through judicial pronouncements 
guidance (through regulation) on how to balance between the rights of the individual and the need to 
protect and maintain “national attitudes on morality and political order” (Murphy447, p. 599).  
As had been noted earlier in the introductory chapter of the thesis, UAE law448 makes reference 
to public order as against public policy. From the extant literature reviewed, the author is not aware at 
present of any conclusive and universally accepted academic or judicial definition of public order449. In 
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fact, from all indications, ‘Public order’ as also in the case of ‘Public policy’450 is a dynamic and 
constantly evolving concept. More specifically, in scholarly circles and judicial rulings such as 
Richardson v Mellish451 , the public order concept has been conceptualised as vague. Lloyd452 had noted 
for example that “The limits of external public order are very uncertain, linked as that conception is with 
such indeterminate notions as the maintenance of social order or public security” (p.78). Xiao and 
Huo453(p. 676) note for example that “…the wording related to the doctrine sometimes appearing in 
terms of ‘sovereignty, security and social and public interests’ and sometimes in terms of ‘socio-public 
interests”. Similar observations were made earlier by Enonchong454.In the case of public order, any 
expectations that a conclusive and universally accepted academic or judicial definition should be 
possible is unrealistic because what is construed as public order is largely dependent on the facts of each 
case under consideration by the courts455.  
 The non-existence of a conclusive and universally accepted academic or judicial definition of 
public order does not mean that there have been no academic or judicial attempts to define the concept. 
Bernier456 had defined public order (ordre public) as “… the collection of conditions-legislative, 
departmental, and judicial-which assure, by the normal and regular functioning of the national 
institutions, the state of affairs necessary to the life, to the progress, and to the prosperity of the country 
and of its inhabitants” (p. 84).  Gualtieri457(p. 162) stated that “the concept of public order is a concept 
comprised of an inner degree of permanency (the notion of public order) and of a peripheral expression 
of variable relativistic rules (the laws of public order) established for the maintenance of society by 
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Journal of International and Comparative Law, 11 (3), 591-616; Gibson, C. 2008. Arbitration, civilization and public 
policy: Seeking counterpoise between arbitral autonomy and the public policy defense in view of foreign mandatory public 
law. Penn State Law Review, 113 (4), 1227-1268. 
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preserving the public interest”. Thus, according to Bewes458, the focus of public order is on articulating 
“…national thought on customs deemed as essential to the existence of the society” (p. 318).  According 
to Murphy459, public order refers to positive laws of the state which allow the judiciary limited discretion 
to nullify private agreements which are deemed as threats to social order or public security. Xiao and 
Huo460 claim that public order will generally be implored when the enforcement of a private contract or 
arbitral award will offend the economic and social interests of the state, or the state’s conception of good 
morals and values and/or principles of justice.  
From a practical standpoint, most courts in civil jurisdictions (where the concept is more widely 
applied) are unlikely to be burdened with detailed guidance on what constitutes public order (apart from 
a legislative statement as in the case with Article 3 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992). Arguably, this 
concept of ‘Public order’ suggests laws focused on accomplishing matters of societal/public interest – 
whether they be of social, political, economic, moral or religious nature461. More specifically, the basis 
of public order is collective life of which matters such as marriage, human liberty, inviolability of private 
property and social affiliation lie at its core462.  
Despite the fact that public order has its origins in statute (in civil law jurisdictions) while public 
policy is largely a derivative of the common law (in common law jurisdictions)463, both public order and 
public policy share largely similar ethos. Both focus on actions deemed contrary to public order or public 
policy that will not be recognised or enforced by national courts. Both concepts represent corrective 
actions of final resort464 or what Juenger465 has referred to as a “safety valve” (p. 157). More specifically, 
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Murphy466 points to both concepts being focused on determining what is “unacceptable because of its 
moral attitude, its threat to social order, or some other fundamental defect rendering it unworthy of 
enforcement in a civilized country” (p. 615). This has led a number of scholars and commentators 
including Angell and Feulner467, Dimitrakopoulos468, Kantaria469, Almutawa and Maniruzzaman470 and 
Kanakri and Massey471 to conclude that the notion of public order can be equated to public policy472. 
This position is supported by judicial findings. Herein, Privy Council in Evanturel v Evanturel473opined 
that 
 
“…their Lordships will treat ‘public order’ as identical with what in this country is termed 
‘public policy’, although the latter is perhaps the larger of the two terms” (p.26). 
 
However, it is important to note that while the two concepts have been construed in various literatures, 
some scholars opine that both concepts are actually not exact equivalents474. In fact, Murphy475 claims 
that the differences are not in their substantive elements, but in terms of their structure. Both Husserl476 
and Xiao and Huo477 point to public order being a broader concept that extends beyond the scope of 
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public policy while Scott478 and Gualtieri479 suggest that this extension is specific to public order’s 
consideration of morality480. Herein, morality focuses on “rights, obligations, responsibilities and 
conduct which are valid according to the principles of morality” (Scott481, p. 140). However, this claim 
does not appear to be supported by other literatures; Knight482, for example, points to early 
conceptualisation of public policy being related to actions deemed “immoral or illegal” (p. 209). Another 
difference between public order and public policy is the perspective that public policy focuses on 
practical cases as against the focus of public order on abstract notions of order, peace and security483. 
Most notably, although Kessedjian484 points out that it is unclear as to whether public order and public 
policy differ in either content or method, she suggests that a major difference between the two concepts 
is that while public order generally seeks to intervene prior to the legal analysis is undertaken, public 
policy only appears to intervene afterwards. Thus, drawing from the literature on ‘public policy’ and 
also that of ‘public order’, the difference between the two concepts are summarised in the below Table 
2 (below).  
 
Table 2: Difference between ‘Public policy’ and ‘Public order’  
Attribute Public policy Public order 
Focus Value based Regulatory based 
How it is interpreted Driven by the courts interpretation of 
what the society desires. 
Driven by the interest of the state to 
regulate the society based on its 
interpretation of what is necessary for 
social harmony. 
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Morality (disputed) Does not encompass morality. 
However, some literatures485 do 




In Evanturel v Evanturel486, the Privy 
Council found that public policy was a 
much broader concept than public 
order. 
Both Husserl487 and Xiao and Huo  
488claim that public order is a much 
broader concept than public policy. 
Nature Focuses on practical cases. 
Focus on abstract notions of order, peace 
and security. 
 
There are two perspectives of public order489. One perspective (seen to be akin to public policy 
in common law jurisdictions) suggests that the courts will not enforce private contractual agreements 
which are drawn up for individual interests (and which stem from principles of freedom to contract) and 
are likely to (i) be construed as pernicious or repugnant or (ii) likely to override public interest, social 
norms, customs and institutions and also the organization and functioning of the state490. Neither will 
the courts seek to enforce private contractual agreements that are likely to override or offend public 
interest. Conversely, the other perspective (the civil law perspective) suggests that certain legislative 
provisions cannot be subjugated if doing so will offend fundamental societal norms491.  
As Bewes492 further notes, one characteristic of the public order notion is that its breach is 
generally not tolerated by the state for the simple reason that the state construes the maintenance of 
public order as one of its core functions. As Xiao and Huo493 claim, when public order is invoked, there 
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is an appearance that the state deemed it necessary to maintain at all costs some moral, legal (justice), 
economic or social principle.  
 
2.7 Public policy and Arbitrability 
2.7.1 Arbitrability 
The literature suggests that there are five principles likely to form the basis of arbitration proceedings. 
These are (i) party autonomy which is underlined by the Freedom of contract theory494, (ii) the principle 
of separability which allows for arbitration clauses to be deemed separated from the main contact495, (iii) 
the principle of non-judicial intervention in arbitration, (iv) the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle496 
which holds that arbitrators and arbitral tribunals are generally deemed competent to determine their 
own jurisdiction and (v) the principle of arbitrability. Overall, although the literature on the first four of 
these factors appears largely well established497, Idornigie498 claims that arbitrability seems to have 
remained a fluid concept because there is no uniformity in terms of how arbitrability is construed in 
different jurisdictions.  
The literature499 suggests that arbitrability raises the question of whether a specific dispute or 
controversy from the perspective of domestic national law can be settled exclusively via arbitration or 
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exclusively via court based litigation500. There are two ambits to this question501. First is the question of 
whether the specific subject matter of a dispute or controversy can according to applicable national 
law502, public policy503 or other political and economic policies504 be subject to arbitration. This is 
referred to as ‘objective arbitrability’505 . According to Brekoulakis506 national law may articulate the 
scope of arbitrability either through legislation articulated in non-arbitration laws. For example, national 
legislation may articulate matters deemed to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of national courts. 
Alternatively, it may through specific arbitration legislation, set out the scope of arbitration. 
While we do not have a widely accepted theory of arbitrability507 nor an exclusive list of 
arbitrable and non-arbitrable activities508,  it will appear reasonable to assert that the arbitrability will be 
premised on the basis that the specific dispute does not engage upon matters seen to be within the 
exclusive sovereign function of the state509. Thus, disputes that involve national foreign policy, the 
enactment of legislation, the administration of justice and national economic policy generally are matters 
connected to the sovereignty of states and will therefore be inarbitrable. In Muslim countries, this list 
may be extended to certain banking and commercial activities which may be deemed as incompatible 
with the principles of Islamic Sharia. The second ambit to the arbitrability question enquires as to 
whether specific individuals, groups or entities are competent or do have the capacity to enter into an 
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arbitration agreements and/or participate in arbitration proceedings510. This is referred to as ‘subjective 
arbitrability’. In some countries, national legislation either limits or forbids organs of the state from 
signing contracts with arbitration clauses or actually participating in arbitration proceedings.  
It is important to highlight that some literatures have explored arbitrability much broader than 
what we have identified as either objective arbitrability or subjective arbitrability. For example, some 
literatures511 have also identified arbitrability to be dependent upon validity of agreements. Thus, 
arbitrability will be dependent upon either the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate. In other 
instances, scholars have explored arbitrabilitity from a rights perspective512. Here, it is opined that 
arbitration is unsuitable to resolve disputes that may impact on third party rights (that is the rights of 
parties who are not consensual parties to the arbitration agreement). Cozac513 has identified eight 
different means by which arbitral panels/arbitratord may determine arbitrability. These includes the (i) 
national laws of either the disputants or one of the disputants, (ii) general laws of contract, (iii) national 
laws applicable at the seat of arbitration, (iv) national laws deemed to be able to competently adjudicate 
the dispute if not identified within the contracts arbitration clause, (v) national laws applicable where the 
award is to be enforced, (vi) laws specified in the arbitration agreement, (vii) a combination of the laws 
identified between (i) and (vi), and (viii) fundamental principles of laws. As arbitrability is a concept 
that regularly appears in public policy discourse514, it is important to briefly explore the nature of the 
relationship between the two concepts. 
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2.7.2 ‘Public policy’ and ‘Arbitrability’ 
We had in the previous section not only explored the concept of public policy, but also highlighted that 
UAE law does not make reference to public policy, instead, it makes reference to public order. Based on 
this, we had chosen to utilise Public policy (and/or public order) as an all encompassing terminology 
that conveniently captured the essence of both public policy and public order. At the risk of sounding 
repetitive, we had identified Public policy (and/or public order) as characterised ambiguity515 and a lack 
of clarity516. It was in essence a dynamic, constantly evolving and intractable concept. 
Arbitration is now being utilised as a dispute resolution mechanism on matters, which engages 
public policy517. In fact, as Brekoulakis518 has observed, arbitrators are now regularly examining and 
applying public policy provisions in arbitration hearings across a number of countries such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom. Thus, arbitration is being utilised in public-private disputes519. It is also 
being utilised in diverse areas such as disputes related to tax and securities transactions520 and also family 
disputes521, both traditionally characterised as matters of public policy. In terms of tax and securities 
disputes, we see public policy engaged on occasions where a substantial number of treaties and trade 
agreements (which have a direct impact on regulatory sovereignty) utilise arbitration as their preferred 
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dispute resolution mechanism. Similarly, arbitration is now in a number of countries being utilised to 
settle family disputes522. More specifically, the courts in this case accepted that arbitration may be 
utilized in family disputes to resolve matters touching upon (i) property (ii) financial settlement and 
support and (iii) child custody disputes. It will appear therefore that the view that “Public policy is 
outside and beyond the scope of arbitration and stays within exclusive judicial jurisdiction” 
(Anusornsena523; p.9) may no longer hold true. 
Despite the fact that Redfern and Hunter524 suggests that “The concept of arbitrability, properly 
so called, relates to public policy….” (p. 137), implying that both concepts are closely connected525, 
they are not synonymous526, but at best, complementary to each other527. A dispute that engages public 
policy does not necessarily mean that it is not arbitrable. Vice versa, the fact that a dispute is non 
arbitrable does not necessarily mean that this is so for public policy reasons. Brekoulakis528 posits that 
with developments in arbitration law, as relates to arbitrability, the question of public policy is now 
largely irrelevant. 
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accessed 11/09/19. It is also important to note that in the seminal case of Dick v Dick [210 Mich. App. 576 (1995)] heard in 
the Michigan Court of Appeals, the US courts approved the use of arbitration to resolve matters in contested divorce 
disputes.  
523 Anusornsena, V. 2012. Arbitrability and Public Policy in Regard to the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Award 
in International Arbitration : the United States, Europe, Africa, Middle East and Asia. Unpublished SJD Thesis, Golden 
Gate University School of Law, https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=theses, 
accessed 11/09/19. 
524 Redfern, A. and Hunter, M. 1991. Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd ed. 
525 Bantekas, I. 2008. The Foundations of Arbitrability in International Commercial Arbitration. Australian Year Book of 
International Law, 27 (1), 193-224; Indeed, the close connection between arbitrability and public policy is shown in the 
New York Convention (1958) where arbitrability (Article V(2)(a)) and public policy (Article V(2)(b)) are both identified as 
defences that can be raised against the enforcement of an arbitration award. 
526 Fazilatfar, H. 2012. Transnational Public Policy: Does It Function from Arbitrability to Enforcement. City University of 
Hong Kong Law Review, 3 (2), 289-314; Kozubovska, B. 2014. Trends in Arbitrability. IALS Student Law Review, 1 (2), 
20-27. 
527 Bantekas, I. 2008. The Foundations of Arbitrability in International Commercial Arbitration. Australian Year Book of 
International Law, 27 (1), 193-224. 
528 Brekoulakis, S. 2009b. On arbitrability: Persisting misconceptions and new areas of concern. In Mistelis, L. and 
Brekoulakis, S. (eds), Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives, Pub. International Arbitration Law 
Library, pp. 19-46. 
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2.7.3 ‘Public policy’ and ‘Arbitrability’ in the UAE 
Under UAE jurisprudence, matters relating to Public policy (and/or public order) are not subject to 
arbitration529. They thus fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the 
UAE’). These matters are extensive. Article 3 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992 states that public policy 
is “…to include matters relating to personal status such as marriage, inheritance, and lineage, and 
matters relating to systems of government, freedom of trade, the circulation of wealth, rules of 
individuals ownership and the other rules and foundations upon which society is based, in such a manner 
as not to conflict with the definitive provisions and fundamental principles of the Islamic sharia”. The 
literature suggests that public policy matters in the UAE apply to a wide range of matters that engages 
either (i) freedom of trade, (ii) ownership and (iii) the free movement of services and goods530. 
Article 733 of Federal Law (11) of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), lists a number of 
transactions are deemed to be against UAE public order and therefore not arbitrable. These includes (i) 
the use of a debt to cancel another debt (ii) the reduction of a deferred debt through accelerated 
repayment. Other matters of public policy in the UAE include investment solicitation531; so do 
agreements for the sale and purchase of off-plan property, land sale and other construction/real-estate 
contracts, mortgages and foreclosures532. In fact, in the UAE, any ownership of real estate533 is deemed 
a matter of public policy. Included in matters that are deemed public policy and therefore not arbitrable 
in the UAE are also matters relating to family law (marriage, divorce, child custody), inheritance and 
personal status (Angell and Feulner534, 1988) and also procedural issues in dispute resolution535. In (1) 
                                                 
529 Sinjakli, A. 2001. Commercial Agency Disputes and Related Court Judgments in the UAE. International Business 
Lawyer, 29 (10), 458-461. 
530 Ayad, M. 2013. The Doctrines of Public Policy and Competence in Investor-State Arbitration, Arab Law Quarterly, 27, 
297-341; Kanakri, C., and Massey, A. 2016. Comparison of UAE and DIFC-seated arbitrations. Global Arbitration News, 
Available from: https://globalarbitrationnews.com/comparison-uae-difc-seated-arbitrations-20161012/, accessed 07/02/18; 
Al Sakkaf, F. 2017. Arbitration Award vs Public Order, Court Uncourt, 4, 9-11. 
531 Angell, N. and Feulner, G. 1988. Arbitration of Disputes in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 3 (1), 19-32. 
532 Feulner, G. and Khan, A. 1986. Dispute Resolution in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 1 (3), 312-318. 
533 Mayew, G. and Morris, M. 2014. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards in the United Arab Emirates. Defense 
Counsel Journal, 81, 279-287. 
534 Angell, N. and Feulner, G. 1988. Arbitration of Disputes in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 3 (1), 19-32. 
535 See the discussions in (1) Egan (2) Eggert v (1) Eava (2) Efa [2013] DIFC ARB 002 heard by the Judicial Authority of 
the Dubai International Financial Centre: Court of First Instance on 29 July 2015. This discussion extended to the matter of 
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Egan (2) Eggert v (1) Eava (2) Efa536 it was stated that, although each emirate within the UAE could 
freely regulate its judiciary, the extent of the jurisdiction of the various courts within each emirate within 
the UAE were matters of public policy. Matters relating to registered commercial agency agreements 
which are covered by Federal Law No. 18 of 1981 Concerning Organizing Trade Agencies are seen to 
be of public policy matters (although, under the purview of the Ministry of Economy537). So are matters 
relating to labour disputes which, under Federal Law No. 8 of 1980 Regulating Labour Relations (as 
amended), remain the purview of the Ministry of Labour. However, again, as in the case of the Chambers 
of Commerce, which have no powers to enforce arbitration awards, the Ministry of Labour can only 
refer disputes to the courts if an employer disagrees with its findings following arbitration. In addition 
to this list are applicable foreign judgements. The UAE courts will not enforce foreign judgements as a 
matter of public policy without a confirmatory/ ratifying judgement from the UAE federal courts538. This 
was confirmed in a number of cases in the UAE including Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation Judgment 
487/18 of 1997, Dubai Court of First Instance Judgment 489 of 2012. And more recently, (1) Fiske (2) 
Firmin v Firuzeh539 heard by the Dubai International Financial Centre, Court of First Instance. 
The view from the literature is also that public policy in the UAE is construed much more broadly 
than by some other countries which adhere to the civil law tradition such as France, Switzerland and 
Germany540. In fact, Almutawa and Maniruzzaman541 opine that the UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the 
UAE’) can (and have) construed public policy to encompass almost any matter. In the past, these matters 
                                                 
language during dispute resolution. One view debated was the extent to which language of dispute resolution will not raise 
a matter of public order unless a disputant can demonstrate that the use of a specific language during the proceedings 
prevented that disputant from understanding the proceedings.  
536 (1) Egan (2) Eggert v (1) Eava (2) Efa [2013] DIFC ARB 002 
537 Sinjakli, A. 2001. Commercial Agency Disputes and Related Court Judgments in the UAE. International Business 
Lawyer, 29 (10), 458-461. 
538 Blanke, G. 2015. Ruling of Dubai Court of First Instance Calls into Question UAE Courts’ Recent Acquis on 
International Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. Arab Law Quarterly, 29(1), 56-75. 
539 (1) Fiske (2) Firmin v Firuzeh [2014] [Dubai International Financial Centre, Court of First Instance, 006/2017] ARB 001 
540 Nuss, J. 2013. Public Policy Invoked as a Ground For Contesting the Enforcement of an Arbitral Award, or for Seeking 
its Annulment. Dispute Resolution International, 7, 119-133; Hollander, P. 2016. Report on the Public Policy Exception in 
the New York Convention. Dispute Resolution International, 10, 35-50. 
541 Almutawa, A. and Maniruzzaman, A. 2014. The UAE’s Pilgrimage to International Arbitration Stardom. Journal of 
World Investment & Trade, 15(1-2), 193-244. 
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have ranged from arbitration awards flowing from gambling debts542 to  arbitration awards that involve 
the transfer of property543. To summate, we opine that the intractable nature of public policy in the UAE 
combined with the lack of an exclusive list of arbitrable and non-arbitrable activities is likely to lead to 
considerable practical difficulties in terms of arbitration practice within the UAE. 
At this point in the thesis, the author has completed a review of the literature on ‘what is policy?’, 
policy and public opinion, types and forms of policy, policy and the law and public policy. In the chapter 













                                                 
542 Arab, H. 2002. Execution of Foreign Judgments in the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 17(2), 208-211. 
543 Husserl, G. 1938. Public policy and public order. Virginia Law Review, 25 (1), 37-67. 
120 
 
CHAPTER 3: ARBITRATION 
3.1 What is arbitration? 
According to Sturges544 arbitration is a quasi-legal process that involves parties to a dispute submitting 
their claims to hearing by one or more individuals of their choice to decide on a matter or matters of 
controversy between parties.  
 
Arbitration is defined under Article 1 of the UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 as 
 
“A procedure regulated by law in which a dispute between one or more parties is submitted, by 
agreement of the parties, to an arbitral tribunal which makes a binding decision on the 
dispute545”. 
 
As a process, literature generally recognises that arbitration represents an attractive alternative and 
substitute to court-based litigation546. For example, studies by Kritzer and Anderson547 found that when 
compared to litigation, arbitration548 in terms of mode of dispute termination, outperformed litigation 
with approximately 50% of arbitration cases terminated, compared to 5% of cases before the courts. 
                                                 
544 Sturges, W. 1960. Arbitration--What is it. New York University Law Review,35, 1031 – 1047 
545 Unofficial translation obtained under license by the author from two UAE law firms; Baker & McKenzie Habib Al Mulla  
and Al Tamimi & Co. 
546 Lippman, M. 1972. Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement: Some Selected Perspectives. Maine Law 
Review, 24 (2), 215-242; Kritzer, H. and Anderson, J. 1983. The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case 
Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the Courts. Justice System 
Journal, 8 (1), 6-19; Faure, J. 1985. The Arbitration Alternative: Its Time Has Come. Montana Law Review, 46 (1), p.199-
216; Edwards, H. 1986. Alternative dispute resolution: Panacea or anathema?. Harvard Law Review, 99(3), 668-684; 
Mustill, M. 1989. Arbitration: history and background. Journal of International Arbitration, 6 (2), 43-56; Nalmark, R. and 
Keer, S. 2002. International Private Commercial Arbitration-Expectations and Perceptions of Attorneys and Business 
People-A Forced-Rank Analysis. International Business Law Journal, 30 (5), 203-210; Drahozal, C. and Hylton, K. 2003. 
The economics of litigation and arbitration: An application to franchise contracts. Journal of Legal Studies, 32(2), 549-584; 
Mulcahy, L. 2013. The Collective Interest in Private Dispute Resolution. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33 (1), 59-80; 
Karamanian, S. 2017. Courts and arbitration: Reconciling the public with the private. Arbitration Law Review, 9(1), 65-82; 
Dayton, B. and Takahashi, S. 2018. Arbitration Developments in the United Arab Emirates. Asian Dispute Review, 2018(1), 
30-37. 
547 Kritzer, H. and Anderson, J. 1983. The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing Time, 
Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the Courts. Justice System Journal, 8 (1), 6-19. 
548 In this case, arbitration conducted under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). 
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Delikat and Kleiner549 found that arbitration took about a third of the time less than court litigation did 
(arbitration was 33% quicker than litigation); arbitration proceedings took around 16.5 months to 
conclude while comparative litigation proceedings took around 25 months to conclude. Arbitration is, 
however, a process which owes its existence to contract in that, beyond the limited confines of court-
mandated arbitration550, arbitration proceedings theoretically only require the consent of parties as 
articulated in contractual provisions551. Although framed as an alternative and substitute to court-based 
litigation, generally not all controversies are subject to arbitration. For matters to be subject to arbitration, 
they must be arbitrable.  
 
3.2 Arbitrability and the problems of jurisdictional concurrency 
Taking all these into consideration, the question of whether a dispute is arbitrable has consequences for 
the ‘Jurisdiction of court’ in that it may be invoked by any disputant either partially or in a 
comprehensive manner before the courts as a ground for vacatur. A partial  jurisdiction  challenge  will 
usually relate to a challenge to the authority of the arbitrator to decide on a specific  claim,  counterclaim  
and/or  matter. It may also relate to a challenge to the arbitrators’ competency to hear matters pertaining 
to a specific party. Conversely, a comprehensive jurisdiction challenge focuses on challenges to the 
arbitrators competency to hear all matters of the dispute. Hanotiau and Caprasse552 herein posits that at 
any point during arbitration proceedings that the question of jurisdiction arises before the courts, Public 
                                                 
549 Delikat, M. and Kleiner, M. 2003. An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do Plaintiffs Better 
Vindicate Their Rights?. Dispute Resolution Journal, 58(4), 56-58 & 85. 
550 Hensler, D. 1990.  Court-Ordered Arbitration: An Alternative View. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1990, 399-
420;  Orenstein, M. 1999. Mandatory arbitration: Alive and well or withering on the vine?. Dispute Resolution Journal, 
54(3), 57-59 & 80-87; Feingold, R., 2002. Mandatory arbitration: What process is due. Harvard Journal on Legislation, 39 
(2), 281-298; Weston, M. 2015. The Clash: Squaring Mandatory Arbitration with Administrative Agency and 
Representative Recourse. Southern California Law Review, 89 (1), 103-142. . 
551 Bonn, R. 1972. Arbitration: an alternative system for handling contract related disputes. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 17 (2), 254-264; Morgan, E. 1986. Contract theory and the sources of rights: An approach to the arbitrability 
question. Southern California Law Review, 60 (4), 1059-1082; Lipsky, D. and Seeber, R. 2003. The social contract and 
dispute resolution: The transformation of the social contract in the United States workplace and the emergence of new 
strategies of dispute resolution. International Employment Relations Review, 9(2), 87-109; Gelinas, F. 2016. Arbitration as 
transnational governance by contract. Transnational Legal Theory, 7(2), 181-198.. 
552 Hanotiau, B. and Caprasse, O. 2008. Arbitrability, Due Process, and Public Policy under Article V of the New York 
Convention-Belgian and French Perspectives. Journal of International Arbitration, 25 (6), 721-742 
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policy (and/or public order) questions will generally arise. Drawing from choice of law studies553 , we 
can opine that Public policy (and/or public order) represents a way that a court can side step applying 
laws or enforcing decisions that it deems contrary to some general principles. 
The question of jurisdiction usually arises where two or more courts are deemed to be 
simultaneously empowered by either law, treaty, convention or other mechanisms to adjudicate a specific 
dispute554 or to be able to directly bind the disputants (or property) or subject matter of the dispute555. 
Most countries have arbitration laws (inclusive of case laws) that articulate (i) the extent of the primary 
or sole jurisdiction of its national courts – for example to make determination of matters of Public policy 
(and/or public order)  (ii) the extent of the primary or sole jurisdiction of arbitrators/arbitral panels –for 
example on deciding on procedural matters such as the time/schedule for the hearing, the language of 
the proceedings and making factual findings (ii) the extent of the concurrent or simultaneous jurisdiction 
of both the courts and the arbitrators/arbitral panels –for example the granting of interim relief 556and 
(iv) the extent of the courts supervisory powers over arbitrators/arbitral panels. One area here may relate 
to a national court (which has no such restrictions557) intervening where an arbitrator/arbitral panel for 
example grants interim relief that touches upon the rights of parties who are either not subject or have 
not subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator/arbitral panel. Alternatively, an 
arbitrator/arbitral panel may make an application to a court to compel a third party to produce specific 
documents. 
The problem with the existence of concurrent or simultaneous jurisdiction is that disputants may 
engage in ‘forum shopping’ – in order words, they seek to have the dispute adjudicated in a court, either 
                                                 
553 Paulsen, M. and Sovern, M. 1956. Public Policy in the Conflict of Laws. Columbia Law Review,56 (7),  969-1016.  
554 Shelton, T.W., 1928. Concurrent Jurisdiction--Its Necessity and Its Dangers. Virginia Law Review, 15, 137-153; 
Yntema, H. and Jaffin, G., 1931. Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction Plus Credit Nemo Tota Quam Cordus in 
Urbe." Cum Sit Tam Pauper, Quo Modo?" Caecus Amat. Martial. University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American 
Law Register, 79(7), 869-919. 
555 Hazard, G. 1965. A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction. Supreme Court Review, 165, 241-288. 
556 Main, H. 2005. Court Ordered Interim Relief: Developments in English Arbitration Law. Journal of International 
Arbitration, 22 (6), 505-510.  
557 McLachlan, C. 1987. Transnational Applications of Mareva Injunctions and Anton Piller Orders. The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 36 (3), 669-679. 
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before an arbitrator/arbitral panel or court that they opine is most likely to rule in their favour558. As the 
number of dispute adjudicating and resolution bodies courts have increased (for example, in the UAE 
free zones such as the DIFC and DIAC now offer quick business dispute resolution services), there is an 
increasing possibility that different dispute resolution bodies (including national courts) will have 
simultaneous or parallel jurisdiction over a number of disputes. Arguably, such simultaneousity may 
provide a number of benefits such as increased co-operation. For example, in the UAE, a Joint Judicial 
Committee has been formed between the DIFC Courts and the Dubai Courts to jointly hear matters 
deemed to entail concurrent jurisdiction between the two parallel courts. Simultaneousity may also serve 
as a point of conflict between parallel courts. Onyema559 opines that jurisdictional matters can be 
particularly exacerbated where such simultaneousity is deemed to exist between national courts and 
arbitrators/arbitral panels on matters of substantive national law. This can be particularly challenging 
where both courts are bound by substantively different laws. This situation creates a ‘Public policy’ 
interest in that if parallel courts are bound by substantively different (and perhaps conflicting laws), then 
there is a potential that the different courts will arrive at substantively different, inconsistent (and perhaps 
conflicting), decisions on the same matter. Alternatively, as in the case of the UAE federal courts 
(‘Courts of the UAE’) on one side and the ‘Free Zone’ courts such as the DIFC and the DIAC, there is 
also a potential that the parallel courts will differ in terms of how they interpret either the same or similar 
legal norms. The problem is that courts are highly unlikely to enforce decisions that it itself would not 
have reached if faced with the same dispute.  
 
                                                 
558 Granger, C. 1974. The Conflict of Laws and Forum Shopping: Some Recent Decisions on Jurisdiction and Free 
Enterprise in Litigation. Ottawa Law Review, 6 (2), 416-437; Field, M. 2013. Removal Reform: A Solution for Federal 
Question Jurisdiction, Forum Shopping, and Duplicative State-Federal Litigation. Indiana Law Journal, 88 (2), 611-668.  
559 Onyema, E. 2017. The Jurisdictional Tensions between Domestic Courts and Arbitral Tribunals'. International 
Arbitration and the Rule of Law: Contribution and Conformity, ICCA Congress Series no. 19 (Kluwer 2017). Kluwer Law 
International, pp 481-500. 
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3.3 Categories of public policy and the functions of arbitration vacatur 
Literature conceptualises the application of public policy to arbitration into two main types. The first 
relates to policy emergent from legal rulings. Here, the literature suggests that arbitration awards should 
only be challenged and vacated when they can be shown to be in direct conflict with the law or where it 
can be shown that they manifestly disregard the law leading to the possibility that the law will be 
violated560. Those who support this application of public policy to arbitration suggest that judicial 
interference with arbitration awards creates uncertainty and poses a risk to finality of disputes (see for 
example Vestal561). The alternative view suggested by Meltzer562 and Randall563 suggests that arbitration 
awards should only be challenged and vacated when it can be shown to be, in any way, in conflict with 
public policy. The arguments which persist here are that enforcement of public policy is a core role of 
the courts since a failure of the court to enforce public policy will mean that the interest of the public 
remains unprotected.  
A review of the literature suggests that, as relates to private law and arbitration, there are three 
categories of such public policy564. These are (i) public morality, (ii) public interest, and (iii) public 
                                                 
560 Edwards, H. 1988. Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and 
the Duty to Bargain. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 64 (1), 3-36; Mouser, D. 1990. Analysis of the Public Policy Exception 
After Paperworkers v Misco: A Proposal to Limit the Public Policy Exception and to Allow the Parties to Submit the Public 
Policy Question to the Arbitrator. Industrial Relations Law Journal, 12 (1), 89-152; Hodges, A. 2000. Judicial Review of 
Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law. Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 16 
(1), 91-164. 
561 Vestal, A. 1965. Preclusion / Res Judicata Variables: Nature of the Controversy. Washington University Law Review, 
1965 (2), 158-192. 
562 Meltzer, B. 1988. After the Labor Arbitration Award: The Public Policy Defense. Industrial Relations Law Journal, 
10,241-257. 
563 Randall, B. 1992. The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration 
Awards. Brigham Young University Law Review, 1992 (3), 759-784. 
564 Antoine, T. 1977. Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny. 
Michigan Law Review, 75 (5 & 6), 1137-1161; Meltzer, B. 1988. After the Labor Arbitration Award: The Public Policy 
Defense. Industrial Relations Law Journal, 10,241-257; Parker, J. 1988. Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: 
Misco and Its Impact on the Public Policy Exception. The Labor Lawyer, 4(4), 683-714; Galbraith, B. 1993. Vacatur of 
Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the Manifest Disregard of the Law 
Standard. Indiana Law Review, 27 (1), 241-266; Hayford, S. 1995. Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of 
Commerical Arbitration Awards. Georgia Law Review, 30 (3), 731-842; Hayford, S. 1997. New Paradigm for Commercial 
Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial Standards for Vacatur. George 
Washington Law Review, 66 (3), 443-507; Glanstein, D. 2000. A Hail Mary Pass: Public Policy Review of Arbitration 
Awards. Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 16 (2), 297-334; Hodges, A. 2000. Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law. Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 16 (1), 91-164; 
Arfazadeh, H. 2002. In the shadow of the unruly horse: international arbitration and the public policy exception. American 
Review of International Arbitration, 13, 43-197; Sullivan, K. 2002. The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review 
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security. The focus of public morality is on the need to safeguard the mutual identities and relationships 
that exist, shape and maintains the society’s principles relating to how it distinguishes between 
behaviour, which is deemed good or bad.  
The public interest on the other hand focuses on ensuring that when citizens arrive at agreements 
in private, those agreements are not at a lower threshold in terms of expectations of similar agreements 
if made publicly. This position exists because while arbitration represents a method of private dispute 
resolution, the awards that flow from its proceedings can sometimes impact upon the public who are 
arguably not party to a proceeding which is held outside the auspices of a publicly accountable court 
system565. Finally, the public security category focuses on ensuring that the society is protected from 
threats likely to negatively impact on its well-being and peaceful existence. Arguably, beyond these 
considerations, because parties to an arbitration have privately contracted to the powers of an arbitrator, 
regardless of the court’s views on the public merits of the case, an arbitrator’s award will not be vacated 
on public policy grounds.  
Drawing from Ghodoosi566, it is safe to suggest that arbitration vacatur on the basis of public 
policy serves three major functions. Firstly, vacatur on public policy grounds serves to protect 
contracting parties to a dispute where one disputant has obtained a judgement which is “a general 
mischief to the public” (Knight567, p. 208), or in effect violates dominant, established and clearly defined 
public policy (see United Paperworkers Int'l Union568).  
                                                 
of Arbitration Awards under the Federal Arbitration Act. Saint Louis University Law Journal, 46 (2), 509-560; Helm, K. 
2006.  The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Where Does the Buck Stop?. Dispute Resolution 
Journal, 61(4), 16 – 26; Brand, F. 2014. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, Stellenbosch Law Review, 25 (2), 247-264. 
565 Polanto, M. 2013. For the Good of All Not Involved: The Case for a Public Protection Exception to the Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards. Arbitration Law Review, 5(1), 459-471. 
566 Ghodoosi, F. 2015. The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting the Role of the Public Policy Doctrine in the 
Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements. Nebraska Law Review, 94 (3), 685-736.  
567 Knight, W. 1922. Public Policy in English Law. Law Quarterly Review, 38 (2), 207-219. 
568 United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 30 (1987). 
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The second public policy function that arbitration vacatur serves relates to third parties to a 
contract; that is, ‘privity’569. At the core of the doctrine of privity570 is the rule that  
 
“…when two persons, for a consideration sufficient as between themselves, covenant to do some 
act, which if done would incidentally result in the benefit of a mere stranger, that stranger has 
not a right to enforce the covenant, although one of the contracting parties might enforce it as 
against the other”.  
 
Noting this principle, the second function of public policy has always been to avoid or at worse, 
limit the public being burdened with obligations emanating from private contracts that individuals enter 
into. Ghodoosi571 claims that government plays a role in this second function of public policy by 
legislating and enforcing laws which prevent such public burdens. 
The third (and final) public policy function of arbitration vacatur relates to the promotion of 
distributive justice which focuses on decision outcomes of fairness and equity. Thus, the courts can 
nullify an arbitration award that imposes penalties that are unfair and unequitable.  
 
3.4 The meaning of the public policy exception 
So, what do we mean by public policy exception? The public policy exception is a construct of the courts 
that stipulates its prohibition from the enforcement of any contract that violates public policy. As applied 
to arbitration, the public policy exception implies that the courts will not enforce arbitration awards that 
                                                 
569 Whittaker, S. 1996. Privity of contract and the tort of negligence: Future directions. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
16(2),191-230; Andrews, N. 1997. Reform of the Privity Rule in English Contract Law: The Law Commission's Report No. 
242. Cambridge Law Journal, 56 (1), 25-28; Andrews, N. 2001. Strangers to Justice No Longer: The Reversal of the 
Privity Rule under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. Cambridge Law Journal, 60(2), 353-381. 
570 As stated in Railroad Co v Curtiss, 8o N. Y. 2I9. 
571 Ghodoosi, F. 2015. The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting the Role of the Public Policy Doctrine in the 
Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements. Nebraska Law Review, 94 (3), 685-736.  
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violate public policy572. Instead, such awards are ‘vacated’. Arbitration vacatur on the basis of public 
policy therefore emanates from the basic notion that the courts will not aid any course of action that the 
court perceives to be counter to  dominant, well established and clearly defined societal norms 573. Such 
vacation according to Ghodoosi574 does not necessarily imply that the award has been voided; it simply 
means that the award cannot be enforced for public policy reasons. Although this exception is narrow, 
implying that the courts are largely restricted from reviewing the merits of arbitration awards, Grenig575 
posits that the oversight and supervisory powers of the courts to review, annul and set aside an arbitral 
award on the grounds of public policy is generally not restricted to the occasions when the award in itself 
is in violation of societal values. The courts are also likely to annul and set aside arbitration awards (i) 
which are in conflict with general relevant legal precedent and/or statutory provisions,  (ii) where the 
implementation of specific awards will violate dominant, established and clearly defined public policy, 
and (iii) where such awards or their implementation will prejudice the rights of either party to the dispute 
or third-party rights. This position is supported in international case law. In Renusagar Power Co. v 
General Electric Co576 heard in the Supreme Court of India, the court specified that public policy 
exceptions applied to arbitration awards where: 
 
(i) the award conflicts with a fundamental policy of national law (fundamental policy of the 
Indian state);  
(ii) the award conflicts with national interest (in other words the interest of India); and  
                                                 
572 Marcantel, J. 2008. The crumbled difference between legal and illegal arbitration awards: Hall street associates and the 
waning public policy exception. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, 14 (3), 597-638. 
573 Hodges, A. 2000. Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law. Ohio 
State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 16 (1), 91-164. 
574 Ghodoosi, F. 2015. The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting the Role of the Public Policy Doctrine in the 
Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements. Nebraska Law Review, 94 (3), 685-736.  
575 Grenig, J. 2014. After the Arbitration Award: Not Always Final and Binding. Marquette Sports Law Review, 25 (1), 65-
100. 
576 Renusagar Power Co. Ltd vs General Electric Co on 7 October, 1993; Equivalent citations: 1994 AIR 860, 1994 SCC 
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(iii) the award is in conflict with notions of justice or public mortality (in other words, the 
notion of morality in India).  
 
However, it is observed that the scope of ‘fundamental policy’ as identified in Renusagar Power Co. v 
General Electric Co577 was accepted although never espoused in another Indian case, Oil & Natural Gas 
Corp. v SAW Pipes Ltd,578 where the Supreme Court of India added a fourth public policy criterion as 
being in a case where:  
 
(iv) the contravention of the provisions of an act of parliament or any additional substantive 
law governing the contractual relationship between the parties or when such award 
contravenes the terms of a contract.  
 
Arguably, allowing such judgements to stand might negatively impact on societal harmony and may lead 
to social duress; for this reason, the courts are obliged to nullify them.  
 It is important to highlight that the scope of ‘fundamental policy’ as identified by the Supreme 
Court of India Renusagar Power Co. v General Electric Co579 and confirmed in Oil & Natural Gas Corp. 
v SAW Pipes Ltd580 by the Supreme Court of India was only articulated in Oil & Natural Gas v Western 
Geco581 where the Supreme Court of India ruled that the notion of fundamental policy referred to three 
principles: these were (i) the application of judicial and reasoning based on legal authorities, (ii) taking 
cognisance of the principles of natural justice when making judicial rulings, and (iii) appreciating that a 
                                                 
577 Renusagar Power Co. Ltd vs General Electric Co on 7 October, 1993; Equivalent citations: 1994 AIR 860, 1994 SCC 
Supl. (1) 644 (India). 
578 Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd vs Saw Pipes Ltd on 17 April, 2003 (India). 
579 Renusagar Power Co. Ltd vs General Electric Co on 7 October, 1993; Equivalent citations: 1994 AIR 860, 1994 SCC 
Supl. (1) 644 (India). 
580 Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd vs Saw Pipes Ltd on 17 April, 2003 (India). 
581 Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd. (2014) 9 SCC 263 (India). 
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court could not make judicial rulings that were irrational or perverse . Thus, according to the courts, 
fundamental policy allowed the courts to step in and vacate arbitral rulings because [at 30] 
 
“…[t]he adjudication even when made by an arbitral tribunal that enjoys considerable latitude 
and play at the joints in making awards will be open to challenge and may be cast away or 
modified…”. 
 
The difficulty with the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of India is that, generally speaking, to 
ensure finality, conclusive and binding nature in arbitration, it is envisaged that judicial interference in 
arbitration awards should largely be restricted by law to occasions where awards are vacated; that is, set 
aside. However, in Oil & Natural Gas v Western Geco582, the Supreme Court of India went as far as 
actually interfering with the subject matter of the arbitration award by modifying its content on the basis 








                                                 
582 Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Western Geco International Ltd. (2014) 9 SCC 263 (India). 
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CHAPTER 4: ARBITRRATION IN THE UAE 
4.1 The United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
To better understand the legal and court system in the UAE, there is a need for a brief overview of the 
political and legal structures of the country. This will allow for the second research question, that is What 
is the scope of the Public policy (and/or public order) exception as applied by the ‘UAE Courts’?  to be 
addressed. 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a sovereign, independent, federal state lying at the south east 
of the Arabian peninsula with a total area covering approximately 32,278 square miles583. The UAE 
consists of seven constituent emirates (which equate to religious and political states). These are the 
emirates of Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Fujairah, Ajman, Ras al Khaimah, Dubai and Umm al Quwain. The 
emirate of Abu Dhabi also serves as the capital of the UAE. The emirate of Dubai is arguably, however, 
the centre of commercial activity in the UAE. The majority (88%) of the UAE’s population of 9.4 million 
is made up of expatriate non-nationals584 of which 59.4% are from the Indian sub-continent.  
 
4.2 Constitutional arrangements in the UAE 
The UAE is governed by a constitution signed on 18 July 1971 which came into effect on 2 December 
1971. The constitution (‘The UAE Constitution’) was permanently accepted as the supreme law in the 
country by all member emirates of the union in May 1996 with the promulgation of UAE Federal 
Constitutional Amendment Law No.l of 1996. The UAE constitution is divided into 152 articles covering 
a range of rights, obligations and aspirations. Its principle instruments are divided against a number of 
provisions which provide, for example, a federal court system585. The power of the UAE state is  divided 
into three, consisting of (i) the executive branch, (ii) the judiciary, and (iii) the legislature. The executive 
                                                 
583 El Mallakh, R. 1970. The challenge of affluence: Abu Dhabi. The Middle East Journal, 24 (2), 135-146; Zahlan, R. 
2016. The origins of the United Arab Emirates: A political and social history of the Trucial States. Routledge. 
584 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ae.html, accessed 27/05/18 
585 Angell, N. 1986. Regulation of business under the developing legal system of the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law 
Quarterly, 1 (2), 119-140. 
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branch is further sub-divided into three, among them, a ‘Supreme Council’ made up of the Emirs (Rulers) 
of the seven member emirates of the union. The Emirs hold exclusive and unfettered authority within 
each of their individual emirates. While decisions by the ‘Supreme Council’ are based on a simple 
majority vote, constitutional provisions provide that, for substantive decisions to be ratified, the majority 
vote must include that of the Emir of Abu Dhabi and Emir of Dubai586. While the UAE’s constitution 
addresses how the powers of the member emirates are balanced against those of the Federation, it makes 
exclusive provisions for matters to be within the exclusive competency (decision) of either an individual 
emirate or the federal government.  
 
4.3 The legal and court system of the UAE 
Article 1 of the Civil Transactions Code (CTC) of the UAE states that the country is primarily guided 
by its civil constitutional provisions which also encompasses Sharia. However, it is important to note as 
Feulner and Khan587 and Al-Muhairi588 emphasise that while Islamic Sharia serves as one of the main 
sources of UAE constitutional and legislative provisions, the focus of the incorporation of Islamic Sharia 
is not on the outcome of judicial rulings. Instead, they assert that the emphasis is on the process by which 
judicial rulings are procured. Thus, while judicial outcomes that encompass Islamic Sharia may in fact 
differ from those procured under western forms of jurisprudence, both forms of jurisprudence are 
primarily based on similar notions of just and equitable resolution of disputes.  
The UAE operates a federal court system (‘Courts of the UAE’) with the Federal Supreme Court 
of the UAE (the Union Supreme Court)  located in the emirate of Abu Dhabi serving as the apex court 
(equivalent to the United Kingdom Supreme Court). There are two appeals589 courts which sit in the 
                                                 
586 Al-Muhairi, B. 1996a. The Development of the UAE Legal System and Unification with the Judicial System. Arab Law 
Quarterly, 11 (2), 116-160. 
587 Feulner, G. and Khan, A. 1986. Dispute Resolution in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 1 (3), 312-318. 
588 Al-Muhairi, B. 1996b. The Position of Shari'a within the UAE Constitution and the Federal Supreme Court's Application 
of the Constitutional Clause concerning Shari'a. Arab Law Quarterly, 11(3), 219-244. 
589 The Appeal Court in Abu Dhabi hears matters on appeal from Court of First Instance seating in Abu Dhabi and the city 




emirate of Abu Dhabi and the emirate of Sharjah. Matters on appeals from these two courts go to the 
Union Supreme Court. Exceptions provided for appeals on certain matters (primarily criminal) to be 
directed to the Emir of Abu Dhabi who, based on UAE constitutional provisions, also serves as the 
President of the UAE. In addition to the federal court systems that exist in the country, there are currently 
four arbitration centres operating in the UAE. These are the (i) DIFC, (ii) the DIAC, (ii) the Abu Dhabi 
Commercial, Conciliation and Arbitration Centre, and (iv) the International Islamic Centre for 
Reconciliation and Arbitration which is located in the emirate of Sharjah. 
By virtue of Article 105 of the UAE constitution which vests the transfer of courts within each 
emirate to a federal court system only at the behest of individual emirates, two emirates within the 
country, the emirate of Ras al Khaimah and also the emirate of Dubai have opted out of the federal court 
system and are no longer members. Instead, both emirates operate their own independent judicial 
systems which runs parallel to the federal court system590. Furthermore, although the provisions of 
Article 1 of the Civil Transactions Code (CTC) of the UAE emphasise the role of Sharia in UAE law, 
Luttrell591 notes that in civil and commercial disputes heard within the emirates of Dubai and Ras al 
Khaimah, Sharia subordinates emirate law unless among other issues, the dispute touches on matter of 
public policy. Within these two emirates592, the court system consists of the Court of First Instance, 
which can hear all commercial matters, the Court of Appeal which hears appeals from the Court of First 
Instance on matters of fact, and finally the Court of Cassation which hears appeals from the Court of 
Appeal only on points of law. The decisions reached by the Courts of Cassation in the emirate of Dubai 
and also in the emirate of Ras al Khaimah are final and not subject to appeal to the UAE Supreme Court 
in Abu Dhabi. Any appeals from these courts are directed to the respective Emirs (Rulers) of Dubai and 
that of Ras al Khaimah. Furthermore, under the UAE’s constitutional arrangement, each emirate 
                                                 
590 We had earlier alluded to conceptual differences between the Courts of the United Arab Emirates and United Arab 
Courts. Thus it becomes prudent to make reference in the case of the emirate of Dubai to ‘Courts of Dubai’ and similarly in 
the emirate of Ras al Khaimah to Courts of Ras al Khaimah. 
591 Luttrell, S. 2009a. The Changing Lex Arbitri of the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 23 (2), 139-166; Luttrell, S. 2009b. 




maintains its own local courts (Courts of First Instance), which will exercise jurisdiction on matters 
deemed to be outside the scope of UAE Federal law593. Legal proceedings in all UAE federal courts 
(Courts of the UAE) are undertaken in the Arabic language ( اللغة العربية) only. Only UAE nationals may 
practise as lawyers before the courts594 although non-nationals may work as legal ‘consultants’.  Legal 
consultants, however, do not have a right of audience before the courts. 
 
4.4 Parallel court systems in the UAE 
To support commerce, different emirates within the UAE operate a number of ‘free zones’. These free 
zones are in effect economic zones which are regulated with special rules in order to attract expatriate 
investors. For example, a large number of free zones within the emirate of Dubai offer tax-free or duty-
free customs’ benefits. They also offer free and quick business dispute resolution services. Two such 
free zones, the DIFC and the DIAC, operate their own court systems which are in effect parallel to ‘the 
Courts of Dubai’. Arguably, the operations of parallel court systems in the country reflect the country’s 
rich history (Carballo595), the influence of Arabic legal scholarship, and the country’s British colonial 
history (Angell596). Although restricted by tenets of Sharia, it also reflects the historical exclusive 
executive, judicial, legislative (Al-Muhairi597) and religious authority of the Emirs. 
The notion of existence of parallel courts in the UAE is well recognised in literature (for example, 
in Luttrell598; Mohtashami and Tannous599), various UAE case law and underpinned by statutory 
provisions such as the Dubai International Financial Centre Law No. 10 of 2004 (Part 53) pertaining to 
                                                 
593 Luttrell, S. 2009a. The Changing Lex Arbitri of the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 23 (2), 139-166 
594 United Arab Emirates, Federal Law No. 23 of 1981 regulating the Legal Profession, as amended (Article 6(1)).   
595 Carballo, A., 2007. The Law of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Common Law Oasis or Mirage within the 
UAE?. Arab Law Quarterly, 21(1), 91-104. 
596 Angell, N. 1986. Regulation of business under the developing legal system of the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law 
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597 Al-Muhairi, B. 1996a. The Development of the UAE Legal System and Unification with the Judicial System. Arab Law 
Quarterly, 11 (2), 116-160. 
598 Luttrell, S. 2008a. Choosing Dubai: A comparative Study of Arbitration Under the UAE Federal Code of Civil 
Procedure and the Arbitration Law of the DIFC’, Business International, 9 (3), 254-292; Luttrell, S. 2008b. The Arbitration 
Law of the Dubai International Finance Centre. Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, 3 (3), 170-177. 
599 Mohtashami, R. and Tannous, S. 2009. Arbitration at the Dubai International Financial Centre: a Common Law 
Jurisdiction in the Middle East. Arbitration International, 25(2), 173-186. 
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the establishment of the Dubai International Financial Centre and the emirate of Dubai Law No.12 of 
2004 which established the Courts of the DIFC. Interestingly enough, with new DIFC legislation under 
DIFC Law No. 1 of 2008, the DIFC courts have now been given wider reach within the emirate of Dubai 
which allows it to arbitrate disputes outside the DIFC to the extent that disputants explicitly contract to 
settle their dispute under DIFC jurisdiction. The need for disputants to explicitly contract to settle their 
dispute under DIFC jurisdiction was confirmed by the DIFC in Amarjeet Singh Dhir v Waterfront & 
Others600.  
From the case law, the author attests to a distinction between the notion of UAE federal courts 
(Courts of the UAE) and ‘UAE courts’. In Dr. Lothar Ludwig Hardt and Hardt Trading F.Z.E v DAMAC 
(DIFC) Company Limited et al 601, the DIFC Court of First Instance acknowledged that a distinction 
could be made between ‘the Courts of Dubai’ which were established under the emirate of Dubai Law 
No.3 of 1992 and the ‘the Courts of the DIFC’ which were established under emirate of Dubai Law 
No.12 of 2004 – in effect, the DIFC courts agreed that reference to ‘the Courts of Dubai’ implied non-
DIFC Courts.  
Drawing from this case law, the author opines that there is a conceptual difference between UAE 
federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) and ‘UAE courts’, with the former referring to federally constituted 
public courts in the UAE. On the other hand, the author conceptualises the notion of UAE courts as 
implying the entire range of judicial systems that exist in the UAE (inclusive of the free zone courts). 
This will include not only the ‘Courts of the UAE’, but also other ‘’parallel’ courts such as the DIFC, 
the DIAC, the ADCCAC, and the IICRA. The author is further supported in his adoption of the position 
that institutions such as the  DIFC, the DIAC, the ADCCAC and the IICRA are ‘courts’ not only by their 
enabling acts and provisions (such as UAE Federal Law No.8 of 2004 in the case of the DIFC), but also 
from international case law.  
                                                 
600 Amarjeet Singh Dhir v Waterfront Property Investment Limited and Linarus FZE, Claim No. CFI 011/2009, Grounds of 
Decision, 8 July 2009, para. 92.  
601 Dr. Lothar Ludwig Hardt and Hardt Trading F.Z.E v DAMAC (DIFC) Company Limited et al [Dubai International 
Financial Centre Court of First Instance, 036/2009]. 
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In terms of enabling acts and provisions, the relationship between the ‘Courts of the UAE’ (such 
as the UAE Federal Courts of Appeal) and the ‘free zone’ courts such as the Dubai International 
Financial Courts (DIFC) and the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) has continued to evolve. 
Firstly is that the ‘free zone’ courts have consistently drawn disputants challenging their authority to 
UAE Federal Law No. 8 of 2004 Regarding The Financial Free Zones from which they derive their 
powers. Second is that (in the case of the DIFC) the DIFC Court of First Instance pointed out in Isai v 
Isabelle602 that Article 42(1) of the DIFC Arbitration Law which in effect serves as conduit legislation 
empowers the DIFC to make arbitral awards ‘irrespective of the state or jurisdiction in which it is made’. 
Third is that, based on the provisions of Article 8(2) of Dubai Law No 9 of 2004 (as amended), the DIFC 
courts were empowered to determine the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts. Finally, Article 7(2) of the 
Dubai Judicial Authority Law empowers the DIFC to attach assets that are not only within the DIFC, 
but also within the emirate of Dubai. In effect, from the DIFC’s perspective, it maintains separate but 
concurrent jurisdictions with, at the very least, ‘Courts of the emirate of Dubai’ if not ‘Courts of the 
UAE’. 
In terms of international case law, for example, in Broekmeulen603,  in determining the criteria to 
be met for an institution to be deemed a ‘court’ the Court of Justice of the European Union indicated the 
factors it would take into account; these included (i) whether the institution was established legally, (ii) 
whether the institution was permanently seated, (iii) whether the institution enjoyed a degree of 
independence in its operations, deliberations and decisions, (iv) whether the institution operated under 
jurisdiction which was compulsory or mandated, (v) whether the institution procedures involved 
opposing parties, and (vi) whether the institution applied the rules of law. 
Although it will appear from the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union – 
specifically Corbiau604 – that a key consideration for deeming an institution as a ‘court’ is judicial 
                                                 
602 Isai v Isabelle [Dubai International Financial Centre, Court of First Instance, 006/2017] 
603 Case 246/80 Broekmeulen [1981] ECR 2311. 
604 Case 24/92 Corbiau [1993] ECR I-1277. 
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independence, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union – specifically Dorsch v 
Bundesbaugesellschaft 605 and El Yassini v Secretary of State for the Home Department606 – stipulates 
that all six criteria identified in Case 246/80 Broekmeulen607 do not have to be present for an institution 
to be deemed a court. Arbitration, however, appears to require special consideration. Thus, in Nordse608,  
the Court of Justice of the European Union suggested that an arbitral tribunal and/or arbitrator is not a 
court where disputants have decided on the nature of the appointment of the arbitral tribunal and/or 
arbitrator and there has been no public authority involved in the decision to utilise arbitration. In the 
UAE the institutions to which the author refers (DIFC, DIAC, ADCCAC and the IICRA) are all 
constituted by government. 
What is of particular interest about the operations of the parallel courts in the UAE is that while 
most operate within ‘free zones’ in the emirate of Dubai, one, specifically the Dubai International 
Financial Centre (DIFC) subscribes to common law traditions, arguably reflecting the influence of 
English legal thinking that has come about from the UAE’s historical relationship with the Indian sub-
continent emerging from prior British colonial possession of India between 1858 and 1947 at a time 
where the UAE (as the Trucial states) was also a British protectorate609. The DIFC also maintains a 
particularly pro-arbitration position as articulated in its Practice Direction No. 1 of 2017 (Practice 
Direction) on 27 February 2017 which seeks to encourage disputants to commit to challenge arbitral 
awards only on merit. This has to be taken into context because the legal system in the UAE as a whole 
is predominantly of a civil law tradition (a reflection of the influence of Egyptian jurisprudence in the 
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country – see Al-Muhairi610) – although supplemented by Islamic Sharia611) and customary law and 
increasingly, due to market forces, a resurgent spattering of English common law612.  
 
4.5 ADR, arbitration and its key challenges in the UAE 
The cultural outlook towards dispute resolution in the Arab Middle East suggests a cultural preference 
for a negotiated dispute settlement613. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) has existed in the Arab 
Middle East in various forms that includes ‘Tahkim’ (Arbitration) and ‘Sulh’ (Negotiation, mediation 
and conciliation). The literature suggest that ADR has a long history of application in the Arab Middle 
East, possibly from as far back as the seventh century614. However, the literature on current usage 
suggests that, in the Arab Middle East business sector, there is considerable scepticism about ADR, with 
disputants showing a consistent preference for litigation among contracting parties615. Yet, as Maita616 
argues, whether litigation is effectively serving to resolve disputes in a timely fashion remains 
questionable.  
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Scholars provide a very concise historical overview of why there has been such considerable 
scepticism about ADR in the Middle East, particularly concerning arbitration-citing three notorious 
arbitration cases617. This flowed mainly from the decision by international arbitrators (mainly drawn 
from the West) to ignore and discredit extensive legal scholarship in Islam which does actually articulate 
a number of contract law principles. In fact, according to Gemmell618, a major characteristic of the 
arbitration awards in these cases was the concoction of 
 
“…a unique arbitral stew consisting of one part cynicism for local law and one part disdain for 
the Islamic parties’ ability to enforce rights…. The profound and lasting impact of these 
arbitrations on the region’s arbitral psyche should not be underestimated” (pp.179-180). 
 
One such case was the problematic dispute619 between Sheikh Zayed, the much-revered Emir of Abu 
Dhabi and Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd over the precise scope of a 75-year oil 
concessionary contract awarded in 1939 by Abu Dhabi which at that time was a British protectorate. 
Brower and Sharpe620 and Kutty621 opine that other important historical arbitration awards that may have 
framed such considerable scepticism about arbitration in the Middle East include the dispute between 
Saudi Arabia622 and the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) prior to its nationalisation by 
Saudi Arabia, and the dispute between the Emir of Qatar623 and the International Marine Oil Company. 
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Although such scepticism about arbitration existed, as Angell and Feulner624 and Luttrell625 
pointed out, prior to the promulgation of Federal Law 11 of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) 
(Luttrell626), there were no permanent courts in what is today the UAE (then the Trucial States). The 
administration of justice and the resolution of disputes was undertaken at the tribal level under the 
auspices of Sharia (derived from the Quran, Islam’s holy text and the Sunnah which represents records 
of the living examples of the Prophet Mohammed and his sayings which are known as the Hadith).  
As the economy of the country grew, dispute resolution and settlement was primarily undertaken 
under the auspices of either the executive council of individual emirates or in commercial matters, under 
the various Chambers of Commerce in individual emirates. An example being the Sharjah Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry and the Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry. However, even with 
the best intentions, attempts to settle disputes ‘quickly’ and ensure finality, conclusive and binding 
nature via arbitration under the auspices of the various Chambers of Commerce was generally not 
successful and, in some cases, arbitration proceedings took considerably longer than similar cases which 
were brought straight to the courts627. Angell and Feulner628, for example, reported that by mid-1985, 
while arbitration disputes were taking on average four years to resolve, similar cases in the courts were 
taking on average two years or less to resolve. One possible reason for this situation was identified by 
Feulner and Khan629 who highlighted that while playing a significant role in arbitration, the Chambers 
of Commerce generally had no powers of enforcement. However, in their inherent jurisdiction, since the 
courts were still empowered to review the legal merits of each award, what was meant to be in effect a 
straightforward confirmatory/ ratification formality often ended up in effect as a new and substantial 
legal proceeding in its own right.  
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Cognisant of these challenges, and noting the concern of foreign  business entities to participate 
in litigation – particularly where they were largely unfamiliar with the local system of justice, the UAE 
government soon recognised – as pro-competition sentiment grew within the country – that to drive 
economic growth, there was a need for the promulgation of formalised legislative provisions that were 
(i) objectively predictable630, and (ii) effectively brought together the constitutional provisions, traditions 
and Islamic Sharia jurisprudence with formalised legislative provisions. This led to the promulgation of 
the Federal Law 11 of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). Within this ‘new’ law, arbitration 
provisions were contained within Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 238, and 239 to 243. In Article 203(1), 
parties to a contract were explicitly provided with rights to refer disputes to arbitration to the extent that 
such agreements were in writing (Article 203(1)). 
One of the key challenges with ADR conducted under the provisions of Federal Law 11 of 1992 
was that national courts construed arbitration in a restricted manner631. For example, in Dubai Court of 
Cassation Judgment 393 of 1998 the courts opined that arbitration served only as an exception to the 
inherent jurisdiction of the courts to settle disputes. Primarily, this outlook may have been due to judicial 
concerns (which, as earlier pointed out, also does exist in other jurisdictions) that the arbitration process 
could usurp judicial authority and arguably certainity in the law. As Greco and Meredith632 highlight, 
such concerns are not unheard of in countries where there has been recent rapid economic development, 
such as the UAE and India. 
Thus, for example, the requirements that any intention of parties to engage in arbitration must be 
precise and unequivocal with the capacity for such an agreement are only applicable where duly entered 
by a duly authorised representative of the organisation with the appropriate authority633. In Dubai Court 
of Cassation Judgment 393 of 1998, the courts also held that an arbitration clause did not bind the 
                                                 
630 Stovall, H. 2008. Recent Revisions to Commercial Agency Law in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 22 
(3), 307-330. 
631 Luttrell, S. 2009a. The Changing Lex Arbitri of the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 23 (2), 139-166 
632 Greco, M. and Meredith, I. 2007. Getting to Yes Abroad: Arbitration as a tool in effective commercial and political risk 
management, Business Law Today, 16(4), 22-27. 
633 UAE Federal Law No. 2 of 2015 on Commercial Companies, as amended. 
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company in question and only bound the partners who signed the agreement because (i) their rights under 
the article of incorporation/association/formation did not confer such rights to arbitrate matters, and (ii) 
that the company in question was a separate juristic person from the partners. The courts reiterated that 
it was within the inherent jurisdiction of the courts to settle civil and commercial disputes, and any 
presumption within an article of incorporation/association/formation contracting out this right from the 
courts to private arbitration must be precise and unequivocal with the capacity of clearly authorised 
representative of the organisation. This also meant that it was always preferable in arbitration cases heard 
in the UAE that disputants, not their legal representatives, signed any arbitration agreement. The reason, 
according to Dimitrakopoulos634, is that while recognising that a Power of Attorney conferred rights on 
legal representatives to undertake arbitration proceedings on the clients’ behalf, the UAE courts did not 
perceive a Power of Attorney as conferring any right for legal representatives to bind their clients to 
arbitration agreements. In Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 91 of 1993, the courts held that an 
arbitration clause was not binding on parties to an agreement where the agreement was signed by the 
legal representative unless the legal representative was specifically authorised to do so under the 
company’s article of incorporation/association/formation. The ruling in Dubai Court of Cassation 
Judgment 91 of 1993 has to be considered in light of a later ruling in Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 
249 of 1996, where the court found that innocent third parties could maintain a liability claim against an 
organisation whose actions or omissions leads members of the public or another innocent party to 
reasonably believe that a certain individual does have the required authority to act on behalf of the 
aforementioned organisation. 
Another key challenge faced by arbitration within the UAE relates to the existence of parallel 
legal systems operating within the UAE at both emirate level and within specific emirates. The existence 
of such parallel systems has often resulted in various challenges to arbitration awards by, for example, 
                                                 
634 Dimitrakopoulos, A. 2001. Arbitration Practice in the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 16(4), 398-403. 
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individual ‘free zone’ courts. Thus, for example, in ITF v DWS635, National Bonds Corporation PJSC v 
Taaleem PJSC & Deyaar Development PJSC636 and Hardt v Damac637, the question of whether the DIFC 
Courts were part of the ‘the Courts of Dubai’ was questioned.  
In Hardt v Damac638, the DIFC Court of First Instance acknowledged that a distinction could be 
drawn between ‘the Courts of Dubai’ which were established under the emirate of Dubai Law No.3 of 
1992 and the ‘the Courts of the DIFC’ which were established under Law No.12 of 2004 – in effect, the 
DIFC courts agreed that reference to ‘the Courts of Dubai’ implied non-DIFC Courts. However, Sir 
Anthony Colman sitting found that there was still a recognised option for disputants to pursue claims 
outside the emirate of Dubai courts to arbitration under DIFC rule; although this was dependent on 
claimants successfully demonstrating a contractual agreement to contract-out disputes from the DIFC 
Courts. The matter, however, appears contentious following the ruling of Justice Nabil Omran in the 
Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation Judgement 118 of 2014  that 
 
“…litigants have the right to resort to the regular courts regarding the disputes relating to the 
performance of the temporal and precautionary procedures or the summary matters”. 
 
The scepticism about ADR across the Arab639 Middle East is also reflected in other countries such as in 
Saudi Arabia where, for example, Decree No. 58 of 1963 prohibits any government institution from 
entering into an arbitration agreement without prior government authorisation. Going back to the UAE, 
Federal Law No. 2 of 2015 (New Companies Law) prohibits UAE public companies from entering into 
contracts with an arbitration clause unless such a power was registered in its Articles of Association.  
                                                 
635 ITF v DWS [Dubai International Financial Centre Court of First Instance, 2/2012] 
636 National Bonds Corporation PJSC v Taaleem PJSC & Deyaar Development PJSC [Dubai International Financial Centre 
Court of Appeal, 2011/CA 001]. 
637 Dr. Lothar Ludwig Hardt and Hardt Trading F.Z.E v DAMAC (DIFC) Company Limited et al [Dubai International 
Financial Centre Court of First Instance, 036/2009]. 
638 Dr. Lothar Ludwig Hardt and Hardt Trading F.Z.E v DAMAC (DIFC) Company Limited et al [Dubai International 
Financial Centre Court of First Instance, 036/2009]. 




4.6 The scope of the public policy exception under the repealed sections of Federal 
Law 11 of 1992 
Although this thesis seeks more clarity on the public policy exceptions application by the UAE courts, 
the following facts are understood. Prior to its repeal on 3 May 2018 by the UAE Federal Arbitration 
Law No. 6 of 2018, statutory provisions for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the UAE were 
articulated within Articles 203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 and Articles 239 to 243 Federal Law 11 of 
1992640, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). Federal Law 11 of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) had 
been developed as part of UAE constitution and had sought to replace prior dispute resolution 
mechanisms in the country which had been primarily based on Sharia and customary law641.  
At this juncture, it is important to highlight that the development of arbitration law in the UAE 
distinct from Sharia does not infer any opposition by Sharia to arbitration provisions. While not being 
the case, the literature642 identifies fundamental differences between Sharia and civil proceedings as 
articulated by Federal Law 11 of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). These differences are primarily 
in the following areas. First, as relates to the qualification of an arbitrator, under Sharia, such an 
arbitrator was expected to adhere to the Muslim faith and be an adult male who is learned in Sharia. 
Second, under Sharia, arbitrators do have wide powers to intervene in arbitration proceedings which are 
not provided for under the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). Third, under Sharia, an arbitration agreement 
can only apply to prior and not future disputes. Thus, under Sharia, contractual provisions that stipulate 
that future disputes will be subject to arbitration are null and void. Fourth, under Sharia, a party who is 
insolvent is incapable of entering into arbitration as this will lead to a further reduction of their assets. 
                                                 
640 http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/uae/chapter3/  
641 Angell, N. 1986. Regulation of business under the developing legal system of the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law 
Quarterly, 1 (2), 119-140. 
642 Angell, N. and Feulner, G. 1988. Arbitration of Disputes in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 3 (1), 19-32; 
Foster, N. 1998. Guarantees in the UAE: a Comparative Analysis in the Light of English Law, French Law and the Shari'a. 
Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, 5, pp. 42-87; Luttrell, S. 2009a. The Changing Lex Arbitri of the UAE. Arab 
Law Quarterly, 23 (2), 139-166; Qouteschat, O. and Alawamleh, K. 2017. The enforceability of electronic arbitration 
agreements before the DIFC Courts and Dubai Courts. Digital Evidence & Electronic Signature Law Review, 14, 47-60. 
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Fifth, Qouteschat and Alawamleh643 note that,  under Sharia, an arbitration agreement does not need to 
be in written form, but the proof of agreement should be done ‘by a statement of witnesses and by 
drawing back from the oath’. Under Article 203 (2) of Federal Law 11 of 1992, the Civil Procedure 
Code (CPC), “No agreement for arbitration shall be valid unless evidenced in writing”. The final 
difference in terms of Sharia and civil proceedings as articulated by Federal Law 11 of 1992, the Civil 
Procedure Code (CPC) relates to how guarantees are constructed. In terms of Sharia, since documentary 
evidence does not play a prominent part of transactions, there is not particular form required for 
guarantees. Federal Law 11 of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), however, provides for required 
forms for guarantee. Table 3 below provides an overview of this now repealed legislation. The provisions 






                                                 
643 Qouteschat, O. and Alawamleh, K. 2017. The enforceability of electronic arbitration agreements before the DIFC Courts 
and Dubai Courts. Digital Evidence & Electronic Signature Law Review, 14, 47-60. 
145 
 
Table 3: Overview of Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 238 and 239 to 243 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992 
Article/s Scope Important provisions of interest 
203 The Arbitration 
Agreement 
Articulates that an arbitration agreement must be in writing. 
 States that arbitration cannot be utilised to adjudicate matters not capable of being reconciled. These 
are construed as implying criminal matters and matters that relate to or impact upon public policy. 
204 Matters relating to 
disputes on matters to be 
referred to arbitration 
Articulates the courts’ right to intervene and settle the dispute on appropriate procedure. 
205 Names of arbitrators Stipulates that an arbitrator must be specifically cited prior to commencing of proceedings. 
206 Competency of 
arbitrators 
Articulates who is competent to serve as an arbitrator and the number of arbitrators required for an 
arbitral tribunal. 
207 Addresses the disqualification of arbitrators. 
208 Challenging the 
appointment of an 
arbitrator 
Provides 30 days for a party to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator. 
209 Arbitration proceedings Suspension of arbitration proceedings for example where an application has been made to the court to 
intervene in the arbitration proceedings. 
210 Fixing of dates for arbitration hearings.  
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211 Witnesses in arbitration hearings; oath taking and perjury during arbitration proceedings. 
212 Establishes that arbitration awards must conform to legal provisions. 
213 Provides that arbitration awards must be confirmed and ratified in a national court. 
214 Establishes that the courts can order an arbitrator or arbitral tribunal to reconsider its decision or award. 
215 Enforcement of arbitral 
awards 
Establishes that arbitration awards can only be enforced through the national courts. 
216 Challenge and vacatur Articulates the conditions to which a party may apply to the courts for an arbitral award to be 
‘nullified’. 
217 Posits that arbitral awards are not subject to appeal; however, an appeal may be made against the 
judgement of the court that ratified the said award. 
218 Arbitrator fees Stipulates that while an arbitrator may set his/her fees, the courts may on application of a disputant 
amend the fees. 
235 - 238 Execution of foreign 
judgments 
Stipulates that arbitral awards made outside the UAE may be applied in the UAE through an 
application to the UAE courts. 
239 - 243 Execution procedures Mandates the manner within which an arbitral award may be executed. 
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It is, however, important to highlight, as Gemmell644 points out as in the case of other mainstream 
religions, that there are four different schools645 of Islamic Sharia philosophy. The implication of this is 
that, under Sharia, arbitrability differs by school of thought and philosophy. In fact, according to Kutty646 
the very fact on what is subject to arbitration (as relates to public policy) has drawn conflicting judicial 
rulings in the UAE. It remains that public policy is construed subjectively in the UAE647. 
Dimitrakopoulos648 posits that, under UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992, a popular reason for 
invoking Article 216 and Article 217 to challenge arbitration awards in the UAE related to cited 
procedural deficiencies. It is important, however, to highlight that, based on review of UAE case law, it 
does not appear that Article 216 does not make provisions for the annulment of arbitration awards on 
the ground of Public policy (and/or public order). However, the general trend appears to suggest that 
Public policy (and/or public order) considerations is a criterion that is taken into consideration when the 
courts are seeking to ratify an arbitration award.  
Arbitration in the UAE can be undertaken through the courts or without the courts’ interference. 
If arbitration is undertaken through the courts (or parallel courts) then, as stated in Dubai Court of 
Cassation Judgment 67 of 2009, the arbitration process needs to take into consideration Articles 213 (1) 
and 213 (2). If, however, the arbitration process is not under the auspices of the courts, then the 
arbitration process needs only to take into consideration Article 213 (3). These provisions are supported 
                                                 
644 Gemmell, A. 2007. Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East. Santa Clara Journal of International Law, 5 (1), 
169-193. 
645 Due to political and  historical reasons, as with other world religions, Islam has different branches. There are two main 
branches of Islam. These are Shia Islam and Sunni Islam. There is a third branch of Islam – Ibadi – which is predominantly 
practiced in the Sultanate of Oman. Shia Islam is primarily practiced in Iran while the majority of Arab states in the Middle 
East such as the UAE, adhere to Sunni Islam. Within Sunni Islam, there are four main schools of Islamic Shariah 
philosophy - the Hanafi School (which is based on the teachings of Abu Hanifa - AD 699-767) the Maliki School (which is 
based on the teachings of Malik ibn Anas - AD 715-795), the Shafi'i School (which is based on the teachings of 
Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafii - AD 767-820) and the Hanbali School (which is based on the teachings of Ahmad ibn 
Hanbal - AD 780-855). In the UAE, the order of precedence of application of the four different schools of thought to Sharia 
jurisprudence is set out in Article 1 of the Civil Transactions Code (CTC) of the UAE which articulates that the order of 
precedence starts with the Maliki philosophy, then secondly the Hanbali philosophy and then thirdly the Shafi'i and Hanifa 
philosophies together. 
646 Kutty, F. 2006. The Shari'a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration, Loyola of Los Angeles International and 
Comparative Law Review, 28, 565-624 
647 Mayew, G. and Morris, M. 2014. Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards in the United Arab Emirates. Defense 
Counsel Journal, 81, 279-287. 
648 Dimitrakopoulos, A. 2001. Arbitration Practice in the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 16(4), 398-403. 
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by case law, more specifically Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 40 of 2004 and Dubai Court of 
Cassation Judgment 88 of 2004 where it was stated that, 
 
“The award of the arbitrators may not be contested by any manner of appeal”. 
 
However, while it appears that DIFC arbitration awards may not be readily challenged and vacated in 
‘the Courts of Dubai’ because of the provisions of the earlier-discussed enabling Federal Law No.8 of 
2004, it will appear that DIAC awards can be readily appealed to the Dubai courts (‘the Courts of 
Dubai’). In effect, it is safe to suggest, as shown in International Electromechanical Services Co LLC v 
Al Fattan Engineering LLC & Al Fattan Properties LLC649, that the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements in the UAE (in this case the emirate of Dubai) is dependent on the scope and validity of the 
arbitration agreement clearly being aligned with UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992. In sum, while arbitration 
awards may not be appealed (Article 217) as also reiterated by the courts in Dubai Court of Cassation 
Judgment 180 of 2006, provisions for its challenge existed under Article 216. Ibrahim650 has interpreted 
Article 217 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992 as implying that once parties agree to arbitration, they 
implicitly expressly waived their rights to file an appeal. Angell and Feulner651 suggest that, under UAE 
Federal Law 11 of 1992, there were six grounds for challenging arbitration awards. These are: 
 
(i) Where the arbitration agreement was found to be invalid or illegal; 
(ii) Where it was found that the arbitrators were not competent to adjudicate over the subject matter 
of the dispute or had exceeded their authority in adjudicating over the subject matter of the 
dispute; 
(iii)Where disputants had not been properly served with notice of the arbitration proceedings; 
                                                 
649 International Electromechanical Services Co. LLC v (1) Al Fattan Engineering LLC and (2) Al Fattan Properties LLC 
[2012] DIFC CFI 004, Oct 14, 2012 | Court of First Instance. 
650 Ibrahim, A. 2014.  Arbitration in the UAE, Court Uncourt, 1, 17 - 19. 
651 Angell, N. and Feulner, G. 1988. Arbitration of Disputes in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 3 (1), 19-32. 
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(iv) Where the arbitration award was procured through deception or by fraud; 
(v) Where the arbitration award was contrary to UAE law, UAE Public policy (and/or public order) 
or national morals; and 
(vi) Where the award was contrary to the general principles of UAE national civil, customary or 
Islamic law.  
 
Of particular interest to this thesis, however, are provisions for Public policy (and/or public order) 
exceptions. Under the now repealed Articles 203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 and Articles 239 to 243 of 
UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992, the following public policy exception provisions are made. Article 203(4) 
had stated that 
 
“Arbitration shall not be permissible in matters, which are not capable of being reconciled…”.  
 
In addition, Article 212 (2) had stated that  
 
“The arbitrators award shall be in conformity with the provisions of law unless the arbitrator 
was authorized to reconcile the dispute, in which event he shall not be bound to comply with such 
rules except in matters which concern public order”. 
 
Furthermore, Article 235 (2) (e)  had stated that an arbitration award may only be enforced where it has 
been shown that  
 
“It does not conflict or contradict with a judgment or order previously passed by another court 




4.7 UAE case law on the scope of the public policy exception  
Taking note that (i) the UAE courts have been traditionally reluctant to ratify arbitration awards deemed 
to unfairly burden an economically weaker party652, and (ii) as constitutionally an adherent to civil law 
traditions, the principles of stare decisis do not apply to UAE federal courts653, judges in  the ‘Courts of 
the UAE are expected to decide cases on the individual merits of each case. However, there is always a 
chance that disparities may exist in terms of how Public policy (and/or public order) is construed in 
judicial decisions. These differences could emanate from  the nature of principles applied and legal 
training of individual judges (Feulner and Khan654), and differences in how judges may construe the 
interpretation of UAE federal law in a manner that it enforces arbitration awards to the extent deemed 
not to be in conflict with federal law, Islamic Sharia, local customs (in that order – see Luttrell655), and 
rules of natural justice and equity. Noting the above, scholars such as Al-Enazi656(p. 127) suggest that a 
major concern with the notion of Public policy (and/or public order) in the UAE is that its definition is 
extremely broad and therefore 
 
“…susceptible to arbitrary interpretations by the courts”. 
 
Thus, in International Bechtel Co. Ltd. v Department of Civil Aviation of the Government of 
Dubai657[Dubai Court of Cassation, 2004], an arbitration award of £20 million in favour of International 
Bechtel Co. Ltd  was overruled by the Dubai Court of Cassation. The judgement cited as reason the 
ground that witnesses during the arbitration hearings were not sworn in in the manner consistent with 
                                                 
652 Angell, N. and Feulner, G. 1988. Arbitration of Disputes in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 3 (1), 19-32. 
653 Foster, N. 1998. Guarantees in the UAE: a Comparative Analysis in the Light of English Law, French Law and the 
Shari'a. Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, 5, pp. 42-87. 
654 Feulner, G. and Khan, A. 1986. Dispute Resolution in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 1 (3), 312-318. 
655 Luttrell, S. 2009a. The Changing Lex Arbitri of the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 23 (2), 139-166 
656 Al-Enazi, M. 2013. Grounds for refusal of enforcement of foreign commercial arbitral awards in GCC states law with 
special reference to (Bahrain and UAE). Unpublished PhD Thesis, Brunel University, London. 




UAE law. This ruling was made despite earlier case ruling in Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation Judgment 
433/17 of 1997 where the courts ruled that it was not against public policy in the UAE for an arbitrator 
to depart from strict procedural rules regarding witnesses, production of evidence, and documentation. 
Arbitrators were empowered to establish their own processes and procedures pertaining to, for example, 
the production of evidence. Process and procedures could also extend to an arbitration proceeding 
deciding on a point of law which is either not relevant to the dispute or which has not been cited by 
parties to the dispute. This was the case in Modern Engineering v Miskin658, Pacol v Rossakhar659 and 
Lloyd's Rep 135; and Sanghi v The International Investor660 heard in the English courts. On the other 
hand, in terms of the substantive essence of the law itself, a key manifestation relates to the inarbitrability 
of certain disputes; these may include, for example, disputes over matters which are illegal. Nuss661 
identifies contracts for perpetual servitude as one such example of an inarbitrabile dispute.  
The following are also known from UAE case law which is based on the now repealed Articles 
203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 and Articles 239 to 243 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992.  
In Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 43 of 2009, it was found that the sale of off-plan housing 
units that do not comply with mandatory requirements for registration of ownership via Dubai Land and 
Property Department was contrary to public policy. Public policy demands meant that the developer 
could only submit documentation for registration, but the duty to complete the registration process 
resided solely with the Dubai Land and Property Department. In this instance, because a failure on the 
part of the developer to register the property through the Dubai Land and Property Department could 
impair the rights of home owners, the dispute could not be subject to arbitration. 
In Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 180 of 2011, the courts reiterated that arbitration on the 
subject of interim property registers relating to land sale/acquisition could not, because of public policy, 
                                                 
658 Modern Engineering v Miskin, [1981] 1 Lloyd's Rep 135. 
659 Pacol v Rossakhar [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 135. 
660 Sanghi v The International Investor (KCFC), [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep 480. 
661 Nuss, J. 2013. Public Policy Invoked as a Ground For Contesting the Enforcement of an Arbitral Award, or for Seeking 
its Annulment. Dispute Resolution International, 7, 119-133. 
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be subject to arbitration. Similar findings were made by the courts in Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 
14 of 2012 on three earlier arbitration awards relating to private property secured through DIAC where 
it was yet again reiterated that relevant provisions on property law were not subject to arbitration for 
reasons of public policy.  
In Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation Judgment 663 of 2012, the courts ruled that they could intervene 
(again in a property dispute). The courts opined that this was possible on the grounds that even though 
the basis of challenging the arbitration award did not meet the threshold set in Article 216, the arbitrator 
had exceeded his authority under UAE law by venturing into matters of public policy. This was also the 
position in Banyan Tree662 where the Dubai Court of First Instance nullified an earlier arbitration award 
made by the DIFC courts on the grounds that, in seeking to enforce an arbitration award663 outside the 
DIFC free zone, the DIFC courts had exceeded their jurisdiction. The courts went further to identify such 
public policy issues as matters which were of basic concern to society and the state. The author contends 
that the notion of public policy or order within the UAE is drawn particularly wide. However, while this 
may be the case, there are a number of cases which suggest a tightening of the public policy exception. 
In both Dubai Court of Cassation Judgment 282 of 2012 and  Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance 
Judgment 2847 of 2013 the courts found that failure to comply with property sale and purchase 
agreements were only matters of private interest and therefore could not be construed as matters of public 
policy. The courts reiterated that contracts were only liable for vacatur when proper process and 
procedures relating to land registration were not fulfilled. The main point to note here, according to 
Arab664, is that land registration in the UAE is deemed a matter of public policy not because it is deemed 
part of a sale and purchase agreement, but because it is a legal formality which ensures that title is 
transferred to the purchaser. 
 
                                                 
662 Banyan Tree Corporate Pte Ltd. v Meydan Group LLC, Case No. 1619 of 2016. 
663 Banyan Tree Corporate Pte Ltd v Meydan Group LLC (Case ARB 003/2013 judgment 2 April 2015. 
664 Arab, H. 2015. Ground-breaking ruling on public policy by the Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance, Arbitration 
Newsletter, 20 (1), 39-42. 
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4.8 UAE Federal Arbitration Law No. 6 of 2018  
Notwithstanding the earlier alluded-to scepticism with ADR in the Arab Middle East business sector, 
globalisation of international commerce and increasing influences have led to a number of Middle 
Eastern countries enacting new stand-alone arbitration legislation. In fact, evidence of the increasing 
recognition of the importance of arbitration to the region is demonstrated by the establishment of the 
GCC Commercial Arbitration Centre seated in Bahrain. The centre commenced operations in 1995 and 
seeks to provide arbitral services to contracting parties who primarily conduct business in the GCC 
region665. 
According to Luttrell666 Articles 203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 and Articles 239 to 243 Federal 
Law 11 of 1992667, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) had been developed to replace prior dispute 
resolution mechanisms in the UAE that had been primarily based on Sharia and customary law. It had 
been noted earlier by Angell668 that the modernisation of UAE arbitration laws was primarily being 
driven by a desire of the government to further attract increased levels of foreign investment in the 
country. Such modernisation, it had been posited, was likely to be achieved if two things were in place: 
Firstly, a dedicated legislation exclusively focused on arbitration and secondly, a modern legal 
framework aligned to international arbitration jurisprudence. Of course, this does not mean, as Kutty669 
explicitly argues, that Sharia is an unsophisticated, obscure, or defective system. In fact, as in the case 
of western legal philosophy, Sharia is a positive system of law which means that Sharia obliges specific 
actions and rights for individuals and groups. It is also a system of jurisprudence that is in constant 
evolution670.  
                                                 
665 Kreindler, R. 1997. An overview of the arbitration rules of the recently established GCC commercial arbitration centre, 
Bahrain. Arab Law Quarterly, 12(1), 3-25. 
666 Luttrell, S. 2009a. The Changing Lex Arbitri of the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 23 (2), 139-166 
667 http://www.diac.ae/idias/rules/uae/chapter3/  
668 Angell, N. 1986. Regulation of business under the developing legal system of the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law 
Quarterly, 1 (2), 119-140. 
669 Kutty, F. 2006. The Shari'a Factor in International Commercial Arbitration, Loyola of Los Angeles International and 
Comparative Law Review, 28, 565-624 
670 Fyzee, A. 1964. Outlines of Muhammadan Law, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, 3rd edition. 
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Along these lines, as earlier stated, the need to develop a modern and robust stand-alone 
arbitration legal framework has been well recognised in academic commentary671 and practitioner 
commentary672. The primary interest is to develop such a framework that is able to support domestic and 
cross-border commercial and economic activities by drawing upon best practice from around the world. 
Thus, on 3 May 2018, UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration was promulgated as the first 
independent stand-alone arbitration legislation in the UAE. Following its promulgation, arbitration 
provisions as stipulated in Articles 203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 and Articles 239 to 243 of UAE 
Federal Law 11 of 1992 were repealed.  
The new law is reflective of what Brower and Sharpe673 refer to as the ‘The third phase’ of 
arbitration in the Middle East and is reflected in Middle East countries in that, due to globalisation and 
the need to support free flow of capital, there is a need to support international commerce by affording 
not only reciprocal legal protection, but more speedy means of dispute resolution that is able to ensure 
confidentiality.  
                                                 
671 See for example, Angell, N. 1986. Regulation of business under the developing legal system of the United Arab 
Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 1 (2), 119-140; Ballantyne, W. 1986. Arbitration in the Gulf States: "Delocalisation": A 
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9 (3), 254-292; Luttrell, S. 2008b. The Arbitration Law of the Dubai International Finance Centre. Journal of International 
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2009. Arbitration at the Dubai International Financial Centre: a Common Law Jurisdiction in the Middle East. Arbitration 
International, 25(2), 173-186; Lagarde, M. 2015. Liability of Arbitrators in Dubai: Still a Safe Seat of Arbitration. ASA 
Bulletin, 33(4), 780-807; Dayton, B. and Takahashi, S. 2018. Arbitration Developments in the United Arab Emirates. Asian 
Dispute Review, 2018(1), 30-37. 
672 AlMulla, H., and Mackenzie, A. 2018. The UAE introduces Long-awaited Stand-alone Arbitration Law, 
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/people/m/mackenzie-andrew, accessed 26/06/18; Al Tamimi, E., Arab, H., and Snider, 
T. 2018. UAE issues Federal Arbitration Law no. 6/2018, http://feedback.tamimi.com/SnapshotFiles/7c2a1722-d90f-4b24-
a628-14ce1072899b/Subscriber.snapshot?clid=50d2cfeb-41e9-440c-bf6c-15b044f918d5&cid=1f9fec43-bee4-4fb6-9eac-
858d32bdcb80&ce=2xwmQw1Krift45tBCzlK8LCVxujwd5y%2BSywDVByvtxA%3D, accessed 26/05/18; BouMalhab, 
N., Reeves, J. and Sahab, D. 2018. The UAE’s New Arbitration Law, https://www.clydeco.com/insight/article/the-uaes-
new-arbitration-law, accessed 26/05/18; Smith, B. and Mazzawi, M. 2018. UAE approves arbitration law after 11 years, 
https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2018/march/uae-law-on-arbitration-in-commercial-disputes-is-approved-after-11-
years-of-anticipation-/, accessed 26/05/18; Turrini, M., Robottom, L., Bailey, J., Cuffe, C., Roshan, A. and Raza, H. 2018. 
The New UAE Arbitration Law: an incremental shift towards international norms. 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/new-uae-arbitration-law-incremental-shift-towards-international-norms, 
accessed 26/05/18 
673 Brower, C. and Sharpe, J. 2003. International arbitration and the Islamic world: The third phase. American Journal of 
International Law, 97(3), 643-656. 
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On review, the new law seeks to exert a stand-alone arbitration philosophy within current UAE 
legislative provisions but does so by retaining an element of supervisory provisions by higher courts. 
Arguably, one of the major objectives of the drafters of the new UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on 
Arbitration was to limit the wide-ranging supervisory role the courts had previously exerted (see, for 
example, Ballantyne674) under the now repealed Articles 203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 and Articles 
239 to 243 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992. One of the main concerns with the arbitration provisions of 
the now repealed Articles 203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 and Articles 239 to 243 of UAE Federal Law 
11 of 1992 was that, because of the inherent jurisdiction to examine factual matters in disputes, referral 
to the courts when arbitration awards were challenged for any number of reasons implied a repeat of 
hearings on matters of fact previously heard during arbitration proceedings in the courts675. The effect 
of this is that arbitration proceedings under UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992 began to experience the same 
limitations as those experienced by the various Chambers of Commerce prior to the promulgation of 
UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992; in that a number of arbitration proceedings ended up taking (again) 
considerably longer than similar cases which were brought straight to the courts676. In addition, the 
drafters of the new law have sought to designate a single superior court (The Court of Appeal) to deal 
with matters relating to challenges and vacatur petitions. This is in line with international standards and 
currently the practice in other Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt and Djibouti677. 
As such, the provisions of the new arbitration law, which is framed to align with the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, are structured against six sections involving 61 different articles. Of particular interest are 
the following. Article 1 provides the various definitions and scope of application of the new law. For 
example it articulates the definition of arbitration and establishes that references to the courts of the UAE 
imply ‘federal or local Court of Appeals agreed upon by disputants. Article 2 stipulates the applicability 
                                                 
674 Ballantyne, W. 1986. Arbitration in the Gulf States: "Delocalisation": A Short Comparative Study. Arab Law Quarterly, 
1 (2), 205-215. 
675 Dimitrakopoulos, A. 2001. Arbitration Practice in the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 16(4), 398-403. 
676 Luttrell, S. 2009a. The Changing Lex Arbitri of the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 23 (2), 139-166; Seidenberg, S. 2009. 
The Long Dubai: Even in the business-friendliest Mideast, arbitration can take forever. ABA Journal, 95 (12), 17-18 
677 El-Ahdab, A. 2011. Arbitration With the Arab Countries, Kluwer Law International Third Edition. 
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of the new law to all arbitration proceedings conducted within the UAE (Article 2(1)) and those 
conducted outside the country (Article 2(2)) where the parties have explicitly contracted to subject the 
proceedings under its provisions. While the new law makes provisions for parties to arbitration 
proceedings in the UAE to contract out its provisions, this will only be possible where (i) such contract 
or proceedings is not in conflict with public order and morality as construed in the country, and where 
(ii) as stated in Article 2(1), according to Turrini et al. (2018678) the parties have agreed to subject their 
dispute to, for example, either DIFC or DIAC jurisdiction. Table 4 below provides an overview of the 
new legislation. The provisions within this legislation which touch on both vacatur and public policy are 
highlighted. 
                                                 
678 Turrini, M., Robottom, L., Bailey, J., Cuffe, C., Roshan, A. and Raza, H. 2018. The New UAE Arbitration Law: an 
incremental shift towards international norms. https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/new-uae-arbitration-law-
incremental-shift-towards-international-norms, accessed 26/05/18 
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Table 4: Overview of UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration 
Section Provisions Article Scope Important provisions of interest 
Section I Definitions and 
Scope of 
Application 
Article 1 Definitions Defines arbitration; Defines a ‘court’ as federal or local Court of Appeals (as 
such emirate of Dubai Law No.3 of 1992 laws applies). 
Article 2 Scope of 
Application of 
the Law 
Stipulates that the law applies to arbitration conducted within the UAE or other 
country if parties agree to subject the proceedings to UAE law or to another 
jurisdiction within the UAE (such as the DIFC – UAE Federal Laws Federal 
Law No. 8 of 2004 Regarding The Financial Free Zones, Dubai International 
Financial Centre Law No. 10 of 2004 (Part 53) and emirate of Dubai Law No.12 
of 2004 laws applies) to the extent that the arbitration proceedings are not in 
‘conflict with the public order and morality of the State’.  
Section II The Arbitration 
Agreement 
Article 3 International 
arbitration 
proceedings 
Articulates the modalities for determining whether a particular arbitration 
proceeding will be deemed as international when connected to more than one 
country. It is, however, noted that under Article 20 of the Civil Procedure Code 
(CPC), the UAE retains jurisdiction to hear cases involving foreigners (natural 
or juristic persons) who are domicile or who live in the UAE. Similarly, Article 
82 of the CPC provides that if a natural or juristic person conducts business or 
carries out a profession in the UAE, the UAE courts have jurisdiction to hear 
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matters of dispute relating to the business or profession of such a natural or 
juristic person. This jurisdiction extends to branches or sub-units of the said 
entity (Article 33). 
Article 4 Capacity to 
Enter into an 
Arbitration 
Agreement 
Of particular relevance is Article 4 (2) which stipulates that “2. Arbitration is 
not permitted in matters which do not permit compromise”. This is deemed from 
prior literature as relating to questions of public policy. 
Article 5 Form of 
Arbitration 
Agreement 
Stipulates that an agreement to enter into arbitration may be concluded after a 
dispute has arisen. 
Article 6 Autonomy of 
the Arbitration 
Agreement 
Mandates that an arbitration clause in a contract is independent from other 
provisions of the same contract. Thus the fact that a contract is null and void 
does not necessarily imply that arbitration proceedings may be stayed. 
Article 7 A written 
Arbitration 
Agreement 
Now stipulates that an arbitration agreement although it must be in written form, 
can also be in an electronic form if it conforms to UAE Federal Law No. 1 of 
2006 concerning Electronic Transactions and Commerce. 
Article 8 Resolution of a 
Dispute that is 














Article 19 now allows an arbitrator (or arbitral panel) to rule on its jurisdiction to 
conduct proceedings, but allows in Article 19 (2) disputants to challenge the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal within 30 days from the date the arbitrator (or 

























































Article 19 The Arbitral 
Tribunal’s 
Competence to 
Rule on its Own 
Jurisdiction 
Article 20 Time Limit for a 














Article 22 Intervention and 
Joinder of New 
Article 23 states that parties are free to agree on the arbitration procedure. 
Parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration (Article 28). Under Article 
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Parties in an 
Arbitration 
36, the arbitral tribunal may appeal to the courts to make an order to compel a 
witness to appear before the tribunal. 
Article 23 Determination 
of Rules of 
Procedure 
Article 24 Notice 
Article 25 Waiver of Right 
to Object 
Article 26 Equality of the 
Parties 
Article 27 Commencement 
of Arbitral 
Proceedings 
Article 28 Place of 
Arbitration 




Article 30 Statements of 
Claim and 
Defence 





Article 32 Default of a 
Party 
Article 33 Hearings and 
Written 
Proceedings 
Article 34 Expert 
Assistance 
Article 35 Witness 
Testimony 
Article 36 Power of the 
Court to Act on 
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a Request for 
Evidence 
Section V The Arbitral 
Award 




The parties are free to decide on choice of law which will be applied to the 
subject matter of the dispute.  




Law to Govern 
the Subject-
Matter of the 
Dispute 
 
  Article 39 Interim and 
Partial Awards 
 
  Article 40 Consent Award The arbitral award shall be made in writing. 
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  Article 42 Time for Issuing 
a Final Award 
 




  Article 44 Notification of 
Arbitral Award 
 
  Article 45 Termination of 
Arbitral 
Proceedings 
Arbitral proceedings become terminated once an award is made. 
  Article 46 Costs of 
Arbitration 
 
  Article 47 Withholding 
Delivery of 
Award Pending 
Payment of Fees 
An arbitrator/arbitral tribunal is empowered to withhold delivery of its final 
award until it receives payment for the proceedings.  
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  Article 49 Interpretation of 
Award 
 
  Article 50 Correction of 
Material Errors 
in Award 
Sets out that an arbitral tribunal can correct material errors in any award it 
makes. 
  Article 51 Additional 
Award 
 
  Article 52 Binding Force Sets out that arbitral awards are binding and enforceable as a ruling confirmed 
from the courts. 
  Article 53 Challenging 
Arbitral Awards 
Sets out eight grounds for challenging arbitration awards. Sets out the position 
on public policy exceptions, 
  Article 54 Action to Set 
Aside Award 
Action to Set Aside Award. 
  Article 55 Enforcement of 
Award 






















Explicitly articulates the repeal of the previsions of Articles 203-218 of said 
Federal Law No. 11 of 1992 and any other law which is in conflict with the new 
arbitration law. 
Article 59 The Temporal 
Dimension of 
this Law 







Article 61 Publication and 




Of particular interest is that although retaining its emphasis that arbitration agreements should be in 
writing, in acknowledging the growth in e-Commerce, the new legislation stipulates that such written 
agreements can now be in electronic form to the extent that such agreements meet statutory provisions 
stated within UAE Federal Law No. 1 of 2006 concerning Electronic Transactions and Commerce. This 
development is particular interesting and is driven by a recognition by the UAE government that 
technology will change the way in which not only business is conducted, but also the way that arbitration 
and, more generally, dispute resolution will be conducted in the future679. The new provisions within 
UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 in relation to electronic arbitration agreements are in line with the 
UNCITRAL e-Commerce Model Law; more specifically Article 6 of the UNCITRAL e-Commerce 
Model Law which stipulates that on the occasion that there is a legal requirement for information to be 
in writing, such information will retain its legal effect if in data (electronic) form. It also aligns national 
law in the UAE with Article 12(5) of Dubai International Financial Centre Law No. 1 of 2008 which 
provides that arbitration agreements can be entered into via “any communication that the parties make 
by means of data message”. The new provisions within UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 in relation to 
electronic arbitration agreements also emphasise that it will no longer be possible to draw on the evidence 
provided by witnesses where there is no written documentary evidence to demonstrate the existence of 
an arbitration agreement. This provision is in line with provisions within UAE Federal Law No. 10 of 
1992 promulgating the Law of Proof in Civil and Commercial Transactions (as amended) which 
emphasises documentary evidence over witness testimonial evidence. It is also in line with Article 2 of 
UAE Federal Law No. 18 of 1993 on Commercial Transactions Law. 
Article 9 of the UNCITRAL e-Commerce Model Law also provides evidential protection for 
electronic information; stipulating that such information  is admissible in legal proceedings as evidence. 
As suggested by the global consultancy A.T Kearney 680, despite low penetration of e-Commerce in the 
                                                 
679 Jeker, J., Anwar, H., Cabral, M. and Mannan, F. 2006. E-transaction law and online dispute resolution: a necessity in the 
Middle East. Arab Law Quarterly, 20(1), 43-76. 
680 A.T Kearney. 2016. Getting in on the GCC E-Commerce Game. AT Kearney Publication, http://www.middle-
east.atkearney.com/documents/787838/8908433/Getting+in+on+the+GCC+E-Commerce+Game.pdf, accessed 03/06/18. 
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GCC region (0.4% of the GCC’s GDP compared to, for example, 3.5% in the case of the United 
Kingdom), the market is likely to be valued at approximately US$20 billion by 2020. Recent studies by 
Ojiako681 have explored how online dispute resolution (ODR) is likely to impact on dispute resolution 
in the UAE. It is observed that while commercial businesses are likely to derive advantages from the 
exploitation of technology, being able to resolve disputes using technology-mediated interfaces will 
provide commercial businesses with more avenues for even quicker and more convenient forms of 
dispute resolution among geographically dispersed disputants682. This is particularly important in an era 
where a considerable number of businesses operating in the UAE maintain both physical and online 
outlets683. This position was recognised by the DIFC courts which, on 10 October 2016, announced  the 
launch of their ‘smart’ small claims adjudicating tribunal. 
The new UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration also now attempts to restrict how 
arbitration awards are challenged. For example, in Article 8 of the new law, the lodging of a court 
application on provisions set out in an arbitration agreement will not mitigate against commencing or 
continuing either the arbitration proceedings or in fact the conferring of an award. This provision can be 
contrasted to previous provisions in Article 203(5) of the now repealed Civil Procedure Code which 
allowed parties to a dispute to assert objections to the jurisdiction of an arbitration panel at its initial 
seating. Article 19 now allows an arbitrator (or arbitral panel) to rule on its jurisdiction to conduct 
proceedings, in Article 19 (2), but allows disputants to challenge the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal 
within 30 days from the date the arbitrator (or arbitral panel) rules on its jurisdiction. The new law seeks 
to strengthen the arbitration process by stipulating, in Article 52, that arbitration awards are binding upon 
disputants. There is, however, still a requirement that the award must be confirmed and ratified by a 
                                                 
681 Ojiako, U. 2017. Using Online Dispute Resolution Platforms to Resolve Small and Low-Valued Construction Project 
Claims Disputes: An Examination of the Rule of Law and Justice Implications. Unpublished LLB Thesis, University of 
London; Ojiako, U., Chipulu, M., Marshall, A., and Williams, T. 2018. An examination of the ‘Rule of law’ and ‘Justice’ 
implications in Online Dispute Resolution in the Construction Industry, International Journal of Project Management, 36 
(2), 301-316.. 
682 Raines, S. 2006. Mediating in your pajamas: the benefits and challenges for ODR practitioners. Conflict Resolution 
Quarterly, 23 (3), 359–369. 
683 A.T Kearney. 2016. Getting in on the GCC E-Commerce Game. AT Kearney Publication, http://www.middle-
east.atkearney.com/documents/787838/8908433/Getting+in+on+the+GCC+E-Commerce+Game.pdf, accessed 03/06/18. 
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competent court. Article 53 sets out a number of grounds on which the validity of an arbitration award 
may be challenged.  
On review, it is safe to suggest that the grounds for challenging arbitration awards as stipulated 
in the new UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration are largely a restatement of prior grounds for 
challenging arbitration awards as stated in Article 216 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992. However, in a 
marked departure from the provisions of the now repealed UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992, under UAE 
Federal Law No. 6 of 2018, any challenge to an arbitration award must – in line with Article 54 – be 
brought before the courts within 30 days of the arbitral award being finalised. Such a challenge can only 
be brought before a UAE Court of Appeal and not a Court of First Instance684.  
The extent to which other provisions in the new law simultaneously limit the challenge and 
vacatur of arbitration awards while improving the enforcement of arbitration awards in the UAE is 
therefore only a matter that time will tell. A number of scholars have highlighted that, in a number of 
instances, enforcement of arbitration awards in the UAE has been an arduous process because of the 
tendency for disputants to attempt to appeal matters right through the different levels of the UAE courts. 
The reason for the new law is to ensure that disputants can no longer delay enforcement of arbitration 
awards by pursuing various appeals through the three different tiers of the Courts of the UAE. It is, 
however, noted that Dimitrakopoulos685 does justify court interference in UAE arbitration on the basis 
that in a good number of cases challenging arbitration awards in the country, the courts have found that, 
because arbitrators had been focused on the technical merits at dispute, legal, procedural and public 
policy considerations which are important within UAE jurisprudence have been inadvertently missed or 
misinterpreted by arbitrators. The new law states in Article 56 that while an award may be challenged, 
interim relief may be sought and obtained until the courts validate the final award. As earlier mentioned, 
reference to public policy in the new UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 is made in Article 2 (1) which 
                                                 
684 Equivalent to a High Court in England and Wales. 
685 Dimitrakopoulos, A. 2001. Arbitration Practice in the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 16(4), 398-403. 
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basically states that arbitration can be applied to all matters of dispute; but only to the extent that such 
matters do not conflict with UAE public order and morality. This provision is in line with Article 1 of 
the Civil Transactions Code (CTC) of the UAE which states:  
 
“The legislative provisions shall apply to all matters dealt with by those provisions in the 
letter and in the spirit. There shall be no scope for innovative reasoning in the case of provisions 
of definitive import. If the judge finds no provision in this Law, he must pass judgment according 
to the Islamic Sharia. Provided that he must have regard to the choice of the most appropriate 
solution from the schools of Imam Malik and Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal, and if none is found 
there, then from the schools of Imam al-Shafi'i and Imam Abu Hanifa as dictated by 
expediency….if the judge does not find the solution there, then he must render judgment in 
accordance with custom, but provided that the custom is not in conflict with public order or 
morals, and if a custom is particular to a given emirate, then the effect of it will apply to that 
Emirate” [emphasis by author].  
 
Arguably, it will appear that, without the notion of public order being defined in Article 1 of UAE 
Federal Law No. 6 of 2018, the interpretation of what public order encompasses remains vague and can 
be widely applied although – as earlier stated in this thesis – it is defined in Article 3 of the UAE Federal 
Law 11 of 1992. This is a point, which, again, was highlighted earlier in this thesis based on academic 
scholarship686.  
 
                                                 
686 Angell, N. and Feulner, G. 1988. Arbitration of Disputes in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 3 (1), 19-32; 
Dimitrakopoulos, A. 2001. Arbitration Practice in the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 16(4), 398-403; Kantaria, S. 2012. The 
Enforcement of Domestic and Foreign Arbitral Awards in the UAE under the Civil Procedure Code and Proposed 
Arbitration Law. International Arbitration Law Review, 15 (2), 61 – 66; Al-Enazi, M. 2013. Grounds for refusal of 
enforcement of foreign commercial arbitral awards in GCC states law with special reference to (Bahrain and UAE). 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, Brunel University, London; Ghodoosi, F. 2015. The Concept of Public Policy in Law: Revisiting 
the Role of the Public Policy Doctrine in the Enforcement of Private Legal Arrangements. Nebraska Law Review, 94 (3), 
685-736; Kanakri, C., and Massey, A. 2016. Comparison of UAE and DIFC-seated arbitrations. Global Arbitration News, 
Available from: https://globalarbitrationnews.com/comparison-uae-difc-seated-arbitrations-20161012/, accessed 07/02/18. 
173 
 
4.9 Key differences between UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 and the repealed 
arbitration provisions in UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992  
There are other key differences between the new UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration and 
the now repealed Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 238 and 239 to 243 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992. In 
Articles 8 and 15 of the new law, any petition to the Courts of the UAE that seeks to challenge an 
arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal will no longer serve as a ground for suspending of arbitral proceedings 
unless the courts deem such a need. This is envisaged only to relate to criminal complaints being cited 
as a reason to challenge the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal. The now repealed Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 
238 and 239 to 243 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992 had made no provisions for interim relief. This has 
been reiterated by the courts; for example in Dubai Court of Cassation Judgement 201 of 2001, it was 
found that arbitrators had no power to order such summary or precautionary measures. In the new law 
(Article 21), an arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal can make an award for interim relief. The purpose of 
this revision to the law is to provide a party who is due an award some form of relief in the case that the 
opposing party seeks to challenge either the arbitrator or an arbitral tribunal or in fact the award under 
Articles 53 or 54. Dimitrakopoulos687 points out that, under the prior provisions of UAE Federal Law 11 
of 1992, arbitration proceedings were considered stayed when interrupted or suspended by court 
intervention. This inevitably meant that particular disputants could purposely prolong arbitration 
proceedings by progressing various appeals through the three different tiers of the Courts of the UAE in 
order to force settlement. The effect of this is the likelihood that the core aim of arbitration – that is 
finality, conclusive and of binding nature – was likely to be defeated. 
The now repealed Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 238 and 239 to 243 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 
1992 had made no provisions for a restatement of the finality of an arbitral award beyond provisions set 
out in Article 217 (1) that stated perhaps conflictingly that arbitral awards were not appealable; although 
at the same time providing that such awards could be indirectly appealed against through an appeal 
                                                 
687 Dimitrakopoulos, A. 2001. Arbitration Practice in the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 16(4), 398-403. 
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against the court’s ratification of the award. Article 52 now explicitly states that arbitration awards are 
final and binding and will take the same effect as a judgement rendered by a competent Federal Court of 
Appeal. Of particular interest to this thesis in terms of key differences between the new UAE Federal 
Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration and the now repealed Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 238 and 239 to 243 
of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992 relates to the grounds for challenging arbitration awards. Under the 
prior law, the various grounds were spread across the different provisions of Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 
238 and 239 to 243 of Federal Law 11 of 1992. The new UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration 
now provides very limited grounds for such challenges. There are seven such grounds688: 
 
(i) Where the is no substantive agreement between the parties to subject the matter to arbitration or 
such agreement of void has expired/lapsed. 
(ii) Where a party does not have the legal capacity to engage in an agreement to conclude an 
arbitration agreement. 
(iii)Where a party does not have the legal capacity to dispose of the disputed matter via arbitration. 
(iv) Where a party to an arbitration proceeding has not been served with proper notice of the said 
proceedings. 
(v) Where the arbitral award excludes an application of the choice of law of the parties to the dispute. 
Where the arbitral tribunal or the arbitrator was undertaken in a manner that contravenes UAE 
law689 or the agreement of the disputants. 
(vi) That there were substantial procedural irregularities during the arbitral proceedings which 
impacted on the integrity of the award. 
(vii) That matters outside the scope of the dispute were deliberated and awards rendered. If this   
occurs, then the courts are empowered to set aside any arbitral award if it finds that: 
                                                 
688 As the law is written in Arabic, what is stated here is a direct quotation of the English translation of the law based on an 
unofficial translation obained under license by the author from two UAE law firms; Baker & McKenzie Habib Al Mulla and 
Al Tamimi & Co.  
689 In this case, UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration. 
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a. The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by Arbitration. 
b. The arbitral award is in conflict with the public order and morality of the State.               
 
Furthermore, reference to public policy grounds for such challenges is also restricted (Article 2(1)) to 
where the arbitration proceeding or subject matter is in 
 
 “…conflict with public order and morality of the State”. 
 
In sum, on 3 May 2018, the UAE government promulgated UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on 
Arbitration, repealing previous arbitration provisions contained within Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 238 
and 239 to 243 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992. With the new law in place, UAE arbitration law became 
supported by explicitly stand-alone statutory provisions as in other major developed countries such as 
the United Kingdom (UK) in terms of the Arbitration Act 1996 and the United States in terms of the 
United States Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. Of particular interest is that, within the new dispensation 
in the UAE, arbitration proceedings as applied to both international and local proceedings are now drawn 
upon in a manner consistent with UNCITRAL Model Law. For example, in the new arbitration law 
(Article 6 (2)), any application for a total or partial annulment of an arbitration award will not necessarily 










CHAPTER 5: THEORY 
5.1 The applicable theories  
To best explain how public policy may serve as a ground for challenging domestic arbitral awards, two 
theories are drawn upon. These theories serves as a means of ensuring that all knowledge drawn from 
existing literature is combined into a single and concise body of applicable knowledge area of interest. 
The first is Freedom of contract theory690, as espoused within contract-based/party autonomy theory691. 
The second is social contract theory692. All two theories have been applied to arbitration. For example, 
in the case of social contract theory, studies include those  by scholars such as Carlston693, Kochan and 
Jick694, Thomson695, Speidel696, Macneil697, and Lipsky698. They have also been drawn upon for their 
explanatory functions 
 
                                                 
690 Pound, R. 1909. Liberty of Contract, Yale Law Journal, 18 (7), 454-487; Feinman, J., 1989. The significance of contract 
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692 Hobbes, T. 1651. Thomas Hobbes. 2016 Leviathan (2016 reprint), Longman Library of Primary Sources in Philosophy. 
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694 Kochan, T. and Jick, T. 1978. The public sector mediation process: A theory and empirical examination. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 22(2), 209-240. 
695 Thomson, D. 1994. Arbitration theory and practice: A survey of AAA construction arbitrators. Hofstra Law Review, 23, 
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696 Speidel, R. 1996. Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent. Brooklyn Law Review, 62 (4), 1335-
1364. 
697 Macneil, I. 1999. Relational contract theory: challenges and queries. Northwestern University Law Review, 94 (3), 877-
908. 
698 Lipsky, D. and Seeber, R. 2003. The social contract and dispute resolution: The transformation of the social contract in 
the United States workplace and the emergence of new strategies of dispute resolution. International Employment Relations 
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5.1.1 Freedom of contract 
The academic literature stipulates arbitration as a private699 and non-judicial 700 form of alternative 
dispute resolution701. Through contract, two or more parties may seek to resolve a dispute using 
arbitration. The contract to arbitrate generally restricts the state to from interfering with the arbitration 
proceedings or awards, bar two functions. The first is to ensure that the contract to arbitrate is enforced 
and the second is to enforce the finding/award or decision of the third party – chosen by the parties to 
conduct the arbitral proceedings. While in effect disputants are at liberty to contract on how to resolve 
their disputes (for example, through arbitration), that agreement is in reality limited to the extent  that, 
as Carlston702 points out, public policy and the law allows the state to decide on the types  of disputes 
that are arbitrable. Thus, as earlier discussed, in the UAE (for public policy reasons) certain disputes, 
particularly those that touch upon property rights, are not subject to arbitration. 
A contract can be construed as a legally enforceable promise or agreement which two or more 
individuals may enter into703. Parties will enter into contracts for a number of reasons. In commercial 
circles, this may be driven by a need to regulate their business transactions and provide a framework for 
their engagement – in other words, their social interaction704. It may also be to establish mechanisms for 
resolving disputes. In that sense (that is, from a dispute resolution perspective), the literature construes 
a contract as a distinct social process that may be free from the coercive powers of the state705. This 
                                                 
699 Mattli, W. 2001. Private justice in a global economy: from litigation to arbitration. International Organization, 55(4), 
919-947. 
700 Sturges, W. 1960. Arbitration--What is it. New York University Law Review, 35, 1031 – 1047; Bonn, R. 1972. 
Arbitration: an alternative system for handling contract related disputes. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17 (2), 254-264; 
Lippman, M. 1972. Arbitration as an Alternative to Judicial Settlement: Some Selected Perspectives. Maine Law Review, 
24 (2), 215-242; Drahozal, C. 2006b. Is arbitration lawless. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 40, 187-215. 
701 Sander, F. 1985. Alternative methods of dispute resolution: an overview. University of Florida Law Review, 37 (1), 1-
18; Edwards, H. 1986. Alternative dispute resolution: Panacea or anathema?. Harvard Law Review, 99(3), 668-684; Sander, 
F. and Goldberg, S. 1994. Fitting the forum to the fuss: A user friendly guide to selecting an ADR procedure. Negotiation 
Journal, 10, 49–68; Menkel-Meadow, C. 2015. Mediation, Arbitration, and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Elsevier Ltd. 2015; UC Irvine School of Law Research 
Paper No. 2015-59. 
702 Carlston, K. 1952. Theory of the arbitration process. Law and Contemporary Problems, 17(4), 631-651. 
703 Tsuruda, S. 2017. Contract, Power, and the Value of Donative Promises. South Carolina Law Review, 69 (2), 479-532. 
704 Feinman, J., 1989. The significance of contract theory. University of Cincinnati Law Review, 58 (4), 1283-1318. 
705 Feinman, J., 1989. The significance of contract theory. University of Cincinnati Law Review, 58 (4), 1283-1318; Schwartz, 
A. and Scott, R. 2003. Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law. Yale Law Journal, 113 (3), 541-620. 
178 
 
freedom implies that contracts are mutually voluntary and consensual engagements which allow 
individual parties the right to create, design and articulate the nature of the terms of their engagement 
with other parties706.  
The idea that individuals maintain an unlimited freedom to make promises as a natural right is a 
legal doctrine traced to the works of the Scottish economist and philosopher, Adam Smith707. Identified 
by Marshall708 as one of the most important forms of human development to be achieved, freedom of 
contract which implies that individuals are empowered to create, design and articulate their obligations 
to others in a manner that they construe is in their own interest, has long attracted the attention of legal 
scholars709. According to Rosenfeld710, Freedom of contract primarily operates in the domain of private 
forms of justice, and implies that individuals have at their disposal the required institutional factors that 
allow them to engage in contracts, determine their choice of contract, and determine who they may 
choose to engage in a contract with. In its most classical form, Kimel711 alludes to freedom of contract 
entailing very limited or no restriction in an individual’s ability to contract and have such contracts 
enforced. This view of freedom of contract suggests that contracts will be enforced even when there are 
other considerations – whether for public policy, economic or moral reasons – which may justify that it 
should not. Among the various reasons why contracts will be enforced is that, through their enforcement, 
economic efficiency and social welfare are ensured712.  
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Core to the law of contracts is that individual parties have voluntarily assumed benefits and 
obligations that flow from the contract713. Freedom of contract is rooted in the ideas of individual 
autonomy – in effect, the notion that individuals should be allowed (with minimal interference) to decide 
their own destinies and in the process make decisions on the activities they will engage in and the 
relationships they will form714. 
Unlike tort whereby liability is imposed by law, liability in contracts emanates from the voluntary 
nature of the obligations which the parties would have assumed as part of their exchange of promise or 
agreement.  
While a classical view of contracts as a private agreement free from state interference and 
coercion is well espoused within the academic literature, studies by Feinman715, Kimel716 and Schwartz 
and Scott717 opines that it can be somewhat problematic. First, the notion of party autonomy to contract 
is not universally accepted. Pound718 for example had suggested that ‘freedom of contract’ as espoused 
by the courts tended to project a view that justice was individually construed and, as a result, it 
“exaggerates private right at the expense of public right” (p. 457). Second is that the state (through the 
courts) can actually interfere in private contracts. Feinman719 notes that sometimes, for public policy 
reasons, the courts may be willing to impose legal obligation for social/public interest reasons on parties 
to a contract. The courts are able to impose such obligations particularly when called upon to do so when 
adjudicating contractual disputes to, for example, define the extent of party liability. Schwartz and 
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Scott720 on the other hand point out that if the state is not able to intervene and enforce contracts, and in 
effect in the process support the regulation of economic transactions, commercial parties are likely to be 
less willing to engage in business transactions, which will inevitably expose them to risk. This is likely 
to have a negative impact on the viability of economic activity. Third, there are also other reasons why 
the state (through the courts or legislative measures) may seek to restrict an individual’s freedom of 
contract. For example, the courts may decide to restrict such freedoms where such contracts are engaged 
in under duress721, fraud722, when it is deemed to be unconscionable723 or where, for example, the parties 
or a party to the contract is deemed not to have the capacity (out of age or mental incapacity) to enter 
into such contract724. In such circumstances, such contracts may not be enforceable or declared illegal, 
void or voidable either to protect specific parties to such contracts, or for public policy reasons.  Kimel725 
and Meng726 highlights two possible reasons to justify such interference. The first is to ensure social 
justice and the second is to protect vulnerable individuals. More specifically, Kimel727 offers a 
perspective that state interference with individual autonomy and, by extension, freedom of contract can 
be justified on the grounds that such interference actually protects such autonomy by the prevention of 
such autonomy to be compromised through an individual’s poorly construed decision to enter into such 
contracts. In the case of commercial contracts, such state ‘protection’ is provided on the basis that 
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commercial contract are otherwise not formed in cases where essential supporting structures of a 
personal nature exist. Thus, state interference serves to assure parties to a contract that the state will 
enforce legitimate interests and expectations of the contracting parties728). 
 From an arbitration perspective, freedom of contract in the case law as stated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Volt Inf. Sciences v Stanford Univ729  
 
“…is a matter of consent, not coercion, and parties are generally free to structure their 
arbitration agreements as they see fit. Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they 
will arbitrate … so too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will 
be conducted” (at 2). 
 
This position was reiterated by United States Court of Appeals (Seventh Circuit) in Baravati v 
Josephthal, Lyon & Ross730 who opined:  
 
“Indeed, short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of three 
monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to govern the arbitration of 
their disputes; parties are as free to specify idiosyncratic terms of arbitration as they are to 
specify any other terms in their contract” [at 10]. 
 
However, as opined by the Supreme Court in Jivraj v Hashwani731, arbitrators are not employees of 
disputants. Instead they are 
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“…independent providers of services who are not in a relationship of subordination with the 
person who receives the service [at 68]. 
 
They (arbitrators) derive their ‘power’ to arbitrate from a contract which the disputants have entered as 
part of their ‘freedom to contract’732 and autonomy which as Brunet733 points out is “ a significant feature 
of all ADR, and constitutes an especially critical underpinning to arbitration theory and practice” (p.65). 
This implies a right to objective autonomy in terms of their freedom to seek to resolve disputes in a 
manner of their choosing734. According to Ghodoosi735, party autonomy to an extent implies that 
contracting parties are able to contracts in a way and manner that excludes the court’s jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on their dispute. However, this is only to the extent that the dispute is not solely excluded 
from publicly accepted competency of arbitration.  
The notion of party autonomy to contract is however not universally accepted within the context 
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Extending earlier assertions by Pound736, as applied to 
arbitration, Helm737 claims that arbitration contractual clauses that seek to remove all possibility for 
judicial review should be unenforceable because the courts cannot be expected to simply affirm 
arbitration findings and awards without examining the merits of such awards. In effect, it can be posited 
that not only is individual autonomy limited to what is acceptable to the society, but also once the dispute 
is brought to the attention of the courts. This is because, in reality, it is the court acting as an organ of 
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the state that is the true guarantee of individual autonomy738. However, the state can also represent a 
threat to such autonomy as it retains the power to interfere in private contractual obligations and disputes 
– albeit under the guise of ‘public policy’ or, in the case of the UAE – ‘public order. As relates to 
arbitration, it is the courts alone who will decide whether they will review the arbitration awards, and to 
what extent. Thus, another view of the autonomy debate is that the courts are able to review arbitral 
findings and awards because the power of arbitrators flows from the state and not the disputants. This 
opinion is in line with earlier suggestions by Carlston739 that arbitration is in reality an organ of the 
judicial law systems.  
Irrespective of the debates at hand that relate to contractual rights, we opine that the process of 
arbitration derives its existence from both contractual rights and judicial deference.  
The process of arbitration derives its existence from contractual rights in that parties to a dispute 
are from the perspective of individual autonomy allowed to enter into any contract of their choice relating 
to matters of personal interest. This is, however, qualified to the point that the matters contracted into (i) 
are not illegal or reprehensible to society, (ii) do not make obligation on third parties who are not parties 
to the contract (privity) and (iii) do not venture into matters which are against public policy. However, 
the problem with such contracts is that a party may decide not to fulfil obligations it has contracted to. 
On other occasions, there may be a controversy between the contracting parties as to the essence of the 
contract entered into. Although one party may rely on contractual provisions to call upon a non-judicial 
body (such as an arbitrator) to ensure that obligations are fulfilled by the opposing party, that third-party 
non-judicial body will still ultimately have to rely on the coercive political power of the  state to ensure 
that the findings of the non-judicial body are enforced. Herein resides our argument that ultimately, 
irrespective of contract rights and autonomy, arbitration will derive its existence not only from 
contractual rights, but also from judicial deference. It is after all the judges who, through their rulings, 
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have ensured that arbitrator findings and awards are enforced. Carlston740 highlights that an alternative 
thesis on arbitration and contractual rights may well claim that the very essence of arbitration assumes 
the absence of any agreement between disputants bar an agreement on the mode of disputes settlement.  
 
5.1.2 Social contract theory 
As discussed earlier, fundamental to freedom of contract is the idea of individual autonomy. The freedom 
of contract entails that individuals are free to enter into agreements to owe positive obligations to other 
individuals. Freedom to contract does not entail freedom from other individuals. The challenge, 
however, to the idea of individualism in contracts is that, ultimately, individuals exist within social 
orders. Rosenfeld741 provides a more eloquent articulation on how freedom of contract, individualism 
and the society can be reconciled by advancing the idea that while the individual is autonomous and 
independent, individualism implies that the individual should be free from interference by other 
individuals (or institutions) within the society to the extent that the activities undertaken by that 
individual do not interfere either with the activities undertaken by other individuals or the wider society. 
To this extent, it can be construed that while individuals retain a freedom of contract, these freedoms are 
tempered by the individual’s obligations towards the wider society. This is so because, as indicated in 
various literature, individuals are fully embedded within a series of social relationships and networks742.  
Social contract theory is construed as theory that may provide an explanation for how public 
policy may serve as a ground for challenging domestic arbitral awards. It does so by addressing the core 
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question as to why an individual who is autonomous may be expected to owe obligations to the society. 
This question, it is argued, is central to social contract theory. 
Modern social contract theory is largely drawn from the works of the philosophers, Thomas 
Hobbes743, John Locke744 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau745. At its basic level, social contract theory 
suggests that an individual’s political, legal and moral obligations depend on agreements (the contract) 
between that individual and the society in which they reside746. It provides that individuals are prepared 
to cede their unfettered freedom in exchange for security provided by the rule of law within a society. 
Drawing from Allen747, the notion of a social contract has attracted different judicial meanings. For 
example, some judicial rulings have conceptualised social contracts as contracts that are just and fair, 
others as a range of positive laws, and others as legal principles that should be acceptable to the rational 
individual. According to Friend748 the basic idea in social contract theory is that an individual’s moral 
obligations to the society are largely dependent on a contract (agreement) to be part of the wider society 
within which they exist. In effect, it creates the picture of the individual becoming part of the society 
based on a contract that is freely and voluntarily entered into. 
Hobbes749 for example had argued that human beings were primarily self-interested. Individuals 
will in reality only pursue matters perceived to advance their personal interests. In effect, they will pursue 
what was deemed desirable to their interests and ignore what is deemed to be adverse to their interests. 
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Put more simply, Hobbes750 had claimed that all actions taken by an individual are designated to advance 
their personal circumstances. In order to explain why individuals were prepared to become part of a 
society that entailed subjugating ‘unhinged’ individual rights to collective societal values (the common 
good of the society), Hobbes751 and later on Ritchie752 claimed that self-interest was generally mitigated 
by reason and rational assessments by the individual on how to ensure their self preservation. In effect, 
the individual was only prepared to freely and voluntarily subject themselves to societal values, norms 
and common laws that advanced their interests and ensured their survival753. Fundamentally, Hobbes 
believed that obligations were based on individual decisions which were articulated in contracts754.  
The social contract that emerged from this arrangement is that by freely and voluntarily of their 
own volition choosing to subject oneself to societal values, norms and common laws755, the individual 
also expected that these values, norms and common laws will serve as avenues to protect personal 
interests756. The individual who made such sacrifice to consent to the limits of such freedom being 
determined by the values, norms and common laws of the wider society did so on the basis of a tacit 
understanding (contract) that the same society will regulate the interaction between all individuals who 
were part of the society to ensure that harmony prevailed757. Thus, essentially, social contract theory is 
based on the premise that the relationship between individual members of a society and the laws that 
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govern that society are driven by mutual consent758 and reciprocity759. Both are, however, primarily 
derived out of self-interest because, arguably according to Kary760 , the individual can still choose to 
repudiate the contract if this is deemed to serve his interest. 
Freedom of contract and individual autonomy mean that while the individual freely and 
voluntarily of their own volition makes the choice to subject oneself to societal values, norms and 
common laws, they maintain a simultaneous obligation not to seek the imposition of their own interest 
on other individuals761. At the core of the theory of social contract is that the relationship between 
individuals in relation to other individuals and institutions (the social relationship) is primarily driven 
by utility; in other words, it is based on the idea that individuals engage in social relationships in order 
to derive the greatest value possible from the least amount of obligations762. Via a social contract, 
individuals make a decision to be part of a specific society. Doing so, however, is associated with an 
obligation from the individual to abide by the laws and social values that are deemed pertinent to the 
specific society. It is also associated with a reciprocal obligation from the society to protect the basic 
interests of the individual concerned. Thus, based on a freedom of contract, both the individual and the 
society choose to consent to mutually self-imposed obligations763. However, due to freedom of choice, 
individuals may decide e not to abide by such a contract and leave the society. 
While this thesis advances the notion that social contract theory represents one of the theories 
that may best explain how public policy may serve as a ground for challenging domestic arbitral awards, 
social contract theory is not without its critics. Drawing from Allen764, for example, the flexibility of its 
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763 Riley, P. 1973.  How Coherent is the Social Contract Tradition?, Journal of the History of Ideas, 34 (4), 543-562. 
764 Allen, A. 1999. Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, Florida Law Review, 51 (1), 1-40. 
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interpretation leads to a lack of clarity as relates to the desire for relational power between individual 
over the society or, conversely, the society over individuals. It is also worth mentioning that Kary765 
cautions on the importance of recognising that contracts as conceptualised by Hobbes 766 is very different 
from its more modern conceptualisation. One key difference in terms of how Hobbes addressed contracts 
and their more modern conceptualisation is that he viewed contracts as agreements defined by customary 
practice which involved parties ceding their rights to another767. This differs from more modern views 
of contracts which emphasise the acquisition of rights based on a mutually legally enforceable promise 
between two (or more parties). In sum, the central tenet of the social contract theory is that: 
 
(i) individuals are originally born into a natural state within which their views of right and 
wrong, morality, ethics and acceptable behaviour is of their own choice, and that 
(ii) these individuals begin to organise into groups – in effect as they begin to form part of the 
wider society, they begin to enter into social contracts where their previous ‘power’ to 
determine right and wrong, morality, ethics and acceptable behaviour gradually ceases to be 
of their own choice.  
(iii) Instead, the social contracts they form means that their previous ‘powers’ are now delegated 
to the wider society.  
 
This reasoning has been supported by judicial opinions; for example the United States Supreme Court 
in Kennett v Chambers768 stated that 
 
“…every citizen is a portion of [the government], and is himself personally bound by the laws…”. 
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A brief review of the literature on social contract theory shows interest among scholars on the application 
of this theory to arbitration769.  
Kary770 had earlier posited that scholars intent on using social contract theory to explain the 
phenomenon (as is undertaken in this thesis) have mainly adopted either of two approaches. The first 
approach emphasises the meaningfulness of social contract theory. Scholars who adopt this approach 
tend to draw upon social contract theory as a means of enhancing their study of how societal values may 
be best understood. The second approach on the other hand focuses on how social contract theory may 
explain how social contract is enhanced through the creation of new institutions. This is the approach 
adopted herein. This approach is adopted because it supports the idea that individuals out of self-interest 
will conceptualise their rights (and obligations) in a manner that also supports the rights (and obligations) 
that they will ascribe to others.  
The classical interpretation of social contract theory suggested that that the resolution of disputes 
between individual members of a society was the sole responsibility of the state acting through the courts 
system771. Thus, this view of the social contract does not allow for private forms of justice. This view is 
however, changing for a number of reasons, including the practical needs for commercial transactions 
to be supported by more speedy resolution of disputes. Herein, arbitration is construed as one such form 
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of private justice that will serve the individual interests of its users. According to Marcantel772, the wider 
society now chooses officers (in the context of this study, arbitrators) who act on behalf of the society773, 
not only to create and enforce laws to protect the society, but also to create the means for adjudicating 
disputes between individual members of the society. It therefore holds that a contracting party to an 
arbitration proceeding based on a freedom of contract has a choice to enter into an arbitration contract 
(or to include an arbitration clause in a contract). On exercising that freedom, they become bound as 
determined by societal values (rules) which are enforceable by the coercive power of the society – in 
effect, the law. Individual parties who resort to arbitration do so because, in exercising their freedom of 
contract, they have determined that arbitration is more likely to protect their interests and increase utility 
as they (the individual) are more able to limit their obligations only to those parties who are subject to 
the specific contract. Drawing from Rosenfeld774, this can occur in two different ways. First, arbitration 
as a dispute resolution mechanism allows parties within reason to specify their obligations to other 
contracting parties. Second, parties are able to protect their interests by largely specifying the range of 
options and awards available to the arbitrator. They can also choose to dispense with the rigid and 
complex rules associated with litigation giving the arbitrator more discretion. This ensures that their 
interests are largely protected irrespective of the outcome of the arbitration hearing. This is against the 
position the parties may find themselves in where the state (acting through the courts) may arrive at 
rulings which in effect are not in the interest of any of the disputants. Therefore, as Ghodoosi 775points 
out, disputants engaged in arbitration are more likely to protect their interest than when engaged in 
litigation in the courts. Conversely, drawing from Rosenthal’s776 espousing of Social contract theory, it 
follows that if an individual freely and voluntarily of their own volition makes the choice to subject 
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themselves to arbitration and its primary rule of law principle of finality, conclusive and binding nature 
and then seeks to challenge and vacate an arbitration award made under the same social contract, such 
an individual may be seen to have reneged on a key social obligation. This could lead to a loss of trust 
required in contract formation. 
 
5.2 Reflections  
The social nature of arbitration implies that it now represents a well recognised social reality in modern 
jurisprudence. For scholars to understand arbitration, there is thus a need to undertake socially bound 
lines of enquiry that take cognisance of not only its history, but also its potential (as against litigation) 
to repair broken-down social relationships between disputants. It is thus safe to surmise that arbitration 
is largely determined by the nature of the social context in which its proceedings exist. As in the case of 
the law777, it is safe to posit that arbitration does not appear to maintain  specific theories or 
methodologies although Yu778 identifies approximately five theories that are widely applicable; rather, 
arbitration is contextual in that its operations are not specific to any particular cultural, jurisdictional or 
legal tradition. Yet, in a large section of the literature, arbitration has been construed as an institution 
extolling a somewhat single understanding of and specific approach to its interpretation – particularly of 
its more contentious elements which include how its proceedings and awards can be challenged and 
vacated. Thus, our intention is to introduce an interpretation of arbitration as a primary feature of the 
social environment within which it is conducted.   
This view puts the various ideas discussed into an intellectual context that allows the 
identification of other relationships and other connections. While this context is primarily private, it can 
be drawn into the public domain when parties for a number of reasons disagree on the very nature of the 
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contract that enables arbitration proceedings to occur. Herein, the state on the basis of public policy can 
intervene to ensure that contractual obligations are enforced. The state takes on this role primarily for 
public policy reasons for, if contractual obligations can be circumvented or avoided, markets are unlikely 





















CHAPTER 6: PUBLIC POLICY AND PARALLEL UAE COURTS 
6.1 Overview 
To address the third (and final) research question (How does the existence of different parallel courts 
within the ‘UAE Courts system impact on how the Public policy (and/or public order) exception is 
construed and how is its impact on the finality, conclusive and binding nature of arbitration?), a 
pragmatic fact-finding research methodology is adopted. Thus, in order to address the third research 
question, this study has made reference to prior studies that emphasise the need for law studies and 
research that draws upon real-world empirical data.  
 
6.2 Empirical research in law 
From the literature (see Heise779, Schuck780, George781 and Franck782), a traditional definition of what is 
‘empirical’ will involve studies that employ techniques and analyses of a statistical nature as applied to 
data that includes “systematically coded judicial opinions” (Heise783, p. 810). For some scholars, this 
implies that ‘empirical’ meant quantitative studies (Llewellyn784; George785; Kastellec786), geared 
towards the facilitation of “descriptions of or inferences to a larger sample or population as well as 
replication by other scholars” (Heise787, p.821). For example, Schuck788 had cautioned that 
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“The neglect of empirical work is a bad, increasingly worrisome thing for our scholarship and 
teaching” (p. 323).  
 
Baldwin and Davis789 claim that the need for empirical studies in law is being driven by the reality that  
 
“…it is principally through empirical study of the practice of law ... and in studying the way legal 
processes and decisions impact upon the citizen, that the disciplines of sociology and, to a lesser 
degree, philosophy, psychology, and economics have entered into and enriched the study of law” 
(p. 881).  
 
However, irrespective of the research methodology, method or approach adopted when undertaking 
research, it is imperative that it is recognised that 
 
  “... no theory can be proven true by empirical data” (Greenwald et al.790). 
 
The literature suggests that a broader scope of the notion of empiricalism in legal research implies any 
and/or all observations made about the ‘real world’791. Herein, empirical research can be either of a 
qualitative (where textual or in effect, non-numerical data are collected) or quantitative (where numerical 
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data are collected) nature792. Heise793 states that as applied to legal research, empirical research is largely 
of three forms consisting of (i) case content analysis or judicial opinion coding, (ii) inferential research, 
and (iii) descriptive research. 
 
6.3 Case content analysis (judicial opinion coding) 
Increasingly content analysis has become popular in the laws794. Examples of instances of the use of 
content analysis includes Sisk et al. 795 who sought to explore how among other factors, social 
background impacted on judicial decision making. Describing the “…study [of] legal reasoning in 
action through opinions written or joined by [] judges that resolved nearly identical legal questions” (p. 
1382), their study involved a content analysis of district court decisions (made by 293 district court 
judges) involving questions on the constitutionality of sentencing guidelines. In emphasising content 
analysis of judicial opinions as a form of empirical research, Webley796 had highlighted the critical 
importance of understanding the law and judicial decision-making through case-based analysis of legal 
precedent.  
Earlier cited literature suggests that case content analysis or judicial opinion coding represents a popular 
systematic method of research that focuses on the documentary study of judicial decisions. Its popularity 
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according to Hall and Wright797 derives from its wide applicability and use across a broad range of 
subject areas of law. Its main aim according to Sparker798 and Vaismoradi et al.799 is to analytically 
examine textual narratives.  
Case content analysis or judicial opinion coding (hencewith ‘Content analysis’) focuses on text 
analysis. Content analysis is regarded as one of the most important800 and in fact flexible801 social 
research techniques. Its flexibility comes from the fact that the way and manner within which codes are 
selected and developed are at the discretion of the interpretation and judgement of the specific researcher 
undertaking the study. Content analysis is a popular research approach that has been used within its 
traditional realms, which include communications and journalism research802. Such textual analysis can 
involve documents (for example, press reports) or text generated from research. It can also include 
transcripts from interviews or legal cases803. Scholars assert that Content analysis involves separating 
text into short units of content804  and then subjecting it to systematic descriptive coding805. It involves 
a process which Gibbs806 alludes, seeks to “identify[ing] and recording one or more passages of text or 
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other data items such as the parts of pictures that, in some sense, exemplify the same theoretical or 
descriptive idea” (p. 38). Such coding and categorisation also seeks to identify not only trends in used 
words, but also their frequency and relationships.  
The focus of content analysis is to describe, through analysis, “ who says what, to whom, and 
with what effect”807.  However, it is important to note that such description does not happen or occur in 
isolation. The literature808 suggests that any analysis of judicial decisions must take cognisance of the 
legal context within which judges construct their interpretation of statute and legislation. Green and 
Thorogood809 posit that content analysis is also useful for undertaking research where there may be a 
need to report common matters of interest. This is a particularly important point reiterated by Hall and 
Wright810 who highlighted that the use of content analysis is particularly suitable to studies that involve 
the analysis of judicial opinions that address matters of essential value to a wide range of cases. Such 
matters include statutory interpretation (a key focus of interest in this study811). Herein, it is opined that 
where possible, an in-depth understanding of the rationale of UAE judges (gleaned from UAE case law) 
on whether or not to vacate domestic arbitral awards on the basis of public policy is particularly suitable 
for content analysis in that the study seeks to understand “the legal context and reasoning of the opinions 
through which judges express their views” (Heise812).  
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6.4 Case content analysis; the focus on written judicial opinions 
It is also important to recognise that a focus on textual narratives implies that such content analysis must 
be of written judicial opinions813. A point of caution on written judicial decisions: that being the concern 
expressed by a number of scholars about both the impact of unexpressed ideology, bias or personal 
policy preferences on written judicial decisions and also the reality that most written judicial decisions 
are retrospective in nature. For example, in terms of the question of unexpressed ideology, Keele et al.814 
conducted an assessment of the impact of ideology on unpublished and published (written) judicial 
opinions,  finding that (i) judges in appellate courts based their rulings on their ideological inclinations 
in published (written) opinions, but not so when such opinions were not published. However, they found 
that (ii) in lower courts; there were generally no decisional differences between unpublished and 
published (written) opinions. Overall, they found that (iii) published (written) judicial decisions may not 
necessarily be reflective of the ideology or bias of judges in appellate courts. This finding has 
implications for the current study in that arbitration awards in the UAE can only be vacated by appellant 
courts. Perhaps the main message that emanates from the study by Keele et al. 815 is that scholars 
undertaking case content analysis of published (written) judicial decisions may actually end up not being 
able to glean an accurate understanding of the intricate factors that influence the decisions appellant 
judges make. Another point of caution with written judicial opinions is their retrospective nature816. 
More specifically, Frank817 deemed them to be often “…unreal, artificial, distorted [and] …in large 
measure an after-thought” (p. 653). Furthermore, he suggested that written judicial opinions were 
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“…often ex post facto; they are censored expositions” (p. 653). This position is supported by Rubin818 
who opined that in providing written opinions, judges were “…not trying to recreate her actual thought 
patterns, but to justify her conclusion by showing that it proceeds from accepted sources by legitimate, 
properly argued steps” (p. 801). On the same vein, Cross819 claimed that written judicial opinions were 
“…post-facto rationalizations of results dictated by judicial ideology” (p. 267).  
In sum, it will appear that a number of scholars opine that written judicial opinions may not 
provide a real rationale or correct explanation on how some judges draw their conclusions. Judges in 
civil law jurisdictions mainly serve to interpret the law820; thus, it can be argued that in a UAE policy 
context, a content analysis of written judicial decisions may not actually be the best way to capture an 
in-depth understanding of (i) the legal reasoning and manner in which UAE judges examine the 
relationship (and impact) of cultural, religious and constitutional norms issues, and public policy, (ii) 
how UAE law interacts with UAE judicial ideology, (iii) whether the nature of these interactions varies 
on a case-by-case basis between individual judges, and finally (iv) what individual policy attitudes of 
individual UAE judges may actually be. 
 
6.5 Case content analysis; advantages and disadvantages 
Heise821 identified a number of advantages associated with case content analysis or judicial opinion 
coding. For example, he cites its significance in terms of the persuasive and influential nature of drawing 
legal inferences and generalisations from real-life case law data. Hall and Wright822 on the other hand, 
cited the ability of content analysis to both (i) unravel patterns of judicial opinion-making that has 
previously not been noticed and also at the same time (ii) correct  incorrect impressions of such judicial 
                                                 
818 Rubin, E. 1991. The concept of law and the new public law scholarship. Michigan Law Review, 89(4), 792-836. 
819 Cross, F. 1997. Political science and the new legal realism: A case of unfortunate interdisciplinary ignorance. 
Northwestern University Law Review, 92 (1), 251-326. 
820 Lim, Y. 2000. An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices' Decision Making. Journal of Legal Studies, 29(2), 
721-752. 
821 Heise, M. 1999. Importance of Being Empirical. Pepperdine Law Review, 26, 807 - 834.   
822 Hall, M. and Wright, R. 2008. Systematic content analysis of judicial opinions. California Law Review, 96 (1), 63-122. 
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opinion-making. They claim that both enable content analysis to facilitate greater understanding of the 
law than is available through interpretive and subjective research.  
However, while these advantages exist, the usefulness of content analysis can be limited in that 
actual assessment and interpretation of case law during coding and analysis is largely a subjective 
exercise irrespective of measures that are put in place and/are adopted to limit bias and ensure accuracy. 
Furthermore, the validity and reliability of such studies remain questionable. For example, Sisk et al.823 
points to the invariable weakness associated with studying judicial decision-making, noting that the cases 
involve different disputants and different facts and controversies, and that they are adjudicated in 
different time periods. Noting that policy changes over time (as attitudes, propositions, moral standards 
and values also change), it is reasonable to question whether judicial decisions can be studied without 
taking into account the prevailing legal context at the time of the ruling was made. It is recalled that this 
thesis had adopted an underlying philosophy rooted in sociological jurisprudence (the central tenet of 
which is that how legitimate laws are depends largely on their relevance to the society within which such 
laws are constructed824). It had also been noted that the sociological jurisprudence philosophy rejects 
any abstract application of the law825.  
However, the only other alternative to conduct such studies would have been to undertake a 
content analysis of hypothetical cases. However, such an option will imply judicial decision-making 
content analysis disconnected from real-world cases. By implication, such studies are not empirical826. 
Either way, there are two general difficulties and one specific difficulty involved in conducting 
empirical research and more specifically content analysis on the use of public policy to  challenge and 
vacate domestic arbitral awards in the UAE. In terms of the general difficulties, one is that while there 
are studies which discuss whether and how such public policy may influence judicial reasoning, because 
                                                 
823 Sisk, G., Heise, M. and Morriss, A. 1998. Charting the influences on the judicial mind: An empirical study of judicial 
reasoning. New York University Law Review, 73 (5), 1377-1500. 
824 Ehrlich, E. and Ziegert, K. 2017. Fundamental principles of the sociology of law. Routledge. 
825 Pound, R. 1911. The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence. I. Schools of Jurists and Methods of 
Jurisprudence. Harvard Law Review, 24(8), 591-619 (p. 612). 
826 Miles, T. and Sunstein, C. 2008. The new legal realism. University of Chicago Law Review, 75 (2), 831-851. 
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of the reality that the UAE does not operate under Res Judicata and because of the private nature of 
arbitral proceedings, there are very limited empirical studies available on how arbitral/arbitrator 
behaviour is influenced by public policy considerations and the precise nature of judicial reasoning when 
vacating arbitral awards in the UAE on the basis of public policy. The second is the reality that there is, 
arguably, a lack of coincise and exhaustive data on arbitration awards made within the UAE (Almutawa 
and Maniruzzaman827). In terms of the specific difficulties, as earlier alluded to, legal proceedings in all 
UAE federal courts (Courts of the UAE) and written legal opinions are undertaken and provided only in 
the Arabic language ( اللغة العربية). As the researcher is unfamiliar with this language ( اللغة العربية), only 
reported judgements that were translated into English and reported in legal databases such as Lexis 
Middle East Law , WestlawGulf and Kluwer Arbitration were examined. 
 
6.6 The approach 
Hall and Wright828 provided guidelines on the use of content analysis in judicial decision-making 
research and, in the process, opined that 
 
“…content analysis makes legal scholarship more consistent with the basic epistemological 
underpinnings of other social science research. The method combines a disciplined focus on 
legal subject matter with an assumption that other investigators should be able to replicate the 
research results” (pp. 64-65).  
 
Although widely used, it is important to recognise that content analysis is not a single research 
method. A review of its application by Hsieh and Shannon829, for example, suggests that there are three 
                                                 
827 Almutawa, A. and Maniruzzaman, A. 2014. The UAE’s Pilgrimage to International Arbitration Stardom. Journal of 
World Investment & Trade, 15(1-2), 193-244. 
828 Hall, M. and Wright, R. 2008. Systematic content analysis of judicial opinions. California Law Review, 96 (1), 63-122. 




distinct ways within which content analysis has been utilised – which they refer to as (i) conventional, 
(ii) directed, and (iii) summative – noting that their differences only emanate from for, example, coding 
– more specificallythe way and manner in which coding schemes are developed and the origin of such 
codes, among other factors. For example, they highlight that as relates to conventional content analysis, 
the categories of codes emanate unmediated from text. 
A review of the literature830 suggests that the process of case content analysis will involve; 
  
(i) identification of case selection criteria.  
(ii) searches within various databases831(see Shapiro832; Befort833).  
(iii) identification of relevant cases that fit the selection criteria. The cases selected should be 
reproducible834.  
(iv) collating the written judgements that fit selection criteria. 
(v)  systematic analysis of the selected cases.  
(vi) drawing meaning from the coding (via analysis). 
 
 
                                                 
830 Hall, M. and Wright, R. 2008. Systematic content analysis of judicial opinions. California Law Review, 96 (1), 63-122; 
Befort, S. 2013. An empirical examination of case outcomes under the ADA Amendments Act. Washington and Lee Law 
Review, 70 (4), 2027-2072. 
831 These databases include the High Courts Judicial Database  (http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/jurilhighcts.htm), the 
United States Supreme Court Database, Westlaw (http://www.next.westlaw.com), Lexis Middle East Law 
(https://www.lexismiddleeast.com/), WestlawGulf (http://westlawgulf.com/), Kluwer Arbitration 
(http://www.kluwerarbitration.com), the UN treaty database (https://treaties.un.org/), BAILII (http://www.bailii.org/), the 
British and Irish Legal Information Institute website, SAFLII (http://www.saflii.org/), the Southern African Legal 
Information Institute website and NZLII (http://www.nzlii.org/), the website of the New Zealand Legal Information 
Institute. 
832 Shapiro, C. 2008. Coding complexity: Bringing law to the empirical analysis of the Supreme Court. Hastings Law 
Journal, 60 (3), 477-540. 
833 Befort, S. 2013. An empirical examination of case outcomes under the ADA Amendments Act. Washington and Lee 
Law Review, 70 (4), 2027-2072. 
834 As in the study undertaken by Shapiro and Levy (1995), this study will focus solely on cases involving judicial review 
following a Westlaw search covering a well-defined time period. 
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6.6.1 Identification of case selection criteria 
As indicated earlier, the process of case content analysis was adopted from Hall and Wright835. The first 
step in the case content analysis involved the identification of case selection criteria. Herein, the scope 
of review was generally arbitration provisions contained within Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 238 and 239 
to 243 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992; more specifically, Articles 216 and 217 of this law836.  
 
6.6.2 The database search 
Having identified Articles 216 and 217 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992 as the scope of review, the next 
stage of the study involved the identification and selection of relevant databases that will support case 
selection. It was the researcher’s intention to obtain the widest sample of cases and also ensure that the 
cases were heterogeneous in nature (and thereby, eliminate potential bias emanating from obtaining data 
from a single data source). Thus, efforts were made to examine online court records from not only the 
‘Courts of the UAE’, but from ‘parallel’ courts as well.  
‘Courts of the UAE’ searches were conducted through those UAE federal courts with online 
presence in English. These were the Dubai Courts (https://www.dc.gov.ae) and the Abu Dhabi Judicial 
Department (https://www.adjd.gov.ae). The searches suggested that, in the Dubai Courts 
(https://www.dc.gov.ae), available written legal opinions were only provided in Arabic ( اللغة العربية) 
which the researcher was unfamiliar with. Searches were attempted via the Abu Dhabi Judicial 
Department (https://www.adjd.gov.ae); however this portal did not allow for general searches where the 
case reference number was unknown. The same applies to searches attempted via the Ras al Khaimah 
courts (https://grpportal.rak.ae/irj/portal/court_civil_inquiry/). Here again, this portal did not allow for 
                                                 
835 Hall, M. and Wright, R. 2008. Systematic content analysis of judicial opinions. California Law Review, 96 (1), 63-122. 
836 As earlier stated, this study focuses on these specific provisions as the author is not aware of any arbitration appeals in 
the UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) that had been decided on the basis of UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on 
Arbitration, which repealed previous arbitration provisions contained within Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 238 and 239 to 243 
of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992. It is observed that UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration, repealing previous 
arbitration provisions contained within Articles 203 to 218, 235 to 238 and 239 to 243 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992, 
was promulgated as law in the UAE on 3 May 2018 at the time of writing this thesis. 
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general searches in the absence of a specific case reference number. Neither did the portal for the Ajman 
courts (https://moj.gov.ae/web/ejusticesite/status-search). No web portal seemed to exist for the courts 
of Umm al Quwain, Fujairah or Sharjah. ‘Courts of the UAE’ searches were conducted over three 
discrete periods (in February 2018, September 2018 and February 2019) in order to reduce the possibility 
of duplicate cases being identified.  
‘Parallel’ court searches were then conducted on the online website 
(https://www.difccourts.ae/judgements/court-of-appeal/) of the Judicial Authority of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre: Court of Appeal.  This body is the appellant arbitration court dealing 
with appeals against arbitration judgements and awards made by the Judicial Authority of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre: Court of First Instance. As in the case of the ‘Courts of the UAE’ 
searches, searches were conducted over three discrete periods (in February 2018, September 2018 and 
February 2019). In April 2019, a further search was conducted, expanded to cover awards made by the 
by the Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Court of First Instance. This 
decision was made following initial review of DIFC case law. During this review, it became apparent 
that appeals against domestic arbitration awards made within the DIFC and in fact, by other arbitral 
institutions such as DIAC were being filed and heard by this court837. 
Other searches were undertaken in a number of legal search engines/databases including Kluwer 
Arbitration, Lexis Middle East Law, Westlaw and WestlawGulf. No searches were conducted in, for 
example, legal search engines/databases such as BAILII, NZLII, SAFLII and the UN treaty database. 
The reason for this was that these search engines/legal databases are usually jurisdiction-specific.  
 
                                                 
837 In particular, reference was made to the emirate of Dubai Law No.12 of 2004 which established the Courts of the DIFC 
and DIFC case law, specifically as earlier stated, Amarjeet Singh Dhir v Waterfront & Others which stated that DIFC-enabling 
law allowed disputants to explicitly contract to settle their dispute under DIFC jurisdiction. Based on DIFC law, the Dubai 
International Financial Centre: Court of Appeal has exclusive jurisdiction when parties have contracted as such, over appeals 
filed in relation to judgments and awards made by the DIFC Court of First Instance. 
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6.6.2.1 The WestlawGulf search  
For searches focused on cases heard in UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’), WestlawGulf was 
employed as the search engine. Noting that the objective of the search was to capture the widest body of 
listed cases, suffixes such as ‘UAE’, ‘Dubai’ and ‘Abu Dhabi’ were not utilised in the search against the 
three keyword strings ‘arbi*’, ‘arbitr*’, and ‘arbitration’. Another reason for not including suffixes in 
the WestlawGulf search related to different English spellings being attributed to the constituent emirates 
of the UAE. For example, arguably أبو ظبي (Abu Dhabi) could be reported as ‘Abu Dhabi’, ‘AbuDhabi’ 
or ‘Abu-Dhabi’. The initial search in WestlawGulf resulted in 374 listed court decisions. These decisions 
had been drawn from the courts of a number of Gulf countries such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Bahrain. A few reported cases were 
also drawn from the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Lebanese Republic. Of the 374 WestlawGulf  cases, 
210 were drawn from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). A further review of the 210 cases pointed to a 
number of duplicate case reports. Following a review and identification of such duplication, 34 cases 
were identified as duplicates leaving the total number of useable reported UAE cases as 176. Included 
in this list of 176 cases obtained from WestlawGulf  were 6 cases drawn from the Judicial Authority of 
the Dubai International Financial Centre. Apart from the advantage that the obtained cases had already 
been transcribed from Arabic ( اللغة العربية) into English, drawing from Befort838, it is reasonable to argue 
that the inclusion of these cases in the WestlawGulf search engines/database is indicative that legal 
commentators does consider the specific cases to be of significance.  
 
6.6.2.2 The DIFC search 
For searches focused on cases heard in the parallel courts, searches were undertaken directly on the 
online site of the Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre using five keyword 
                                                 
838 Befort, S. 2013. An empirical examination of case outcomes under the ADA Amendments Act. Washington and Lee 
Law Review, 70 (4), 2027-2072. 
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strings ‘arbi*’, ‘arbitr*’, ‘arbitration’, ‘public order’ and ‘public policy’. A total of 53 cases were 
initially identified. When dealing with this search, there was no need to consider arbitration vacatur as 
a key search string as both the DIFC courts serve as appellant courts. For example, the DIFC Court of 
First Instance can hear appeals against arbitration awards made by independent arbitrators on matters 
connected with the DIFC. In other instances, the DIFC Court of Instance has heard matters relating to 
arbitration awards made by the DIAC. Furthermore, the DIFC Court of Appeal serves as an appellant 
court for arbitration matters heard in the DIFC Court of First Instance.  No search was conducted against 
DIAC cases as their website did not appear to provide any link to reported cases 
(http://www.diac.ae/idias/). No search was also conducted against ADCCAC 
(http://www.adccac.ae/English/Pages/Default.aspx) or the IICRA (http://iicra.com/arbitration/how-to-
enforce-award-in-iicra/). 
 
6.6.3 Identification of relevant cases that fit the selection criteria and collation 
According to Hall and Wright839, this step should include a discussion on the sources of the cases and 
why such specific cases were selected for discussion. Generally, the basis for case selection should be 
that these are the cases that most clearly articulate the legal dispute or phenomenon under exploration. 
In the case of this study, this will imply making a decision on which written judgements best capture 
how UAE judges construe the relationship (and impact) of various competing norms (whether they be 
cultural, religious or constitutional in nature), on Public policy (and/or public order). Doing this will 
facilitate this study’s research question to be addressed. By implication, identifying the legal dispute or 
phenomenon under exploration enables the researcher to address the research question/s. It was 
important as part of the study to identify reported cases that touched upon the scope of review, which 
had been identified as arbitration cases heard in both UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) and 
                                                 
839 Hall, M. and Wright, R. 2008. Systematic content analysis of judicial opinions. California Law Review, 96 (1), 63-122. 
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parallel courts such as the Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre that largely 
involved Articles 216 and 217 of UAE Federal Law 11 of 1992 as impacted by Article 203(4)840 and 
Article 235 (2) (e)841 of the UAE Civil Procedure Law.  
In terms of the UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’), to therefore identify reported court 
decisions that addressed the dual provisions of Public policy (and/or public order)on one hand and 
arbitration vacatur on the other, each transcript of the remaining 176 reported cases was examined and 
rated to determine whether the specific case involved Public policy (and/or public order) and arbitration 
vacatur, or not. Some of the more frequent reasons that could have been drawn upon for elimination of 
specific cases were (i) where the transcript was too brief to ascertain the focus of the case, (ii) where it 
was clear from reading through the transcript that the decided case had no relevance to either Public 
policy (and/or public order) or arbitration vacatur, or (iii) where the reported case was only a restatement 
of UAE law. However, as the process did not reveal any cases that fell within these criteria, no cases 
were eliminated. 
When dealing with the DIFC search, there was no need to consider arbitration vacatur as a key 
search string. On review, nine cases were eliminated from the 53 cases earlier identified from the Judicial 
Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre search. Elimination was primary where, on 
review, it was found that the case simply restated UAE law. Thus in total, 44 cases from the DIFC search 
were deemed usable for the study. Final cross-checks were made to ensure that there was no cross-over 
in terms of cases reported in either the WestlawGulf search or the DIFC search. From this process, a 
total number of 220 cases formed the core of cases to be utilised in the study consisting of 170 UAE 
federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) cases drawn from the WestlawGulf search and 50 drawn from the 
DIFC search dealing with the parallel courts. In effect, the Judicial Authority of the Dubai International 
Financial Centre.  
                                                 
840 Article 203(4) states that Arbitration shall not be permissible in matters, which are not capable of being reconciled…”. 
841 Article 235 (2) (e) states that “It does not conflict or contradict with a judgment or order previously passed by another 




6.6.4 Systematic analysis of the selected cases 
Of the 220 cases that formed the core of cases to be utilised in the study (consisting of 170 cases drawn 
from the WestlawGulf  and 50 cases drawn from the DIFC search), in terms of the federal courts (‘Courts 
of the UAE’) cases drawn from the WestlawGulf  search, the earliest case had been decided in 1992 
while the latest case had been decided in 2018. This is a timespan of approximately twenty-six years 
and, arguably, serves as an opportunity to better understand a broad perspective of the interplay between 
Public policy (and/or public order) on one hand and arbitration vacatur on the other. The selected cases 
had been heard in the following courts: (i) Union Supreme Court, (ii) Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation (iii) 
Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance (iv) Abu Dhabi Commercial Court and the (v) Dubai Court of 
Cassation (vi) Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Court of Appeal (vii) 
Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Court of First Instance and (viii) 
Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Joint Judicial Committee of Dubai 
Courts and DIFC Courts. In total, for both WestlawGulf  and DIFC search, a breakdown of the number 
of cases heard in each of the courts is shown in Table 5, below.  
 
Table 5: Breakdown of cases heard per Court (from the WestlawGulf and DIFC 
search) 
Court Number of cases 
Union Supreme Court 51 
Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 48 
Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance 1 
Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation 1 
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Dubai Court of Cassation 69 
Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Court of 
Appeal 
12 
Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Court of First 
Instance 
33 
Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Joint Judicial 




Systematic analysis of the selected cases involved the identification and recording of similar and 
comparative features of each selected case via a system of coding. Coding according to Hall and 
Wright842 will involve creation of a coding scheme which ultimately ensures that the analysis is more 
objective. This implied content analysis of translated case reports to highlight frequently occurring and 
therefore easily distinguishable lexicon (vocabulary) on Public policy (and/or public order) and 
arbitration vacatur. Although it would have been arguably more beneficial to examine individual words 
within the context of their individual use, content analysis of translated case reports proceeded on the 
basis of an examination of the individual words utilised in the case judgements. By adopting this 
approach, the potential of dealing with a wide variety of word combinations that would have been 
analytically unmanageable was avoided. Furthermore, attempting to code word combinations would 
have required the researcher to introduce a priori judgements on the nature of appropriate combinations. 
In effect, this would have introduced bias into the analysis. The case judgements obviously contained 
many different words. For this reason, analysis proceeded as follows. First, reference was made to the 
pre-determined case labels (which are referred to herein as first-order codes) utilised to classify each 
case. Second, to facilitate a tractable analysis of text, efforts were made to identify words that were 
                                                 
842 Hall, M. and Wright, R. 2008. Systematic content analysis of judicial opinions. California Law Review, 96 (1), 63-122. 
210 
 
sufficient to form a distinguishing lexicon. Earlier, when faced with the challenge of facilitating a 
tractable analysis of text, Nag et al. 843 had chosen to exclude all words that appeared less than ten times 
from their textual database, their reason being that the use of such words was too limited to be deemed 
as constituent of any distinguishing lexicon. In this study, words that were not regularly repeated844 in 
the pre-determined case labels were excluded as deemed not to represent any distinctive lexicon. Third, 
a lexicographic analysis of each of the cases was then undertaken from which ‘distinctive vocabulary’ 
consisting of thirty words deemed associated with the scope of the Public policy (and/or public order) 
exception in arbitration vacatur were identified (shown in Table 6).  
Table 6: Frequently appearing words/phrases in the selected cases 
‘Invalid’ ‘Defect’ ‘Wrong’ 
‘Null’ ‘Misapplication’ ‘Void’ 
‘Cancel’ ‘Error’ ‘Jurisdiction’ 
‘Limit’ ‘Exceed scope’ ‘Authority’ 
‘Prejudice’ ‘Objection’ ‘Vacate’ 
‘Scope’ ‘Flawed’ ‘Challenge’ 
‘Appeal’ ‘Public harmony’ ‘Unacceptable’ 
‘Public policy’ ‘Public peace’ ‘Impermissibility’ 
‘Public order’ ‘Acceptable’ ‘Violation’ 
‘Stay’ ‘Inadmissible’ ‘Setting aside’ 
 
The final stage of coding involved the consolidation of the different variations of the most frequently 
appearing words in the selected cases. Via a system of consolidation of the different variations of the 
                                                 
843 Nag, R., Hambrick, D. and Chen, M. 2007. What is strategic management, really? Inductive derivation of a consensus 
definition of the field. Strategic Management Journal, 28(9), 935-955. 
844 After careful consideration, a decision was made not to ‘count’ words that were in the pre-determined case labels. There 
were a number of reasons for this decision, one being that it was recognised that the pre-determined case labels still 
represented translated labels from Arabic to English. Furthermore, there was no evidence of ‘standard’ case labels being used. 
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frequently appearing words in the selected cases shown in Table 6, nine parent codes (themes) were 
developed, as shown in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Parent codes (themes) 
‘Abuse of court process’ ‘Appointment of arbitrators’ ‘Arbitrators award’ 
‘Arbitration procedure’ ‘Determining the subject matter of 
the arbitration’ 
‘Effects and limits of agency’ 
‘Jurisdiction of court’ ‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ ‘The arbitration contract’ 
 
 
6.6.5 Drawing meaning from the coding (via analysis)  
In total, data on 220 cases consisting of 170 UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) cases drawn from 
the WestlawGulf  search  and 50 drawn from the DIFC search dealing with the parallel courts of the 
Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre were collected (as shown in Table 5). 
The UAE federal courts (‘Courts of the UAE’) cases were drawn from the (i) Union Supreme Court, (ii) 
Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation (iii) Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance (iv) Abu Dhabi Commercial Court 
and the (v) Dubai Court of Cassation. The parallel court cases from the Judicial Authority of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre were drawn from the (v) Dubai Court of Cassation (vi) Judicial Authority 
of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Court of Appeal (vii) Judicial Authority of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre: Court of First Instance and (viii) Judicial Authority of the Dubai 
International Financial Centre: Joint Judicial Committee of Dubai Courts and DIFC Courts (together 
these eight courts became our ‘First-order Court Category’).  
 As earlier discussed, the UAE constitution allows for individual emirates to derogate from 
specific constitutional and legislative provisions. More specifically, Article 116 of the UAE Federal 
Constitution allows for individual emirates to exercise a power that has not been assigned to the UAE 
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federation through constitutional provisions. Similarly, Article 122 of the UAE Federal Constitution 
provides that individual emirates retain full jurisdiction on all matters that have not been assigned to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of UAE the federation.  
With the above in mind, data analysis commenced with a combination of cases law from the 
different courts for validity. Thus, on the argument that Article 101 of the UAE Federal Constitution 
emphasizes that rulings of the Union Supreme Court are final and binding upon all, irrespective of our 
understanding that decisions reached by the Courts of Cassation in the emirates of Dubai and Ras al 
Khaimah are final and not subject to appeal to the Union Supreme Court sitting in Abu Dhabi, we kept 
‘Union Supreme Court’ as a separate ‘Second-order Court Category’(see Figure 1). Also, cognizance of 
UAE’s constitutional arrangement which allows each emirate to maintain its own local courts, all cases 
emanating from the (i) Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation, (ii) the Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance and 
the (iii) Abu Dhabi Commercial Court were categorized as ‘Abu Dhabi Courts’. Conversely, all cases 
emanating from the Dubai Court of Cassation were categorized as ‘Dubai Courts’. Cases from the 
parallel courts operating in Dubai, that is the (i) Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial 
Centre: Court of Appeal, (ii) Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Court of 
First Instance and the (iii) Judicial Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Joint Judicial 




Figure 1: Court categories
 
 
Table 8 (below) shows the distribution of cases among the four categories of court mapped against the 
‘Second-order Court Category’. Of the 220 cases, a slight majority, comprising 128 (representing 58%), 
of prior arbitration awards had been nullified (‘Null, void and cancelled awards’) by the courts; whereas 
92 (representing 42%) had not. The data suggests a pattern whereby both the ‘Abu Dhabi Courts’ and 
the ‘Union Supreme Court’ show a strong tendency to nullify (‘Null, void and cancelled awards’) prior 
arbitration awards. In contrast, both the ‘Dubai Courts’ and the‘DIFC Courts’ appear to be less likely to 
nullify (‘Null, void and cancelled awards’) prior arbitration awards. Notably, the ‘Abu Dhabi Courts’ 
show a strong tendency to nullify (‘Null, void and cancelled awards’) prior arbitration awards, having 
nullified 42 (84%) out of 50 cases. Most judicial decisions to nullify (‘Null, void and cancelled awards’), 
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Table 8: Cross-tabulation of court decision and effect of ‘Public policy (and/or public 
order)’ by court category 
Court Category Null, void and 
cancelled 
awards 
Public policy (and/or 
public order) 
Totals 
No Yes No Yes 
 
‘Abu Dhabi Courts’ 8 42 27 23 50 
‘Dubai Courts’ 32 37 47 22 69 
‘DIFC Courts’ 36 14 35 15 50 
‘Union Supreme Court’ 16 35 34 17 51 
Total 92 128 143 77 220 
 
 
Table 9 shows a cross tabulation of the ‘Second-order Court Category’ codes derived from the content 
analysis versus by court decision, i.e. to nullify (‘Null, void and cancelled awards’) or not. The data 
shows a wide variance of incidence of ‘Second-order Court Category’ codes. The code ‘Jurisdiction of 
court’ was present in most cases (80%), as was ‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ (63%). On the other 
hand, very few decisions contained the codes ‘Appointment of arbitrators’ (10%) and ‘Effects and limits 
of agency’ (13%). What this means is that ‘Jurisdiction of court’ was a major consideration in arbitration 
vacatur applications before the UAE Courts.  
 
Table 9: Incidence of ‘Second-order Court Category’ codes in court decisions 
 
Present Absent % Incidence 
‘Abuse of court process’ 37 183 17% 
‘Appointment of arbitrators’ 21 199 10% 
‘Arbitrators award’ 102 118 46% 
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‘Arbitration procedure’ 101 119 46% 
‘Determining the subject matter of the arbitration’ 68 152 31% 
‘Effects and limits of agency’  28 192 13% 
‘Jurisdiction of court’ 175 45 80% 
‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ 138 82 63% 
‘The arbitration contract’ 59 161 27% 
 
In our quest to explore the impact of the ‘Public policy (and/or public order)’exception on the question 
of nullifying (‘Null, void and cancelled awards’) prior arbitration awards by the various ‘UAE Courts’, 
we employed Logistic regression845. Logistic regression is generally a mathematical model that is 
utilized to articulate the relationship between several independent variables (X) to a dichotomous 
dependent variable (D). A series of logistic regression models was conducted with the general form of 





] = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽j𝑥𝑖j
𝑗
𝑗=1 + 𝑒𝑖         (1) 
 
Where: 
i is a case; 
yi is a binary variable representing court’s decision to nullify or not nullify the case;  
xj are the explanatory variables, which may help us predict the court’s decision; and  
ei is an error term. 
 
Effect of Court Category: The first logistic model examined the effect of the court category on the 
decision to nullify (‘Null, void and cancelled awards’) prior arbitration awards. The model was a good 
                                                 
845 Kleinbaum, D., Dietz, K., Gail, M., Klein, M. and Klein, M., 2002. Logistic regression. New York: Springer-Verlag; 
Peng, C., Lee, K. and Ingersoll, G. 2002. An introduction to logistic regression analysis and reporting. Journal of 
Educational Research, 96(1), 3-14 
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fit for the data [Wald Likelihood Ratio Chi-square = 30.96 (DF =  3), p-value < 0.0001; Pseudo R-square 
value (Nagelkerke) = 0.15; Max-rescaled R-Square = 0.21]. 
Table 10 shows the estimated effects of the different court categories. The reference category of 
the predictor being the ‘Union Supreme Court’. The results suggest no significant difference in the 
decisions made by ‘Dubai Courts’ in comparison to the ‘Union Supreme Court’. On the other hand, 
decisions made by both the ‘Abu Dhabi Courts’ and the ‘DIFC Courts’ differed significantly from the 
‘Union Supreme Court’. The ‘Abu Dhabi Courts’ were significantly more likely to nullify (‘Null, void 
and cancelled awards’) prior arbitration awards than the ‘Union Supreme Court’. By contrast, the ‘DIFC 
Courts’ was significantly less likely to nullify (‘Null, void and cancelled awards’) prior arbitration 
awards than the ‘Union Supreme Court’. 
 
Table 10: Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Court Categories 
Parameter   DF Estimate Standard Wald Pr > ChiSq 
Error Chi-Square 
Intercept   1 0.4104 0.1576 6.7817 0.0092 
Court 
Category 
Abu Dhabi Courts 1 1.2477 0.315 15.6878 <.0001 
Court 
Category 
Dubai Courts 1 -0.2652 0.2323 1.3032 0.2536 
Court 
Category 
DIFC Courts 1 -1.3549 0.2728 24.6599 <.0001 
 
 
Differential Effects of Predictors across different court categories: Next, the extent decisions made by 
each court can be attributed to a different reason, taking each predictor individually was undertaken. 
Table 11 shows the results of the effects of individual predictors within each court. The figures shown 
are Wald Chi-square Values (DF = 1). The results indicate that none of the predictors was able to 
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significantly predict vacatur decision of both the Abu Dhabi Courts or the DIFC Courts. In contrast, 
‘Public policy (and/or public order)’, ‘Arbitrators award’ and ‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ were 
predictive of the decision of both the Dubai Courts and the ‘Union Supreme Court’. Additionally, 
‘Jurisdiction of court’ was predictive of the ‘Union Supreme Court’ decision. Using the Chi-square value 
as a measure of individual variables’ predictive value, then ‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ appears 
to be the most valuable individual predictor. 
 











‘Public policy (and/or public order)’ 1.6 12.8** 0.0 5.4* 
‘Abuse of court process’ 3.1 0.0 0.6 0.6 
‘Appointment of arbitrators’ 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 
‘Arbitrators award’ 0.1 4.8* 2.5 4.0* 
‘Arbitration procedure’ 1.6 2.0 1.0 0.0 
‘Determining the subject matter of the arbitration’ 0.7 1.8 0.0 0.2 
‘Effects and limits of agency’  0.0 1.5 0.0 0.6 
‘Jurisdiction of court’ 0.2 0.4 0.0 4.9* 
‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ 0.0 23.6** 0.0 16.8** 
‘The arbitration contract’ 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 
* p-value < 0.05 
** p-value < 0.01 
 
Finally, multiple logistic regression models to estimate the joint effects of the predictors on the decision 
made by each court was conducted. Each model was conducted under the stepwise criterion (entry p-
value = 0.1 and stay p-value = 0.05). In each case, the predictors that we had found to be significantly 
predictive as shown in Table 11 were specified as candidate variables. Multiple logistics regression 
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models for the ‘Abu Dhabi Courts’ or the ’DIFC Courts’ were not undertaken since none of the 
predictors were individually, significantly predictive. 
The multiple logistic regression model for the ‘Dubai Courts’ was a good fit for the data [Wald 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square = 20.56 (DF = 2), p-value < 0.0001; Pseudo R-square value (Nagelkerke) 
= 0.46; Max-rescaled R-Square = 0.62]. Table 12 shows the estimated parameters.  Both ‘Public policy 
(and/or public order)’ and ‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ were retained in the final model as 
significant predictors. The estimated coefficient suggests the presence of ‘Null, void and cancelled 
awards’ in the decision increases the probability of the case being nullified. Similarly, the presence of 
‘Public policy (and/or public order)’ increases the probability of the case being nullified. The effect of 
‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ is stronger than that of ‘Public policy (and/or public order)’. 
 
Table 12: Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Dubai Courts 




1 0.6568 0.4611 2.029 0.1543 
‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ Absent 1 -1.5217 0.3703 16.8846 <.0001 
‘Public policy (and/or public order)’ No 1 -1.3761 0.4764 8.3423 0.0039 
 
The multiple logistic regression model for the ‘Union Supreme Court’ was the best fit for the data [Wald 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-square = 16.14 (DF = 2), p-value < 0.0001; Pseudo R-square value (Nagelkerke) 
= 0.54; Max-rescaled R-Square = 0.76]. Table 13 shows the parameter estimates from the multiple 
logistic regression model of the ‘Union Supreme Court’. As with the ‘Dubai Courts’, both ‘Public policy 
(and/or public order)’ and ‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ were retained in the final model as 
significant predictors.  
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Table 13: Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Dubai Courts 





1 1.8282 0.7665 5.6893 0.0171 
‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ Absent 1 -2.431 0.6269 15.0396 0.0001 
‘Public policy (and/or public order)’ No 1 -1.3719 0.6948 3.8994 0.0483 
 
The estimated coefficient suggests the presence of ‘Null, void and cancelled awards’ in the decision 
increases the probability of the case being nullified, as does the presence of ‘Public policy (and/or public 















CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Premise 
An essential element of arbitration as a form of private form of dispute resolution is the freedom to 
contract. The associated objective autonomy between disputants enables them to resolve and settle 
disputes in a manner of their choosing. In most cases (apart from court-mandated procedures), parties 
engaged in arbitration are generally agreeing to exclude the court from adjudicating on the dispute. 
Freedom to contract and objective autonomy, however, do not restrict the State’s unimpeachable right 
to restrict such freedoms and autonomy for a number of reasons including on the grounds that the nature 
of such a private contract may be contrary to Public policy (and/or public order). Public policy (and/or 
public order) exceptions may arise before, during or after the arbitration proceedings. For example, such 
exceptions may be raised at the onset of proceedings or in countries operating under the double exequatur 
principle (such as the UAE), at the point a party is seeking a confirmatory/ ratification order/judgement 
from the courts to enforce an award. 
Understanding the extent of UAE Public policy (and/or public order) considerations following 
the Dubai Court of Cassation decision to nullify a £20 million arbitration award initially made to 
International Bechtel Co. Ltd in its Judgement 503 of 2003846 has served as a major driver for this thesis. 
To achieve this aim, three research questions augmented by associated objectives were presented.  
 
7.2 Addressing the research questions 
The first research question asked; What is the purpose of the Public policy (and/or public order) 
exception in the UAE? Its associated objective was to understand the purpose of the Public policy (and/or 
public order) exception. This exception suggests that the courts are prohibited from the enforcement of 
any private or public contract that violates Public policy (and/or public order). To achieve this objective, 
                                                 




specific literature was reviewed which pointed to ‘Public policy’ as a concept generally accepted as 
vague and ‘unruly’. Conversely, the literature also articulated subtle conceptual differences between 
‘Public policy’ and ‘Public order’. We also found the existence of different forms, types and perspectives 
of ‘Public policy’. In light of these, we found that the purpose of ‘Public policy’ and, by implication, 
‘Public order’ was to provide legitimacy to institutions to enact coercive power.  
The second research question asked; What is the scope of this exception as applied by the 'Courts 
of the UAE'?. Its associated objective was to understand the extent of the exception as applied by the 
‘Courts of the UAE’. Of particular relevance was a need to take into consideration (i) parallel legal 
systems operating within the UAE at both emirate level and within specific emirates, and (ii) the 
evolving relationship between the different courts in the UAE: in effect, the relationship between the 
‘Courts of the UAE’ on one side and the ‘free zone’ courts which, by virtue of their enabling acts and 
provisions (such as UAE Federal Law No.8 of 2004 in the case of the DIFC), are arguably as restated in 
(1) Fiske (2) Firmin v Firuzeh847, ‘UAE courts’. The author found evidence from the literature that Public 
policy (and/or public order) exceptions existed in three forms in the UAE. First, there were restrictions 
in terms of what disputes were in fact arbitrable. Included in this list were all matters relating to the 
distribution of wealth. Second, there were restrictions in terms of acceptable proceedings of arbitration 
hearings. Included in this list were matters relating to fair hearing and the right to be heard. Third, there 
were restrictions on the types of arbitration awards that could be enforced. Exploration of the scope of 
the Public policy (and/or public order)exception as applied by the ‘UAE Courts’ (which were construed 
as referring to the entire range of judicial systems that exist in the UAE, inclusive of the ‘free zone’ 
courts) suggested that each court generally interpreted its provisions to encompass a particularly wide 
meaning. The findings furthermore suggest that while the identification of matters that are arbitrable (in 
effect, capable of settlement via arbitration)_may not necessarily be controversial, they remain complex 
                                                 




to articulate. For one, it has the ability to not only limit the validity of any arbitration contract, but also 
remove from an arbitrator or arbitral institution their ability to hear matters or enforce awards. The third 
(and final) research question asked; How does the existence of different parallel courts within the ‘UAE 
Courts system impact on how the Public policy (and/or public order) exception is construed and how is 
its impact on the finality, conclusive and binding nature of arbitration? Noting that the key underlying 
principles of arbitration was in its finality, conclusive and binding nature, addressing this research 
question involved undertaking a case content analysis (judicial opinion coding) of UAE arbitration case 
law within the prevailing framework of UAE arbitration law. A total of 220 case reports pre-translated 
from Arabic ( اللغة العربية) into English were collected from a the WestlawGulf  and DIFC search. These 
were then examined, coded and analysed.  
The outcome from the data analysis suggested that courts sitting in the emirate of Abu Dhabi 
(inclusive of the Union Supreme Court which sits in Abu Dhabi) were more willing to nullify (‘Null, 
void and cancelled awards’) prior arbitration awards than courts sitting in the emirate of Dubai (which 
included the Dubai Courts and the DIFC Courts). However, there were also differences in terms of a 
willingness to nullify arbitration awards between the Abu Dhabi Courts and the Union Supreme Court 
itself with the Abu Dhabi Courts significantly more likely to nullify prior arbitration awards than the 
Union Supreme Court. These finding resonates with pronounced attitudes of the Abu Dhabi Courts. 
Noting a UAE perspective that Public policy (and/or public order) was concerned with matters which 
could impact upon foundations of the society (Kanakri and Massey, 2016848), the Abu Dhabi Court of 
Cassation Judgment 118 of 2014, for example had stated that 
 
“…litigants have the right to resort to the regular courts regarding the disputes relating to the 
performance of the temporal and precautionary procedures or the summary matters”. 
                                                 
848 Kanakri, C., and Massey, A. 2016. Comparison of UAE and DIFC-seated arbitrations. Global Arbitration News. 




Second, we note that the decisions of the Union Supreme Court are binding on matters where there is no 
derogation on all UAE Courts including the courts of the emirates of both Dubai and Ras al Khaimah 
who are not members of the UAE federal court system.  
The study found that courts within the emirate of Dubai consisting of the ‘Dubai Courts’ and 
the‘DIFC Courts’ appeared less likely to nullify  prior arbitration awards (when compared to the Abu 
Dhabi courts), no significant differences were found to exist in terms of nullification of such awards 
based on different construction of Public order (as construed by the Dubai Courts) and Public policy (as 
construed by the DIFC Courts). In effect, this study was unable to ascertain whether the subtle 
differences between of Public order and Public policy had any impact on the decision to nullify an 
arbitration award.  
The study however found that the major consideration across the various vacatur decisions of 
the ‘UAE Courts’ appeared was ‘Jurisdiction of court’. This is a particularly interesting finding and 
confirms that the UAE Courts will jealously guard broad interpretation of this jurisdiction. What 
however requires investigation in further studies is the implications for the Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
doctrine. Article 3 of the new Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration now appears to recognise this 
principle (although retaining specific jurisdiction of matters relating to natural or juristic persons who 
are domicile or who live in the UAE). Thus, one implication of our finding is that for the new UAE 
federal law on arbitration to fully empower provisions set out in Article 3 (which deals with jurisdiction), 
the UAE Courts may need to make rulings which pre-empt disputants from seeking to limit the capability 
of arbitrators to exercise such powers which now have legislative support. To summate, it is clear from 
its regular appearance in vacatur applications, that matters of exclusive jurisdiction of the court requires 
the attention of those who either conduct business in the UAE or those who may choose the UAE as a 
seat of arbitration.  
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Our understanding of the literature suggests that the determination of matters deemed arbitrable 
if construed from a Public policy (and/or public order) perspective are within the sole preview of the 
State. Evidence from the study suggests that unlike what is experienced most European jurisdictions 849, 
in the UAE, the use of Public policy (and/or public order) as a test for what is arbitrable remains ever 
present and is perhaps one of the most important considerations for potential disputants.  
Thus its regular citation by UAE Courts. In fact, on review of the various UAE case laws, it did 
not appear to suggest that questions of arbitrability (and by implication, matters of exclusive jurisdiction 
of the courts) were discrete matters of contractual attention.  
The study also found that the presence of ‘Public policy (and/or public order)’ discourse in 
arbitration disputes being heard across all ‘UAE Courts’ significantly increased the probability of the 
case being nullified (‘Null, void and cancelled awards’). This finding supports the view that ‘Public 
policy (and/or public order)’ remains a sensitive matter in the UAE. Again, as in the case of International 
Bechtel Co. Ltd v Department of Civil Aviation of the Government of Dubai, those who conduct 
businesses in the UAE or who may seek to choose the UAE as the seat of their arbitration must be very 
clear that the UAE Courts will not tolerate even the slightest infringement of ‘Public policy (and/or 
public order)’. We will comment on this during our final reflection. 
More generally speaking, the research findings  suggests first, considerable disparities between 
the different parallel courts that formed the ‘UAE Courts’ in terms of arbitration vacatur. Generally, the 
courts sitting in the emirate of Abu Dhabi, that is the (i) Union Supreme Court, (ii) Abu Dhabi Court of 
Cassation (iii) Abu Dhabi Court of First Instance and the (iv) Abu Dhabi Commercial Court appeared 
more likely to nullify prior arbitration awards than courts sitting in emirate of Dubai which includes the 
Dubai Court of Cassation and the ‘DIFC Courts’. A possible explanation for these differences can be 
gleaned from prior studies. Angell and Feulner850 had observed major disparities in terms of how disputes 
                                                 
849 Mante, J., 2016. Arbitrability and public policy: an African perspective. Arbitration International, 33(2), 275-294. 
850 Angell, N. and Feulner, G. 1988. Arbitration of Disputes in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 3 (1), 19-32. 
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were arbitrated in the emirates of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah.  For example, in their study, it appeared 
that courts sitting in the emirate of Abu Dhabi were more willing to seek to regulate how arbitration 
proceedings were conducted while court sitting in the emirate of Dubai appeared more willing to refuse 
to interfere with arbitration proceedings where there is a valid arbitration contract. They had also found 
that in similar circumstances within the emirate of Sharjah, the courts will stay, but not dismiss such 
applications. One possible reason could be historical.  Al-Muhairi851 for example had pointed to the 
emirate of Dubai drawing upon more secular mechanisms during the establishment and organisation of 
its courts. It is possible that such secularism has encouraged the Dubai courts to be less willing to 
interfere with arbitration proceedings and awards. Expanded to the entire country, drawing from the 
literature, it is safe to suggest that of the other emirates of Fujairah, Ajman, Ras al Khaimah and Umm 
al Quwain, the emirate of Ras al Khaimah is likely to be placed at the same spectrum of doctrinal 
interpretation of finality, conclusive and binding nature of arbitration. Thus, Luttrell852 specifically 
suggesting that entities that conduct business in the UAE may be best advised to undertake their 
commercial activities in either the emirate of Dubai or the emirate of Ras al Khaimah. Similarly, our 
study findings suggests that entities that conduct business in the UAE or parties seeking to utilise the 
UAE as the seat of their arbitration are best to specify the seat of arbitration as the emirate of Dubai (and 
by implication, also the emirate of Ras al Khaimah). However, this is only on the condition that their 
legal strategy fully accepts (and/ or desires) the need for finality, conclusive and the binding nature of 
arbitration. Conversely, entities that conduct business in the UAE or parties seeking to utilise the UAE 
as the seat of their arbitration are best to specify the seat of arbitration as the emirate of Abu Dhabi (and 
by implication, also the emirate of Fujairah, Ajman, and Umm al Quwain). However, this is only on the 
condition that their legal strategy does not accept (and/ or desire) the need for finality, conclusive and 
the binding nature of arbitration. In effect, this relates to a legal strategy, which may desire never-ending 
                                                 
851 Al-Muhairi, B. 1996a. The Development of the UAE Legal System and Unification with the Judicial System. Arab Law 
Quarterly, 11 (2), 116-160. 
852 Luttrell, S. 2009a. The Changing Lex Arbitri of the UAE. Arab Law Quarterly, 23 (2), 139-166 
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litigation. The implications of the findings of our study when considered in light of earlier studies by 
Angell and Feulner853 is that when the legal strategy may entail a ‘wait and see’, then it may be best to 
specify the seat of arbitration as the emirate of Sharjah.   
The finding that the presence of Public policy (and/or public order) discourse in arbitration 
disputes being heard across all ‘UAE Courts’ significantly increased the probability of an arbitration 
award being nullified is partially surprising. Here, that the courts will intervene when Public policy 
(and/or public order) is raised is inevitable as the country is a 'double exequatur jurisdiction. The broad 
based conceptualisation of Public policy (and/or public order) in the country’s constitutional and 
legislative provisions and legal principles suggests that the UAE Courts are quite willing to intervene 
when such matters are raised. However, what is perhaps surprising from our findings is the significant 
increase in the probability arbitration awards being nullified on the grounds of the  Public policy (and/or 
public order). This suggests perhaps a conservative judiciary. 
The findings from this study have a number of theoretical and practical implications which will 
now be discussed. 
 
7.3 Theoretical implications 
Earlier cited literature had emphasised that empirical research was more likely to support the 
development of any understanding of law (and by extension – arbitration) as a social phenomenon. In 
investigating arbitration vacatur in the UAE and then utilising judicial case content analysis to seek to 
understand how the scope of this exception may be minimised, the thesis responded to various calls for 
a need to move away from legal research dominated by anecdotal and doctrinal work and, in effect, from 
propositions which were not validated to empirical legal research. While deciding on our research 
approach, the author was very, however, very mindful that the study will face major challenges relating 
                                                 
853 Angell, N. and Feulner, G. 1988. Arbitration of Disputes in the United Arab Emirates. Arab Law Quarterly, 3 (1), 19-32. 
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to validity854 and reliability 855. Webley856 however, acknowledges that these terminologies, that is both 
validity and reliability both have their roots in the interpretivist and positivist data concepts. Thus, it may 
be difficult to apply these interpretations to qualitative research which is more focused on developing 
richer understanding of social relationships.  
By finding that there are differences in terms of judicial opinions emanating from the 
interpretation of Public policy (and/or public order) across the various UAE Courts, this study was able 
to identify the precise scope of the public policy exception as construed by UAE Courts. Overall, the 
findings demonstrate not only the already acknowledged vague of what precisely is construed as Public 
policy (and/or public order) in the UAE but, more precisely, the complex nature of interrelating factors 
that UAE Courts have to take into account in their articulation of the manifestations of Public policy 
(and/or public order) exceptions.  
Arguably, this study is the first that has investigated arbitration vacatur in the UAE utilising 
judicial case content analysis. In terms of theoretical implications, firstly, the thesis not only re-opens an 
existing area of scholarly and practitioner interest in arbitration vacatur in the UAE, but also opens a 
new area of debate by specifically seeking to understand how UAE courts have constructed their 
interpretation of statute and legislation as relates to Public policy (and/or public order). Furthermore, 
the study draws on two theories – (i) contract theory and  (ii) social contract theory to serve as the 
practical lens for exploring how Public policy (and/or public order)may serve as a ground for 
challenging domestic arbitral awards. Drawing from Bacharach857, it had been posited that the sum of 
these theories represented a means of organising the complexities associated with the range of 
                                                 
854 Defined as the extent to which unambiguous consideration of a phenomenon has been captured – see Webley, L. 2010. 
Qualitative approaches to empirical legal research. In Cane, P and Kritzer, H. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical 
Legal Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 926-950. 
855 Defined as the extent to which the same data will be produced by different researchers using the same measure 
instrument or procedures – see Kirk, J. and Miller, M. 1986. Reliability and validity in qualitative research. Beverly Hills, 
Ca.: Sage Publications. 
856 Webley, L. 2010. Qualitative approaches to empirical legal research. In Cane, P and Kritzer, H. (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 926-950. 




interwoven propositions that were empirically testable in order to explain observed phenomena under 
exploration. Noting that the study had adopted the ‘Law and Society’ philosophy858, it then became 
imperative that the study was to be undertaken in a manner consistent with social research, as an 
empirical endeavour. At the core of this philosophy is the idea that the legitimacy of any law is largely 
determined not by the authority of the state, but by the relevancy of laws to the society within which it 
is set to operate. This form of study according to Schuck859 involves “the uncovering of facts about how 
individuals and institutions within our legal culture actually behave” (p. 323).  
 
7.4 Practical implications 
The wide interpretation of precisely what Public policy (and/or public order) means and its numerous 
elements creates a considerable lack of clarity and uncertainty over how it is interpreted, and what 
opportunities do exist for minimising its scope. This suggests that the UAE Courts and other policy 
makers should ideally seek to improve understanding of this exception. One possible approach may 
involve direct engagement with the arbitration and legal professions. Here, the stated aim should be to, 
at the very least, try to articulate a clearer set of principles on Public policy (and/or public order) beyond 
mere re-statements of the law. It is unlikely that more legislation will resolve the intractable nature of 
public policy. The law even when strictly adhered to is unlikely to encourage individuals and parties 
who have differing and constant shifting interests, to behave in different ways860. Furthermore, laws 
(legislation) are usually drawn in a very narrow and precise manner that are unlikely to accommodate 
the heterogeneity of public policy. 
 
                                                 
858 Ehrlich, E. and Ziegert, K. 2017. Fundamental principles of the sociology of law. Routledge. 
859 Schuck, P. 1989. Why don't law professors do more empirical research. Journal of Legal Education, 39, 323-336. 




7.5 Limitations and future studies 
As expected, this study was not without limitations. However, these limitations do serve as the platform 
for future studies. The first limitation of this study is that the case laws analysed were based on cases 
decided on the ‘old’ UAE Arbitration law as  articulated within  Articles 203 to 218, Articles 235 to 238 
and Articles 239 to 243 of Federal Law (11) of 1992, the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). However, as the 
UAE promulgated a new standalone arbitration law, Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration, as 
recently as 3 May 2018, which then appeared in the official gazette in June 2018 taking effect in July 
2018, none of the case laws analysed is based on statutory interpretations of ‘new’ UAE arbitration law. 
Thus, future studies should seek to account for the enactment of the new UAE arbitration law. Doing so 
will create more opportunities to understand and better explain the vacatur phenomenon within UAE 
arbitration jurisprudence. However, as this new law has only recently come into force, there is very little 
discourse in the literature or in fact, court reports that will support optimal engagement within this subject 
in the near future.  
The second limitation of this study emanated from the fact that the UAE does not yet maintain 
any formal case reports; neither do arbitral institutions that operate in the country such as the DIFC and 
the DIAC retain comprehensive information on arbitral awards or in fact, those that have been challenged 
successfully in the courts. For example, although it seems obvious that case reports of the Judicial 
Authority of the Dubai International Financial Centre: Court of Appeal as an appellant arbitration court 
performed this role, no such records were easily retrieved for the DIAC courts. The third limitation is 
that as noted earlier, proceedings of the majority of the cases utilised in this study (all reported from the 
WestlawGulf  search) were carried out and reported in Arabic ( اللغة العربية). Furthermore, noting that the 
WestlawGulf case reports are not official translations of proceedings of the ‘Courts of the UAE’, it is 
possible that contextual meaning could have been lost in the WestlawGulf  translation from Arabic ( اللغة
 into English. The difficulty this situation creates relates to the possibility that the study was (العربية 
undertaken with case reports that may have lost grammatical, idiomatic and syntactical equivalence. 
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Such a scenario is likely to have a considerable impact on the reliability of the study. In order to mitigate 
against this limitation, future studies may, for example first seek original case reports reported in Arabic 
 and then conduct official translations into English prior to analysis. The fourth limitation of (اللغة العربية )
this study emanated from the coding approach. Coding had commenced by firsly making reference to 
the pre-determined case labels (which were designated as first-order codes). However, earlier studies by 
Shapiro 861 warn that the uncritical utilisation of legal databases can negatively impact on the validity of 
the research findings. One cited limitation was that research databases sometimes label and categorise 
cases against a very high level of generality. Within the context of this study, this approach has the 
potential to under-report the considerable amounts of public policy matters that the UAE courts have 
had to address in the various cases862. Furthermore, a major problem with the designated first-order 
codes is that neither the WestlawGulf nor the the DIFC case reports provided a tangible explanation on 
how each keyword (first-order code) was determined. The implication of this is that, in reality, one 
cannot be certain that all the different legal and Public policy (and/or public order) issues arising from 
each case was comprehensively captured. In addition (further accentuated by the lack of precedence in 
UAE jurisprudence), it is difficult to establish precisely the nature of interaction between the different 
reported cases. Arguably, such missing information represents lost opportunities for scholars and 
practitioners who are interested in understanding the operation of UAE jurisprudence as relates to Public 
policy (and/or public order).  
To summate, despite these limitations, the analysis of the cases still affords scholars and 
practitioners the opportunity to engage in detailed and intimate exploration of  the broad manifestation 
of the public policy exception in not only the UAE but also across the Gulf region. One country of 
interest may be the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which not only has recently (in 2016) established a Saudi 
                                                 
861 Shapiro, C. 2008. Coding complexity: Bringing law to the empirical analysis of the Supreme Court. Hastings Law 
Journal, 60 (3), 477-540. 
862 Shapiro, C. 2008. Coding complexity: Bringing law to the empirical analysis of the Supreme Court. Hastings Law 
Journal, 60 (3), 477-540. 
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Centre for Commercial Arbitration (SCCA), but also (June 2017) promulgated implementing regulations 
for its new Arbitration Law. 
 
7.6 Final reflections  
7.6.1 Oaths and public policy 
The Bechtel judgement emphasised that in Dubai, the rendering of oaths were deemed as a matter of 
public policy and therefore, not waivable. The Dubai Court of Cassation further reiterated its position 
that within Dubai, the issuing of warnings to witnesses on their need to be truthful when rendering 
testimony did not amount to oaths. 
However, the public policy dilemma is that arbitration literature is clear that unlike in court 
proceedings where oaths are required prior to any form of evidence of testimony can be admitted as 
evidence863, disputants and witnesses that testify during its proceedings may only be obliged to be under 
oath only if doing so is explicitly requested by other party or if required by national law864. This is 
because arbitration is a quasi-legal dispute resolution mechanism. Hence, the ultimate decision on 
whether evidence during arbitration proceedings should be under oath is the arbitrators’ prerogative865. 
Participants and witnesses actually retain the right not to submit to oath taking although they are still 
under an obligation to render evidence, which is truthful.  
The literature866 perhaps best elaborates the likely emphasis of the Dubai Court of Cassation on 
the significance of oaths in arbitration proceedings. That being UAE’s societal expectations and value 
systems which expect that statements given under oath will be truthful. Oaths are matters neither of 
                                                 
863 Bierce, A. 1977. A Reconsideration of the Sworn Testimony Requirement: Securing Truth in the Twentieth Century. 
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866 Hasan, S. 2007. Islamic Concept of Social Justice: Its Possible Contribution to Ensuring Harmony and Peaceful 
Coexistence in a Globalised World. Macquarie Law Journal, 7, 167-184; Polkinghorne, M. 2008. Enforcement of annulled 
awards in France: the sting in the tail. International Construction Law Review, 25(1), 48-56. 
232 
 
insignificance or superficiality in Arab culture867. In fact, they construed within this cultural space as 
instruments of guarantee and therefore regarded as important legal principles868.  
The solemn nature of oaths implores upon a covenant operating in the public space – and 
therefore to public policy869. Hasan870 posits that the Quran (Islam’s holy book), mandates that an 
adherent to the Islamic faith should not break any given oaths as it inevitably establishes that an 
individual recognises their wider duty to the community. For these reasons, Lee871 notes that in some 
communities, breaking an oath, refusing to subject to oaths or not being subjected to oaths is considered 
to have serious implications in that it can be a threat to the maintenance of public order (public policy). 
Oaths therefore within the sphere of governance mechanisms of public sector project governance may 
be utilised to implement both interactional (interpersonal) and/or procedural focused public policy. For 
example, in terms of its procedural use, societal values expected that only when statements are given 
under oath during should represent decisive evidence (which then has interactional implications). In fact, 
Whitcombe872 had observed that oaths represented the “highest possible security which men in general 
can give for the truth of their statements” (p. 39).  
The engagement of public policy meant that the Dubai courts sought to reiterate legal frameworks 
it felt were necessary to protect UAE values. Evidence of the intractable nature of public policy is that 
in an earlier decision relating to arbitration proceedings, the Abu Dhabi Court of Cassation in Judgment 
433/17 of 1997 ruled that it was not against public policy in the UAE for an arbitrator to depart from 
strict procedural rules regarding witnesses, production of evidence, and documentation. The court ruled 
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that arbitrators were empowered to establish their own processes and procedures pertaining to, for 
example, the production of evidence. Thus, while the Dubai Court of Cassation had cited and extended 
arbitration proceedings to legislative standards of court proceedings as a matter of public policy, this 
was not a view taken and maintained by the Abu Dhabi courts.   
 
7.6.2 A wider perspective 
Examination of the literature on arbitration in the UAE suggests that the country does have the potential 
to become a major arbitration hub. From the literature873, it will appear that they are three factors that 
will determine whether this will happen. These are the robustness of the (i) substantive law which 
includes  predictability and certainty in the law, the disputing party's familiarity with the country’s law 
and jurisprudence, (ii) legal infrastructure which includes the neutrality and impartiality of the judiciary 
and an outward positivity towards arbitration as a whole, and (iii) convenience in terms of location, 
familiarity with language and clear court proceedings. Arguably, disputing parties choose the seat of 
arbitration because of the need for certainty, effectiveness and neutrality during the arbitration process. 
In addition, disputants generally want to see their disputes resolved under laws which are stable and 
predicable, that will fairly and justly consider the merits of their claims and, on the conclusion of 
proceedings, enforce the arbitral award with minimum effort. Thus, the prevailing legal regime and the 
state of arbitration jurisprudence can determine the effectiveness of arbitration proceedings. The author 
contends that these factors also apply to domestic arbitration awards. Parties to arbitration proceedings 
conducted in countries which exhibit these desired characteristics are more likely to have confidence in 
the arbitration proceeding and associated matters. They are thus less likely to seek the challenge and 
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vacate such awards and less likely to see other means of addressing their grievances outside the court 
systems where the domestic proceedings were undertaken.   
It is thus inevitable that, for the country to support its policy of economic diversification, there 
is a need to support commercial activities with appropriate, viable and up-to-date means of dispute 
resolution. Arbitration represents one such dispute resolution mechanism.  
It is expected that with the further modernisation of the country’s arbitration law following the 
promulgation of the new UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration, the viability of the country as 
an arbitration hub will become more entrenched. At the moment, it will appear that the most preferred 
and popular seats of international commercial arbitration remain Hong Kong, London and Singapore 
and Geneva874. The literature suggests, though, that while there is potential for further development of 
arbitration jurisprudence in the UAE, doubts still exist. The literature alluded to a number of these 
concerns which included, for example, concerns over the role and influence of Islamic Sharia on 
arbitration proceedings. There also appear to be concerns relating to differences between how public 
policy is construed in the UAE and in western countries. Drawing upon the works of Bassiouni and 
Badr875and Kutty876 one wonders whether these differences emanate from an emphasis of Sharia on 
collective rights as against a western view of public policy on individual rights. Yet Kutty’s877 view is 
debateable noting that Kamali878 does opine that Sharia first and foremost actually focuses on the 
individual. 
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There are also concerns in the literature on a wide and subjective interpretation within UAE 
jurisprudence of the notion of Public policy (and/or public order)879. It is this specific concern that has 
remained of interest to this thesis. This concerns require attention as studies have shown that preferences 
for specific seat of arbitration appears to continue to be determined by perceived existence of amongst 
others, formal legal infrastructure and track record of enforceability of arbitral awards880. It is hoped that 
with the promulgation of the new UAE Federal Law No. 6 of 2018 on Arbitration, its clearer and more 
restrained outlook to UAE domestic arbitration will prevail. Certainly, there is nothing wrong with any 
criticism levelled against the current domestic arbitration dispensation in the country; however, as 
Almutawa and Maniruzzaman881 do highlight, irrespective of criticisms levelled against the manner of 
approach towards which arbitration jurisprudence has leaned in the UAE, the country, its judicial 
institutions and jurisprudence are still in their infancy, certainly compared to other developed economies 
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